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Severity
HIGH
CVSS
7.5
Priority
0.409
Executive Summary
An active phishing campaign tracked as FAUX#ELEVATE is targeting French-speaking corporate environments by distributing malware disguised as resume documents. Within approximately 25 seconds of opening the file, the malware steals browser-stored credentials and exfiltrates them before silently installing a cryptocurrency miner, all while evading detection through Dropbox staging and compromised WordPress infrastructure. Organizations with French-speaking employees, domain-joined Windows environments, or Chromium-based browser deployments face direct exposure to credential compromise and unauthorized resource consumption.
Technical Analysis
FAUX#ELEVATE delivers heavily obfuscated VBScript payloads (T1059.005, T1027) via spear-phishing attachments (T1566.001) disguised as resumes.
Execution is gated by a WMI domain-join check (T1497.001) that suppresses activity on non-enterprise machines, actively evading sandbox detection mechanisms.
The attack chain completes credential theft in ~25 seconds via app-bound encryption (ABE) bypass targeting Chromium privilege elevation mechanisms (T1555.003), then deploys XMRig for Monero mining (T1496).
Privilege escalation uses WinRing0x64.sys (CVE-2020-14979, CWE-269), a known-vulnerable kernel driver still flagged by Microsoft Defender as VulnerableDriver:WinNT/Winring0, to gain kernel-level access (T1068). UAC bypass (T1548.002) and Defender disablement (T1562.001) follow. Exfiltration routes through mail.ru SMTP (T1041, T1071.003). C2 communications use compromised WordPress sites (T1102). Payload staging abuses Dropbox (T1105). Post-execution cleanup (T1070, T1070.004) removes artifacts to inhibit forensic recovery. Affected targets: domain-joined Windows machines, Chromium-based browsers, Firefox, Windows Defender, UAC/Registry. No CVE is assigned to the campaign itself; the driver abuse references CVE-2020-14979. Relevant CWEs: CWE-693 (protection mechanism failure), CWE-269 (improper privilege management), CWE-494 (download of code without integrity check), CWE-506 (embedded malicious code), CWE-311 (missing encryption of sensitive data). No vendor patch exists for the campaign; the driver vulnerability has been known since 2020. Source: Securonix threat research, reported via The Hacker News (2026-03-04).
Action Checklist IR ENRICHED
Triage Priority:
IMMEDIATE
If forensic analysis reveals credential exfiltration from more than 10 domain-joined machines, or if Monero mining signatures are detected on any production servers, escalate to Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and activate external IR firm engagement within 4 hours; if targeting government or critical infrastructure entities, notify CISA and relevant sector ISACs immediately.
Step 1, Block vulnerable driver: Add WinRing0x64.sys to your WDAC or Driver Block List policy; Microsoft Defender detects it as VulnerableDriver:WinNT/Winring0, confirm the definition is current and the alert is not suppressed.
Preparation
NIST 800-61r3 §2.1 (preparation phase); §3.2.1 (detection and analysis of kernel-level compromise)
NIST 800-53r5 SI-7 (Information System Monitoring)
NIST 800-53r5 AC-6 (Least Privilege)
CIS Controls v8 6.1 (Establish and Maintain Application Allow-lists)
Compensating Control
For organizations without WDAC: Export WinRing0x64.sys file hash (SHA256) and distribute to all endpoints; use free hash-checking utilities (e.g., fciv.exe built into Windows) in scheduled Task Scheduler jobs to audit for presence; alternatively, use Autoruns (Sysinternals, free) to manually enumerate driver load paths on at-risk machines quarterly. If EDR unavailable, configure Windows Defender Exploit Guard via Group Policy to block unsigned or low-reputation drivers.
Preserve Evidence
Capture driver load events from Windows Event Log (System channel, Event ID 7, filter on 'WinRing0'); export HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services registry hive before blocking to document pre-existing loads; preserve all .sys files in C:\Windows\System32\drivers matching the pattern 'winring*' for hash comparison and malware analysis.
Step 2, Block known-abused infrastructure: Restrict or alert on outbound connections to mail.ru SMTP endpoints and unapproved Dropbox domains at the perimeter; flag C2 traffic patterns to low-reputation WordPress-hosted domains.
Containment
NIST 800-61r3 §3.2.2 (containment strategies); §3.2.3 (eradication); §4 (incident handling recovery recommendations on network segmentation)
NIST 800-53r5 SC-7 (Boundary Protection)
NIST 800-53r5 CA-3 (System Interconnections)
CIS Controls v8 13.1 (Maintain and Enforce Network-Based URL Filters)
Compensating Control
Without next-gen firewall: configure Windows Defender Firewall outbound rules (Group Policy Computer Configuration > Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security > Outbound Rules) to block mail.ru SMTP (25, 465, 587 to mail.ru IP ranges); document Dropbox shared domain list (*.dropbox.com, *.dropboxusercontent.com) and add to firewall deny list. For WordPress C2: use free DNS filtering (e.g., Quad9, NextDNS free tier) to block low-reputation domains; manually audit browser history on suspected machines for WordPress referrers and block via hosts file. Monitor netstat output via scheduled Task Scheduler script capture.
Preserve Evidence
Capture proxy/firewall logs for all outbound SMTP connections (filter source port 25, 465, 587) and Dropbox domains for past 90 days before implementing block; export Windows Firewall logs (C:\Windows\System32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log); preserve network packet captures (.pcap) from suspected infected endpoints showing egress traffic patterns; document baseline DNS queries to mail.ru and WordPress domains from uninfected control machines for comparison.
Step 3, Hunt for VBScript execution: Query EDR and SIEM for VBScript (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) spawned from user-context processes (Outlook, browser downloads) in the last 30 days, especially on domain-joined machines; correlate with WMI query activity (T1497.001) and Chromium privilege elevation process invocations.
Detection & Analysis
NIST 800-61r3 §3.1 (preparation for detection); §3.2.1 (detection and analysis with log analysis and event reconstruction)
NIST 800-53r5 AU-2 (Audit Events)
NIST 800-53r5 SI-4 (Information System Monitoring)
CIS Controls v8 8.5 (Implement Application Allowlisting for Scripts)
CIS Controls v8 8.8 (Disable Unused Scripts and Interpreters)
Compensating Control
Without EDR/SIEM: manually export Windows Event Logs (Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational if Sysmon installed free; otherwise System and Security channels) filtering Event ID 1 (process create) for wscript.exe and cscript.exe parent processes from outlook.exe, explorer.exe, chrome.exe, firefox.exe. Query WMI Event Log (Applications and Services > Microsoft > Windows > WMI-Activity > Operational, Event ID 11) for WmiQueryLanguage queries. Search user Temp folders (C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp, C:\Users\*\Downloads) for recent .vbs, .js, .wsf files modified in past 30 days; use dir /s /od commands to sort by date. Check registry HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU and RecentDocs for script references.
Preserve Evidence
Export full Windows Event Log (Security, System, Sysmon Operational) for all domain-joined machines for past 30 days before hunting (preserve .evtx files); capture process creation tree screenshots or logs showing parent-child relationships (wscript.exe parent = explorer/Outlook); preserve all .vbs/.js/.wsf files found in user Temp/Downloads for static malware analysis; extract Windows.old folder if available (post-reboot forensics); capture WMI repository (C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository) as forensic image for offline WMI event analysis.
Step 4, Audit browser credential stores: Identify any domain-joined endpoints where Chromium privilege elevation mechanisms or equivalent ABE bypass tooling may have executed; treat affected browser credential stores as compromised and initiate password resets for exposed accounts.
Eradication
NIST 800-61r3 §3.2.3 (eradication phase); §4 (post-incident activities and lessons learned); NIST 800-53r5 IA-2, IA-4 (authentication and access controls)
NIST 800-53r5 IA-2 (Authentication)
NIST 800-53r5 IA-4 (Identifier Management)
NIST 800-53r5 AC-2 (Account Management)
CIS Controls v8 6.2 (Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts)
Compensating Control
Without EDR: manually inspect Chrome/Edge credential store on suspected machines — export Chrome Local State and Login Data from C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default; use free SQLite viewer tools to inspect encrypted credentials (decryption requires direct memory access on domain-joined machines, but file presence confirms exposure). For Firefox, check C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*.default-release for key4.db and logins.json; presence of these files indicates credential storage was accessible. Cross-reference with login timestamps in Windows Event Log (Security channel, Event ID 4624) to identify when credentials may have been extracted. Initiate manual password reset workflow for all accounts that have logged in via affected browsers in past 30 days.
Preserve Evidence
Capture Chrome/Edge Local State, Login Data, and History database files before credential reset (preserve encrypted state); export Firefox key4.db, logins.json, and history.sqlite; preserve Windows Event Log 4624 (logon events) and 4648 (explicit credential use) for past 30 days to identify affected accounts; document all Chrome/Edge/Firefox browser processes with timestamps from Task Scheduler history or prefetch files (C:\Windows\Prefetch\*chrome*.pf*, *firefox*.pf*); capture memory dumps (if possible) or process handles from affected machines to identify any open credential store access.
Step 5, Harden email and endpoint controls: Enforce attachment policies that block or sandbox macro-capable and script-capable files from external senders; review VBScript execution policy via Group Policy (Software Restriction Policies or AppLocker) to prevent user-space script execution on enterprise endpoints.
Recovery
NIST 800-61r3 §3.2.4 (recovery phase); §4 (post-incident recommendations for hardening); NIST 800-53r5 SI-4, CA-7 (system monitoring and security assessments)
NIST 800-53r5 SI-3 (Malware Protection)
NIST 800-53r5 SI-7 (Information System Monitoring)
NIST 800-53r5 AC-6 (Least Privilege)
CIS Controls v8 8.2 (Restrict Administrative Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts)
CIS Controls v8 13.1 (Maintain and Enforce Network-Based URL Filters)
Compensating Control
Without enterprise email gateway: use Outlook rules at organizational level to flag or move .vbs, .js, .wsf, .hta, .scr attachments to quarantine folder (Group Policy User Configuration > Administrative Templates > Microsoft Outlook > Outlook 2016 > Security > Attachment Handling). Deploy AppLocker via Group Policy (Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Application Control Policies > AppLocker) with rules blocking wscript.exe, cscript.exe from non-System32 paths; set to 'Audit' mode first for 2 weeks to baseline, then 'Enforce'. Alternatively, use Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy to audit and block script execution. Enable VBScript disable in Group Policy (Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Windows Script Host > Prevent execution of VB scripts) as fallback. Test hardening on pilot group before full deployment.
Preserve Evidence
Baseline current email attachment volume before policy implementation by reviewing mail server logs or SMTP transport rules for past 30 days; document existing VBScript execution allowlists (if any) in AppLocker/SRP; preserve current Group Policy objects (.gpo exports) before hardening changes for rollback capability; capture endpoint process execution logs for 1 week post-hardening to confirm no legitimate business process breakage.
Recovery Guidance
Post-eradication recovery requires mandatory password resets for all affected accounts with 30-day monitoring for lateral movement via Windows Event Log 4624/4648 correlation. Conduct full browser credential store audit across enterprise (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) and implement browser-level credential protection (Windows Hello for Business, FIDO2). Deploy compensating controls from Step 5 organization-wide within 7 days and validate with log analysis to confirm VBScript execution blocking is effective without breaking legitimate workflows. Schedule 30-day post-incident review to assess control effectiveness and update threat hunting signatures.
Key Forensic Artifacts
Windows Event Logs: Security (Event ID 4624, 4648, 1102), System (Event ID 7 driver load), Sysmon Operational (Event ID 1 process creation, Event ID 11 file events)
WMI Event Log: Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational (Event ID 11 WmiQueryLanguage queries)
User-space artifacts: C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp, C:\Users\*\Downloads, %TEMP% for .vbs/.js/.wsf/.hta files with recent modification times
Browser credential stores: Chrome Local State, Login Data, History (C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default); Firefox key4.db, logins.json (C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles)
Registry and persistence: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services (driver load history), HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU, HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RecentDocs, HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Network and exfiltration: Proxy/firewall logs (outbound SMTP to mail.ru, Dropbox domains, WordPress C2), network packet captures (.pcap) showing C2 beaconing patterns, mail server logs for external SMTP relay abuse
Monero mining indicators: Process and driver memory artifacts (WinRing0x64.sys kernel driver loaded), Task Scheduler history for scheduled miner tasks, performance baseline (CPU/GPU usage anomalies), Prefetch files (*chrome*.pf*, *wscript*.pf*)
Detection Guidance
Behavioral indicators:
- wscript.exe or cscript.exe spawned from a mail client or browser download context on a domain-joined machine;
- WMI query for domain membership (Win32_ComputerSystem DomainRole property) immediately preceding script execution, query EDR process telemetry for this sequence;
- Chromium privilege elevation process invoked outside of a legitimate browser update workflow;
- WinRing0x64.sys loaded as a kernel driver, query Windows Event Log (System, Event ID 7045 for new service installs) and Sysmon Event ID 6 (driver load);
- outbound SMTP connections to mail.ru from non-mail-server endpoints (firewall/proxy logs);
- XMRig process signatures or high sustained CPU utilization on endpoints combined with outbound connections to Monero mining pools (common pool ports: 3333, 4444, 5555, 7777, 14444);
- mass file deletion or overwrite activity following script execution (T1070.004), Sysmon Event ID 23 (file delete) in a short burst post-execution. SIEM query starting point: correlate wscript.exe/cscript.exe process creation (Sysmon EID 1) + WMI activity (EID 19/20/21) + outbound SMTP (firewall logs, destination AS belonging to mail.ru) within a 60-second window on the same host. Source attribution: Securonix campaign report (FAUX#ELEVATE); Microsoft Defender Antivirus documentation (T1 source).
Indicators of Compromise (4)
| Type | Value | Context | Confidence |
| DOMAIN |
mail.ru (SMTP endpoints) |
Abused for credential exfiltration via SMTP; outbound connections from non-mail-server endpoints should be alerted or blocked |
medium |
| DOMAIN |
dropbox.com (staging paths, unspecified) |
Abused for payload staging; specific URLs not publicly disclosed in available sources — flag anomalous Dropbox download activity from script execution context |
medium |
| HASH |
WinRing0x64.sys (specific hash not disclosed in available sources) |
Vulnerable kernel driver used for privilege escalation; Microsoft Defender signature: VulnerableDriver:WinNT/Winring0 — use Defender detection as the practical indicator |
high |
| DOMAIN |
Compromised WordPress sites (specific domains not publicly disclosed) |
Used for C2 communications; hunt for DNS/HTTP connections to low-reputation WordPress-hosted domains from endpoint processes, particularly post-script execution |
low |
Compliance Framework Mappings
T1102
T1543.003
T1027
T1041
T1548.002
T1033
+13
SI-3
SI-4
CA-7
SC-7
AC-6
SI-2
+6
5.4
6.8
2.5
2.6
6.3
14.2
+1
164.312(d)
164.308(a)(5)(i)
164.308(a)(6)(ii)
164.312(e)(1)
A.8.8
A.5.34
A.5.21
A.8.24
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
T1102
Web Service
command-and-control
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
defense-evasion
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
exfiltration
T1548.002
Bypass User Account Control
privilege-escalation
T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
discovery
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
credential-access
T1496
Resource Hijacking
impact
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
command-and-control
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
privilege-escalation
T1070
Indicator Removal
defense-evasion
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
initial-access
T1562.001
Disable or Modify Tools
defense-evasion
T1082
System Information Discovery
discovery
Guidance Disclaimer
The analysis, framework mappings, and incident response recommendations in this intelligence
item are derived from established industry standards including NIST SP 800-61, NIST SP 800-53,
CIS Controls v8, MITRE ATT&CK, and other recognized frameworks. This content is provided
as supplemental intelligence guidance only and does not constitute professional incident response
services. Organizations should adapt all recommendations to their specific environment, risk
tolerance, and regulatory requirements. This material is not a substitute for your organization's
official incident response plan, legal counsel, or qualified security practitioners.