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Severity
HIGH
CVSS
7.5
Priority
0.282
Executive Summary
Torg Grabber is a newly identified infostealer actively targeting cryptocurrency wallet browser extensions, password managers, and 2FA tools across all major browsers. Delivered via ClickFix, a clipboard-hijacking technique requiring no file download or user-executed exploit, it bypasses Chrome's App-Bound Encryption and has produced 334 unique samples in roughly 60 days, indicating rapid iteration under a likely malware-as-a-service model. Organizations face credential theft risk wherever employees use personal browser profiles or store credentials in browser-based password managers, with particular exposure for any staff holding or transacting cryptocurrency assets.
Technical Analysis
Torg Grabber is an infostealer under active development, with 334 compiled samples observed between December 2025 and February 2026.
Initial access uses ClickFix (MITRE T1204.002, T1566): the technique hijacks clipboard contents to stage and execute a malicious PowerShell command (T1059.001) without requiring a file drop or exploitation of a patched vulnerability; the user pastes and runs the command themselves under social engineering pressure.
Key capabilities include: bypass of Chrome App-Bound Encryption (ABE), a privilege-isolation control introduced by Google to block credential extraction at user privilege level (maps to CWE-693, Protection Mechanism Failure); credential harvesting from cryptocurrency wallet extensions including MetaMask, Phantom, TrustWallet, Coinbase, Binance, Exodus, Ronin, and Keplr (T1555.003); targeting of 103 password managers and 2FA tools including LastPass, 1Password, Bitwarden, KeePass, and Dashlane (T1552.001); session cookie theft (T1539); keylogging (T1056.001); screenshot capture (T1113); system enumeration (T1082); and exfiltration over HTTP/S (T1041, T1071.001).
Persistence mechanisms are present (T1547). Obfuscation and packing techniques are in use (T1027, T1140). DLL injection has been observed (T1055.001). Installed security software is enumerated (T1518.001). Affected platforms span 25+ Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Brave, Edge, Vivaldi, Opera) and 8 Firefox variants. No CVE is assigned; CWEs of note are CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), CWE-522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials), CWE-312 (Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information), and CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure). No patch exists; mitigation is behavioral and architectural.
Action Checklist IR ENRICHED
Triage Priority:
IMMEDIATE
Escalate to external IR firm or law enforcement immediately if any endpoint shows confirmed execution of ClickFix (PowerShell spawned from browser with clipboard API call, or 4104 script block log containing obfuscated credential-stealing payloads), or if any cryptocurrency wallet or password manager credentials are confirmed compromised by monitoring for unauthorized transactions, failed login alerts, or credential reuse on external systems.
Immediate, Block ClickFix delivery vectors: deploy endpoint controls (EDR or DLP) to detect and block clipboard-to-PowerShell execution chains; use Group Policy to restrict clipboard redirection from remote sessions if applicable; educate users on ClickFix social engineering tactics (pasting commands from untrusted sources into Run or PowerShell); deploy or verify endpoint detection and response (EDR) coverage across all endpoints with browser access to cryptocurrency or financial platforms.
Preparation
NIST 800-61r3 §2 (Preparation phase: tools, policies, training)
NIST 800-53 AC-3 (Access Control Policy)
NIST 800-53 SI-4 (Information System Monitoring)
CIS Controls 6.1 (Establish and Enforce Asset Management)
CIS Controls 8.1 (Establish and Enforce Security Configuration Management)
Compensating Control
For teams without EDR: (1) Deploy Windows Defender ATP (free tier) or osquery (open-source, requires manual query tuning). (2) Block PowerShell via Group Policy: set 'Turn on Module Logging' (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging) and 'ScriptBlockLogging' to enabled. (3) Disable clipboard access in Chrome via GPO: set 'Disable Clipboard API' (cloud policy console or group_policy_template.adm). (4) For Firefox: disable dom.events.clipboardevents.enabled in about:config. (5) Create a scheduled task using logman.exe to capture process creation events to a local CSV file hourly.
Preserve Evidence
Before deploying policy: (1) Export current browser policies from Group Policy Editor (gpresult /h report.html for baseline). (2) Capture Windows Event ID 4688 (Process Creation) and Event ID 4104 (PowerShell Script Block Logging) from 30 days prior to establish baseline behavior. (3) Query EDR for all PowerShell spawned from browser processes (chrome.exe, firefox.exe, msedge.exe) in the last 90 days. (4) Screenshot current security configuration: gpsec.msc snap-in, Internet Options for all browser GPOs, and MDM policies if deployed.
Detection, Hunt for ClickFix execution artifacts: query EDR and SIEM for PowerShell processes spawned from browser child processes or user-interactive sessions with no parent executable context (T1059.001 + T1204.002); search for clipboard-read API calls followed by PowerShell invocations within short time windows; review Windows Event ID 4104 (PowerShell script block logging) for encoded or obfuscated commands.
Detection & Analysis
NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 (Detection and Analysis)
NIST 800-53 SI-4 (Information System Monitoring)
NIST 800-53 IR-4 (Incident Handling)
CIS Controls 8.5 (Log All Access and Changes of Administrative Event Data)
CIS Controls 8.11 (Monitor and Alert on Account Login Behavior)
Compensating Control
For teams without SIEM/EDR: (1) Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging via Group Policy (Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Windows PowerShell → Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging). (2) Export Windows Event Log 4688 (Process Creation) and 4104 (Script Block Logging) daily using wevtutil: `wevtutil qe Security /q:*[System[(EventID=4688 or EventID=4104)]] /rd:true /f:csv > powershell_hunts.csv`. (3) Parse for patterns: `findstr /R "chrome.exe\|firefox.exe\|msedge.exe" powershell_hunts.csv | findstr "powershell.exe\|pwsh.exe"`. (4) Search for Base64-encoded strings in 4104 logs using: `Get-EventLog -LogName Security -InstanceId 4104 | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Message | findstr /I "base64\|encode\|-enc\|-e"`. (5) Manually review Prefetch files (C:\Windows\Prefetch) for suspicious execution order using WinPrefetchView (free tool from Nirsoft).
Preserve Evidence
Collect before analysis: (1) Full Windows Security Event Log (minimum 30 days) exported as .evtx format. (2) PowerShell Operational and Analytic logs (C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Windows PowerShell.evtx and Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx). (3) Clipboard history from affected user accounts (use Get-ClipboardHistory if Windows 11, or check %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Clipboard\SourceTitles for File Explorer access). (4) Browser debug logs: Chrome cache/History, Firefox places.sqlite, and Edge WebData databases. (5) Memory dump of any PowerShell process identified in logs (use Volatility or WinDbg to extract command-line arguments and scripts).
Assessment, Inventory credential exposure surface: identify all endpoints where employees access cryptocurrency wallets, browser-based password managers (LastPass, Bitwarden, 1Password, etc.), or 2FA browser extensions; flag environments where personal and corporate browser profiles share credential stores; assess whether Chrome ABE is enabled and whether any endpoint policy downgrades it.
Detection & Analysis
NIST 800-61r3 §3.2.3 (Determine scope of the incident)
NIST 800-53 CA-7 (Continuous Monitoring)
NIST 800-53 IA-4 (Identifier Management)
CIS Controls 2.1 (Establish and Maintain a Software Inventory)
CIS Controls 6.2 (Ensure Authorized Software is Current)
Compensating Control
For teams without SIEM inventory tools: (1) Use GPO reporting: `gpresult /h gpoinventory.html` on each endpoint to enumerate applied policies. (2) Query installed browser extensions via command line: (Chrome) `Get-ChildItem "$env:UserProfile\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Extensions"` for all user profiles. (Firefox) `Get-ChildItem "$env:UserProfile\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\extensions"`. (3) Enumerate password managers: `Get-ItemProperty HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select-Object DisplayName | findstr /I "lastpass bitwarden 1password keepass dashlane nordpass protonpass"`. (4) Check Chrome ABE status: query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Google\Chrome\ChromeVariations\RestrictedDomains and verify presence of encryption-related registry keys. (5) Audit browser profiles: check %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data for non-corporate or mixed profiles.
Preserve Evidence
Collect before assessment: (1) HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE and HKEY_CURRENT_USER registry hives exported from all endpoints (reg save HKLM C:\hive_HKLM & reg save HKCU C:\hive_HKCU). (2) Extension manifests from Chrome/Brave/Edge User Data folders (*.json files in Extensions directories). (3) Browser startup files and preferences (Chrome: Preferences, Local State; Firefox: prefs.js, user.js; Edge: Preferences). (4) Outputs of software inventory tools or manual audits listing all password manager and crypto wallet software. (5) Screenshots or exports of Group Policy Applied settings (gpresult /h) from sample endpoints in each department.
Communication, Notify affected user populations: issue a targeted advisory to finance, treasury, and any staff with cryptocurrency custody responsibilities; include specific ClickFix awareness guidance, describe the technique (a fake CAPTCHA or error page instructs users to paste a command into Run or PowerShell); escalate to incident response if any endpoint shows indicators consistent with execution.
Containment
NIST 800-61r3 §3.3 (Containment, Eradication, and Recovery) — communication component
NIST 800-53 AT-1 (Security Awareness and Training)
NIST 800-53 IR-6 (Incident Reporting)
CIS Controls 12.3 (Address Unauthorized Software)
CIS Controls 17.1 (Map and Inventory All Devices)
Compensating Control
For teams without formal communication infrastructure: (1) Draft advisory in plain language: describe ClickFix as a social engineering attack (fake error or CAPTCHA prompting a code paste into Windows Run dialog or PowerShell). (2) Include visual examples: annotated screenshot showing a phishing page mimicking a CAPTCHA, with red box highlighting 'paste this command' instruction. (3) Distribute via email with clear subject line (All-Hands: Critical Security Advisory - Cryptocurrency Wallet Threats). (4) Post on internal wiki/intranet with instructions to report any suspicious prompts to security-team@company.com. (5) Schedule optional 15-minute webinar for finance/treasury teams with Q&A. (6) Create a simple detection checklist: 'Did you paste a command into PowerShell after visiting a website? Report it immediately.' (7) Provide a secure reporting form (Google Form or internal ticketing system) with fields: time, domain/website, command pasted (if remembered), endpoint name.
Preserve Evidence
Preserve before communication: (1) Copy of all prior advisory templates and distribution lists. (2) Email server logs showing successful delivery to targeted groups. (3) Screenshot or archive of intranet post and any posted graphics. (4) Timestamps and attendance records for any webinar held. (5) A baseline of incoming security reports 7 days prior to assess reporting uptake post-advisory.
Long-term, Reduce browser-based credential risk structurally: migrate organizational credentials from browser-native password managers to enterprise vault solutions with hardware-backed authentication; enforce hardware security keys (FIDO2) for any account protecting cryptocurrency assets or privileged access; evaluate browser isolation or dedicated browser profiles for high-risk financial activity; monitor MITRE ATT&CK T1555.003 and T1539 detections for ongoing campaign evolution.
Recovery
NIST 800-61r3 §3.4 (Post-Incident Activities) and §2.1 (Policy and Planning)
NIST 800-53 IA-2 (Authentication)
NIST 800-53 IA-5 (Authentication Mechanism Management)
NIST 800-53 SC-7 (Boundary Protection)
CIS Controls 5.2 (Use Multi-Factor Authentication for All Administrative Access)
CIS Controls 6.8 (Implement Flag and Remove Suspicious Email Messages)
Compensating Control
For resource-constrained teams: (1) Phase migration: begin with high-risk accounts (treasury, crypto custody, privileged access). Use open-source vaults (Bitwarden self-hosted or KeePass with encrypted cloud sync) as intermediate step before enterprise solution. (2) Hardware keys: procure Yubikey 5 or Titan keys (~$40–60 per unit) for finance/treasury; enforce FIDO2 for single sign-on (SSO) provider as minimum compliance. (3) Browser isolation: implement at pilot scale using Windows Sandbox (native to Windows 10/11 Pro) for financial browsing, or Docker containers (free) for segregated browser sessions. Create a startup script: launch a separate Chrome profile for crypto/financial domains only. (4) Monitoring: set up free alert rules in Splunk Free (if deployed) or use auditd (Linux) to monitor for T1555.003 (credential extraction from password stores) and T1539 (data from cloud storage) by watching for unexpected process access to credential files. (5) Documentation: create a runbook for crypto/treasury staff: 'If you see a CAPTCHA or error page on a financial site, close the tab immediately and contact security. Do not paste code.'
Preserve Evidence
Archive for compliance and future reference: (1) Current credential storage locations and formats (browser password stores, local files, cloud services) documented before migration. (2) Baseline MITRE ATT&CK detections for T1555.003 and T1539 from 90 days prior (set this as floor for monitoring). (3) Records of all hardware security keys distributed (serial numbers, user assignments). (4) Browser isolation/profile test results: screenshots of isolated profile behavior and access logs. (5) Signed approval from finance and security leadership for long-term credential management strategy change. (6) Post-implementation audit: verification that no credentials remain in browser password stores after migration cutoff date.
Recovery Guidance
Post-containment, conduct full credential rotation for any user whose endpoint showed ClickFix indicators: reset all passwords stored in affected password managers, revoke and re-issue hardware security keys, and reset cryptocurrency wallet private keys if hosted in browser extensions. Perform a 30-day post-incident review analyzing all collected forensic artifacts (4104 logs, EDR telemetry, clipboard artifacts) to confirm no secondary infection occurred and to refine detection rules for T1059.001, T1204.002, and T1555.003 for long-term monitoring. Coordinate with finance/treasury to audit all cryptocurrency wallets and financial accounts for unauthorized activity in the 60-day window prior to detection.
Key Forensic Artifacts
Windows Event ID 4688 (Process Creation) and Event ID 4104 (PowerShell Script Block Logging) with parent process chain intact
Windows Prefetch files (C:\Windows\Prefetch\*.pf) for execution timeline of powershell.exe, cmd.exe, and browser executables
Browser cache, cookies, and Local Storage (Chrome: %UserProfile%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data; Firefox: %UserProfile%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles)
Registry HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU (Run dialog history)
Clipboard history (Windows 11: Get-ClipboardHistory; Windows 10: registry HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Clipboard)
Browser extension manifests and background script files from Extensions directories (Chrome: Extensions/*.js, Firefox: addons.sqlite)
Memory dump of any active PowerShell or cmd.exe process for command-line argument recovery and injected script analysis
Detection Guidance
No public IOCs (hashes, IPs, domains) have been confirmed from primary-tier sources for this campaign as of the configuration date; treat any IOC-level data from secondary or unverified sources with caution before blocking production traffic. Behavioral detection is the primary viable approach. Key indicators:
- PowerShell processes launched interactively from Run dialog or terminal without a parent process chain consistent with administrative tooling, especially with encoded commands or web-retrieved payloads (Event ID 4104, 4688);
- browser extension data directories accessed by non-browser processes, watch for reads of %APPDATA%\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Local Extension Settings or equivalent paths by processes other than the browser itself;
- clipboard API access followed immediately by shell execution; EDR platform capabilities vary - consult your EDR vendor documentation for clipboard-to-execution chain detection, or build correlation rules at the SIEM layer using Event ID 4104 (PowerShell script block logging) paired with network connection logs within 60-second windows;
- outbound connections from PowerShell or cmd.exe to non-categorized or newly registered domains (exfiltration via T1071.001);
- DLL injection events targeting browser processes (T1055.001);
- enumeration of installed applications consistent with security software discovery (T1518.001). If SIEM ingests endpoint telemetry, build a correlation rule: PowerShell script block log
- with base64-encoded content AND a network connection event within 60 seconds, flagged for analyst review. Source attribution: BleepingComputer and community forums (secondary-tier sources, recommend verification with primary threat intelligence before tuning production detection rules).
Indicators of Compromise (1)
| Type | Value | Context | Confidence |
| HASH |
[not confirmed from primary-tier sources] |
334 unique samples reported compiled Dec 2025 – Feb 2026; hashes not confirmed from primary-tier sources as of 2026-03-04. Check threat intelligence platforms (VirusTotal, MalwareBazaar) for Torg Grabber family tags before operationalizing. |
low |
Compliance Framework Mappings
T1115
T1056.001
T1113
T1027
T1082
T1560
+12
SI-3
SI-4
CA-7
SC-7
CM-7
SI-7
+6
A08:2021
A04:2021
A07:2021
2.5
2.6
5.2
6.3
7.3
7.4
+1
164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D)
164.312(d)
164.312(e)(1)
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
T1115
Clipboard Data
collection
T1113
Screen Capture
collection
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
defense-evasion
T1082
System Information Discovery
discovery
T1560
Archive Collected Data
collection
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
credential-access
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
exfiltration
T1518.001
Security Software Discovery
discovery
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
persistence
T1055.001
Dynamic-link Library Injection
defense-evasion
T1566
Phishing
initial-access
T1552.001
Credentials In Files
credential-access
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
defense-evasion
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
credential-access
Guidance Disclaimer
The analysis, framework mappings, and incident response recommendations in this intelligence
item are derived from established industry standards including NIST SP 800-61, NIST SP 800-53,
CIS Controls v8, MITRE ATT&CK, and other recognized frameworks. This content is provided
as supplemental intelligence guidance only and does not constitute professional incident response
services. Organizations should adapt all recommendations to their specific environment, risk
tolerance, and regulatory requirements. This material is not a substitute for your organization's
official incident response plan, legal counsel, or qualified security practitioners.