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Severity
HIGH
Priority
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Executive
Executive Summary
FortiGuard Labs reports a 389% year-over-year increase in confirmed ransomware victims, reaching 7,831 globally, while time-to-encryption has collapsed to under 48 hours, cutting the defender response window to near zero. Threat actors are now operating ransomware as a scalable, end-to-end criminal enterprise; emerging threat intelligence suggests agentic AI tooling is accelerating attack execution and pre-encryption data exfiltration, though widespread operational adoption remains under assessment. For boards and CISOs, this signals that traditional detection-and-respond timelines are structurally broken; prevention, segmentation, and rapid containment must replace them as the operational baseline. [Note: Statistics are sourced via FortiGuard Labs reporting pending verification against the primary research publication.]
Impact Assessment
CISA KEV Status
Not listed
Threat Severity
HIGH
High severity — prioritize for investigation
TTP Sophistication
HIGH
6 MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified
Detection Difficulty
HIGH
Multiple evasion techniques observed
Target Scope
INFO
General, organizations globally across multiple sectors
Are You Exposed?
⚠
You use products/services from General → Assess exposure
⚠
6 attack techniques identified — review your detection coverage for these TTPs
✓
Your EDR/XDR detects the listed IOCs and TTPs → Reduced risk
✓
You have incident response procedures for this threat type → Prepared
Business Context
A ransomware incident resolved within 48 hours of initial access leaves organizations facing simultaneous crises: operational shutdown from encryption, reputational exposure from data leak sites, and regulatory notification obligations triggered by exfiltrated data — all before a forensic firm can often be mobilized. The 389% increase in confirmed victims signals that no sector or size profile confers immunity, and the industrialized criminal model means attack capacity scales faster than most security programs. Organizations without pre-negotiated incident response retainers, tested backups, and cyber insurance aligned to current extortion demands are accepting substantially higher recovery costs and business interruption than their risk registers likely reflect.
You Are Affected If
Your organization operates internet-facing applications or VPN endpoints without universal MFA enforcement
Your sector handles high-value or regulated data (healthcare, financial services, critical infrastructure, legal, manufacturing) that increases extortion leverage
Your backup architecture shares domain credentials or network connectivity with production systems, making it reachable via compromised accounts
Your SOC operates on business-hours-only coverage or batched alert review cycles that cannot respond within a 48-hour window
Your organization relies on ransomware-as-a-service initial access vectors: exposed RDP, unpatched public-facing applications, or credential reuse from prior breaches
Board Talking Points
Ransomware victims increased 389% year-over-year per FortiGuard Labs, and attackers now complete encryption within 48 hours — faster than most organizations can detect and respond.
Within the next 30 days, confirm that MFA is enforced on all remote access, EDR covers all endpoints, and backup restoration has been tested under a ransomware scenario.
Without these controls in place, a ransomware incident will likely result in simultaneous operational shutdown, public data exposure, and regulatory notification obligations before containment is possible.
HIPAA — ransomware incidents involving patient data trigger breach notification requirements; pre-encryption exfiltration of PHI constitutes a reportable breach regardless of whether encryption occurs
GDPR — exfiltration of personal data of EU residents before encryption triggers 72-hour supervisory authority notification obligations under Article 33
SEC Cybersecurity Disclosure Rules — publicly traded companies must assess whether a ransomware incident of this profile constitutes a material cybersecurity incident requiring Form 8-K disclosure within four business days of materiality determination
Technical Analysis
The FortiGuard Labs report, sourced here via a Security Boulevard secondary article and not yet directly verified against the primary FortiGuard publication; all statistics should be treated as indicative pending that primary source verification, describes a ransomware ecosystem that has matured into a professionalized, scalable criminal supply chain.
The 389% victim count increase (7,831 confirmed) likely reflects both genuine growth in operations and expanded victim-shaming site visibility, but either interpretation demands serious operational attention.
The most tactically significant finding is time-to-encryption under 48 hours.
Historically, dwell times measured in weeks gave defenders meaningful detection windows. Sub-48-hour TTE eliminates most SIEM-and-analyst response cycles, particularly in organizations that batch their alert reviews or lack after-hours SOC coverage. The attack chain compressed into this window typically follows a pattern mapped across MITRE ATT&CK: initial access via exploited public-facing applications (T1190 ) or valid account abuse (T1078 ), rapid internal reconnaissance, lateral movement, bulk data staging and exfiltration over command-and-control channels (T1041 ), and then encryption deployment (T1486 ). The use of acquired tools or capabilities (T1588.006 ) and financial extortion mechanisms (T1657 ) are layered into this model as service components, initial access brokers, ransomware-as-a-service kits, and negotiation specialists each operating in their own lane.
The agentic AI dimension adds an emerging layer. By agentic AI, we mean autonomous or semi-autonomous tooling that profiles targets, prioritizes data for exfiltration, and executes reconnaissance steps with minimal operator direction, effectively lowering the skill floor for large-scale ransomware deployment. Emerging threat intelligence suggests threat actors are using AI tooling to accelerate execution and expand data exfiltration scope before triggering encryption. This is consistent with broader threat intelligence trends: AI lowers the skill floor for reconnaissance and scripting, enables faster target profiling, and can automate exfiltration prioritization to identify high-value data (credentials, IP, regulated records) before the encryption clock starts. Defenders should treat this as an acceleration multiplier on existing TTPs, not a novel attack class. Note that widespread operational deployment of agentic AI in ransomware campaigns remains under assessment; this represents an emerging capability rather than a universal baseline.
Defensive gaps most commonly exploited in this model: insufficient network segmentation allowing lateral movement post-compromise; incomplete or inconsistently deployed EDR coverage creating blind spots; MFA gaps on internet-facing systems and privileged accounts enabling valid account abuse; and immature or untested backup architectures that fail under encryption pressure. Organizations without a tested incident response plan calibrated to sub-48-hour scenarios are operating with a structural deficit.
Action Checklist IR ENRICHED
Triage Priority:
IMMEDIATE
Escalate to CISO and legal counsel immediately if any retroactive log review (Step 5) surfaces prior C2 contact, anomalous data transfer volumes consistent with pre-encryption exfiltration (T1041), or evidence of valid account abuse (T1078) on systems holding PII, PHI, or financial data — these findings trigger breach notification assessment under GDPR, HIPAA, and state privacy statutes regardless of whether encryption was completed.
1
Step 1: Assess exposure, audit internet-facing assets and identify any systems accessible via valid accounts without MFA; these are primary initial access vectors in the compressed TTE model described
IR Detail
Preparation
NIST 800-61r3 §2 — Preparation: establishing IR capability and reducing attack surface before an incident occurs
NIST IA-2 (Identification and Authentication — Organizational Users): enforce MFA on all internet-facing authentication endpoints
NIST RA-5 (Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning): enumerate and risk-rank externally reachable services
CIS 6.3 (Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications)
CIS 6.4 (Require MFA for Remote Network Access)
CIS 1.1 (Establish and Maintain Detailed Enterprise Asset Inventory)
Compensating Control
Run `shodan search 'org:"YourOrgName"'` via Shodan free tier to enumerate externally visible services. Use `nmap -sV -p 445,3389,22,8443,80,443 <CIDR>` to identify RDP, SMB, and web services exposed without authentication gates. Cross-reference results against your asset inventory in a spreadsheet; flag any host reachable without MFA as Priority 1. For VPN/remote access, pull Active Directory sign-in logs with `Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties LastLogonDate | Where {$_.LastLogonDate -lt (Get-Date).AddDays(-45)}` to identify dormant accounts that could be abused via credential stuffing — a common ransomware initial access pattern.
Preserve Evidence
Before closing any exposure, document the pre-remediation attack surface: export Shodan or Censys results showing open ports/services per host; capture screenshots of any login portals lacking MFA prompts; pull Windows Security Event Log Event ID 4625 (Failed Logon) and 4648 (Explicit Credential Logon) from internet-facing hosts to establish a baseline of existing credential-guessing activity targeting those endpoints; export firewall/NAT rules showing inbound permit rules to establish a before/after remediation record.
2
Step 2: Review controls, verify EDR is deployed and actively monitored across all endpoints; confirm network segmentation limits lateral movement from any single compromised host; test backup restoration under simulated encryption scenario
IR Detail
Preparation
NIST 800-61r3 §2 — Preparation: ensuring detection tools, segmentation controls, and recovery capabilities are operational before the sub-48-hour TTE window closes
NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling): maintain capability spanning preparation through recovery
NIST SI-4 (System Monitoring): continuous endpoint and network monitoring to detect ransomware staging and lateral movement
NIST CP-9 (System Backup): verify backup integrity and restoration speed against a sub-48-hour recovery objective
NIST SC-7 (Boundary Protection): enforce segmentation to limit blast radius from a single compromised host
CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs)
CIS 4.4 (Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers)
CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)
Compensating Control
EDR gap: deploy Sysmon with SwiftOnSecurity config (`sysmon -accepteula -i sysmonconfig.xml`) on all Windows endpoints — Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 3 (Network Connect), 11 (File Create), 23 (File Delete) cover the core ransomware execution chain. For segmentation verification, run `traceroute` or `Test-NetConnection -ComputerName <SegmentHost> -Port 445` between VLANs to confirm SMB lateral movement is blocked. For backup restoration testing, restore a sample file set from your most recent backup to an isolated host and time the operation — if restoration exceeds 24 hours for critical systems, your RTO is incompatible with sub-48-hour TTE scenarios and must be escalated immediately.
Preserve Evidence
Before modifying any segmentation rules or EDR configs, capture the current state: export EDR coverage report showing enrolled vs. total endpoints (gap = unmonitored blast radius); run `netstat -an` on key servers to document current listening services and established connections; pull firewall rule tables for inter-VLAN ACLs and save as baseline; verify backup job logs for last successful completion date and restoration test date — absence of a recent restoration test is itself a critical finding requiring documentation.
3
Step 3: Update threat model, incorporate sub-48-hour TTE as a planning assumption; update incident response runbooks to reflect compressed detection-to-containment timelines; map ransomware kill chain to MITRE techniques T1486, T1078, T1190, T1041, T1657
IR Detail
Preparation
NIST 800-61r3 §2 — Preparation: updating IR plans and detection logic to reflect current threat actor TTPs before an incident forces reactive adaptation
NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan): update plan to reflect sub-48-hour TTE as the operative planning assumption, replacing legacy dwell-time detection models
NIST IR-2 (Incident Response Training): retrain SOC staff on compressed timeline decision authorities — containment decisions cannot wait for management approval chains built around multi-day dwell times
NIST SI-5 (Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives): integrate FortiGuard Labs TTP updates into detection rule sets
CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)
CIS 7.2 (Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process)
Compensating Control
Map each MITRE technique to a concrete Sigma rule: T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact) → Sigma rule `ransomware_file_encryption.yml` detecting mass file rename events via Sysmon Event ID 11; T1078 (Valid Accounts) → query Windows Security Event ID 4624 Logon Type 3 (Network) from unusual source IPs; T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) → parse web server access logs for HTTP 500 responses and abnormal URI patterns indicating exploitation attempts; T1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel) → Wireshark/tcpdump filter `host <external_IP> and port not in {80,443,53}` to catch non-standard exfil; T1657 (Financial Theft) → monitor for access to finance-adjacent file shares using osquery `SELECT * FROM file_events WHERE path LIKE '%finance%' OR path LIKE '%accounting%'`. Store all rules in a version-controlled Git repository so runbook updates are auditable.
Preserve Evidence
Before finalizing the updated threat model, pull historical SIEM/log data (or Windows Event Log archives) to reconstruct any prior near-miss events: search for Event ID 4724 (Password Reset Attempt), 4728 (Member Added to Security-Enabled Global Group), and 7045 (New Service Installed) — all consistent with ransomware operator lateral movement and persistence staging. Document which of the five MITRE techniques (T1486, T1078, T1190, T1041, T1657) currently have zero detection coverage in your environment; those gaps become the prioritized detection engineering backlog.
4
Step 4: Obtain primary source, retrieve the original FortiGuard Labs report or press release directly (not via secondary outlets); verify the 389% statistic and 48-hour TTE claim against this primary source before briefing leadership or external stakeholders. This step must be completed before proceeding to Step 5.
IR Detail
Post-Incident
NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity: communicating threat intelligence findings and lessons learned to drive organizational posture improvements and resource allocation
NIST IR-6 (Incident Reporting): extend reporting to include threat intelligence briefings that inform executive risk decisions, not only active incident status
NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan): governance updates require executive sponsorship — this briefing is the formal trigger for plan revision authority
NIST RA-3 (Risk Assessment): the 389% victim increase and sub-48-hour TTE are quantitative inputs to a formal risk assessment update
CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)
Compensating Control
Produce a one-page executive brief with three columns: Current Posture (detection-centric, built on multi-day dwell time assumptions), Threat Reality (sub-48-hour TTE per FortiGuard Labs, pending primary source verification), and Gap (specific controls missing from Step 1 and Step 2 assessment). Use concrete cost anchors: average ransomware recovery cost from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report (cite year and version used) vs. cost of MFA deployment and EDR gap closure. Flag clearly in the brief that the 389% figure is from a secondary source and link the request for primary FortiGuard report access to Step 5 — do not present the statistic as verified until the primary report is reviewed.
Preserve Evidence
Attach to the leadership brief: the asset exposure audit output from Step 1 (count of MFA gaps), EDR coverage gap from Step 2 (percentage of unmonitored endpoints), and detection coverage gap from Step 3 (number of MITRE techniques with zero detection rules). These are first-party evidence from your own environment and do not depend on external statistic verification — they make the risk tangible regardless of the 389% figure's final verification status.
5
Step 5: Communicate findings, brief leadership on the structural shift from dwell-time detection to prevention-first posture; use the FortiGuard Labs statistics as context for resourcing conversations, noting that these figures have been verified against the primary publication. Update incident response and cyber insurance terms to reflect 48-hour response window assumptions.
IR Detail
Post-Incident
NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity: communicating threat intelligence findings and lessons learned to drive organizational posture improvements and resource allocation
NIST IR-6 (Incident Reporting): extend reporting to include threat intelligence briefings that inform executive risk decisions, not only active incident status
NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan): governance updates require executive sponsorship — this briefing is the formal trigger for plan revision authority
NIST RA-3 (Risk Assessment): the 389% victim increase and sub-48-hour TTE are quantitative inputs to a formal risk assessment update
CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)
Compensating Control
Produce a one-page executive brief with three columns: Current Posture (detection-centric, built on multi-day dwell time assumptions), Threat Reality (sub-48-hour TTE per FortiGuard Labs, pending primary source verification), and Gap (specific controls missing from Step 1 and Step 2 assessment). Use concrete cost anchors: average ransomware recovery cost from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report (cite year and version used) vs. cost of MFA deployment and EDR gap closure. Flag clearly in the brief that the 389% figure is from a secondary source and link the request for primary FortiGuard report access to Step 5 — do not present the statistic as verified until the primary report is reviewed.
Preserve Evidence
Attach to the leadership brief: the asset exposure audit output from Step 1 (count of MFA gaps), EDR coverage gap from Step 2 (percentage of unmonitored endpoints), and detection coverage gap from Step 3 (number of MITRE techniques with zero detection rules). These are first-party evidence from your own environment and do not depend on external statistic verification — they make the risk tangible regardless of the 389% figure's final verification status.
Recovery Guidance
Given the sub-48-hour TTE, recovery planning must assume backup integrity is the primary restoration path — verify that backups are stored offline or in immutable storage and confirm the most recent restoration test date before any incident occurs. Post-containment, monitor for re-infection attempts for a minimum of 30 days: ransomware operators commonly maintain secondary persistence (scheduled tasks, modified startup items) that survives initial eradication, and agentic AI-assisted campaigns may re-execute automatically from a surviving foothold. Validate restored systems by comparing file hashes of critical binaries against known-good baselines before returning them to production.
Key Forensic Artifacts
Windows Security Event Log — Event ID 4624 (Successful Logon, Type 3 Network) and 4648 (Explicit Credential Logon) from internet-facing hosts and domain controllers: establishes timeline of T1078 (Valid Account) abuse used as initial access in ransomware campaigns operating within the sub-48-hour TTE window
Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create) with target file extensions .tmp, .encrypted, or randomized extensions across multiple directories in rapid succession: primary forensic signature of T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact) execution — mass file rename/create events within a compressed timeframe distinguish ransomware from legitimate file operations
Web server and reverse proxy access logs (IIS `%SystemDrive%\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\` or Apache `/var/log/apache2/access.log`) filtered for HTTP 4xx/5xx bursts against login pages, admin portals, or API endpoints: maps to T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) and T1078 credential stuffing as initial access vectors
Network flow or firewall logs showing large outbound data transfers (>1GB) to non-business IPs or cloud storage endpoints (Mega.nz, Dropbox API, rclone destinations) in the hours preceding any encryption event: forensic evidence of T1041 exfiltration and T1657 data theft, which FortiGuard Labs identifies as occurring before encryption in modern ransomware operations
Windows Scheduled Tasks (`%SystemRoot%\System32\Tasks\`) and registry Run keys (`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`) created within the attack window: ransomware operators using agentic AI-assisted tooling frequently install persistence mechanisms to survive reboot or partial remediation, making these artifacts critical for confirming full eradication before recovery is declared
Detection Guidance
Given sub-48-hour TTE, detection must shift left toward initial access and early lateral movement, post-encryption detections are operationally too late.
Log sources to prioritize: authentication logs for unusual valid account activity (off-hours logins, new geographies, service accounts making interactive logons); VPN and remote access logs for access from unexpected ASNs or using credentials not recently active; EDR telemetry for living-off-the-land binaries being executed in unusual process chains (wmic, vssadmin, bcdedit, particularly any command deleting volume shadow copies, a reliable pre-encryption indicator); network flow data for large internal data transfers to unusual destinations or unexpected egress volumes consistent with pre-encryption exfiltration (T1041 ).
Behavioral hunts to consider: enumerate any process executing vssadmin delete shadows or bcdedit /set recoveryenabled no, both are near-universal ransomware preparation steps; hunt for rapid file renaming events across network shares; identify anomalous use of legitimate admin tools (PSExec, RDP, WMI) initiated from non-admin workstations.
AI-accelerated exfiltration hunting: look for staging directories containing compressed archives created outside normal business workflows; monitor DLP alerts for bulk document access in compressed timeframes. Note that agentic AI-assisted exfiltration may produce different behavioral signatures (e.g., more selective targeting of high-value data, faster staging) than human-operated campaigns; update detection logic to flag unusual data selection patterns alongside volume-based alerts.
Policy gaps to audit: confirm MFA is enforced on all internet-facing authentication, including legacy protocols (SMTP, IMAP, legacy VPN endpoints) that are commonly bypassed; verify backup systems are isolated from domain credentials so ransomware cannot encrypt them via the same valid account access used for the primary attack.
Indicators of Compromise (3)
Export as
Splunk SPL
KQL
Elastic
Copy All (3)
3 tools
Type Value Enrichment Context Conf.
⚙ TOOL
vssadmin.exe
vssadmin leveraged during ransomware pre-encryption phase to delete volume shadow copies, eliminating local recovery options before payload deployment
MEDIUM
⚙ TOOL
bcdedit.exe
bcdedit leveraged to disable Windows recovery environment, preventing OS-level rollback after encryption
MEDIUM
⚙ TOOL
Pending — refer to FortiGuard Labs primary report for published indicators
FortiGuard Labs report likely contains campaign-specific C2 infrastructure, payload hashes, and tooling IOCs; the source article referenced here is a secondary summary and does not publish specific indicator values
LOW
Platform Playbooks
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
CrowdStrike Falcon
AWS Security
🔒
Microsoft 365 E3
3 log sources
Basic identity + audit. No endpoint advanced hunting. Defender for Endpoint requires separate P1/P2 license.
🛡
Microsoft 365 E5
18 log sources
Full Defender suite: Endpoint P2, Identity, Office 365 P2, Cloud App Security. Advanced hunting across all workloads.
🔍
E5 + Sentinel
27 log sources
All E5 tables + SIEM data (CEF, Syslog, Windows Security Events, Threat Intelligence). Analytics rules, playbooks, workbooks.
IOC Detection Queries (3)
Known attack tool — NOT a legitimate system binary. Any execution is suspicious.
KQL Query Preview
Read-only — detection query only
// Threat: Ransomware Surge: 389% Victim Increase, Sub-48-Hour Time-to-Encryption Reported
// Attack tool: vssadmin.exe
// Context: vssadmin leveraged during ransomware pre-encryption phase to delete volume shadow copies, eliminating local recovery options before payload deployment
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe"
or ProcessCommandLine has "vssadmin.exe"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "vssadmin.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath,
ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, AccountDomain,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
Known attack tool — NOT a legitimate system binary. Any execution is suspicious.
KQL Query Preview
Read-only — detection query only
// Threat: Ransomware Surge: 389% Victim Increase, Sub-48-Hour Time-to-Encryption Reported
// Attack tool: bcdedit.exe
// Context: bcdedit leveraged to disable Windows recovery environment, preventing OS-level rollback after encryption
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe"
or ProcessCommandLine has "bcdedit.exe"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "bcdedit.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath,
ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, AccountDomain,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
Known attack tool — NOT a legitimate system binary. Any execution is suspicious.
KQL Query Preview
Read-only — detection query only
// Threat: Ransomware Surge: 389% Victim Increase, Sub-48-Hour Time-to-Encryption Reported
// Attack tool: Pending — refer to FortiGuard Labs primary report for published indicators
// Context: FortiGuard Labs report likely contains campaign-specific C2 infrastructure, payload hashes, and tooling IOCs; the source article referenced here is a secondary summary and does not publish specific in
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName =~ "Pending — refer to FortiGuard Labs primary report for published indicators"
or ProcessCommandLine has "Pending — refer to FortiGuard Labs primary report for published indicators"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "Pending — refer to FortiGuard Labs primary report for published indicators"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath,
ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, AccountDomain,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
MITRE ATT&CK Hunting Queries (3)
Sentinel rule: Ransomware activity
KQL Query Preview
Read-only — detection query only
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType == "FileRenamed"
| where FileName endswith_any (".encrypted", ".locked", ".crypto", ".crypt", ".enc", ".ransom")
| summarize RenamedFiles = count() by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where RenamedFiles > 20
| sort by RenamedFiles desc
Sentinel rule: Sign-ins from unusual locations
KQL Query Preview
Read-only — detection query only
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where ResultType == 0
| summarize Locations = make_set(Location), LoginCount = count(), DistinctIPs = dcount(IPAddress) by UserPrincipalName
| where array_length(Locations) > 3 or DistinctIPs > 5
| sort by DistinctIPs desc
Sentinel rule: Web application exploit patterns
KQL Query Preview
Read-only — detection query only
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where DeviceVendor has_any ("PaloAlto", "Fortinet", "F5", "Citrix")
| where Activity has_any ("attack", "exploit", "injection", "traversal", "overflow")
or RequestURL has_any ("../", "..\\\\", "<script", "UNION SELECT", "\${jndi:")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, SourceIP, DestinationIP, RequestURL, Activity, LogSeverity
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
No actionable IOCs for CrowdStrike import (benign/contextual indicators excluded).
No hard IOCs available for AWS detection queries (contextual/benign indicators excluded).
Compliance Framework Mappings
T1588.006
T1486
T1078
T1657
T1190
T1041
CP-9
CP-10
AC-2
AC-6
IA-2
IA-5
+9
164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A)
164.308(a)(6)(ii)
164.312(e)(1)
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
T1588.006
Vulnerabilities
resource-development
T1486
Data Encrypted for Impact
impact
T1078
Valid Accounts
defense-evasion
T1657
Financial Theft
impact
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
initial-access
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
exfiltration
Guidance Disclaimer
