The ClickFix social engineering campaign exploits no software vulnerability; instead, attackers impersonate DocuSign and Okta through fake CAPTCHA and browser-update pages to trick users into manually executing malicious commands, delivering NetSupport RAT via DLL sideloading of jp2launcher.exe, Latrodectus via obfuscated JavaScript, and Lumma Stealer via MSHTA execution. The technique bypasses perimeter, email, and attachment-based controls entirely, with documented use in nearly a dozen IR engagements in 2025. Organizations should block or alert on mshta.exe, jp2launcher.exe, and wscript.exe executing from user-interactive contexts, push immediate user awareness communications naming DocuSign and Okta impersonation as active lures, and hunt endpoint telemetry for clipboard-paste execution patterns and DLL sideloading from non-standard paths.