TJS Weekly Security Intelligence Briefing - Week of Jan 5th 2026

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_ January 12, 2026_ Tech Jacks Solutions_ 0 Comments

January 5th TJS Weekly Security Intelligence Briefing

Week of January 5th, 2026
Classification: TLP: Public
Prepared: January 5, 2026

SECTION A: EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

For Leadership and Management

A.1 Executive Summary

Risk Posture: ELEVATED

This week’s threat landscape is defined by three operationally significant developments:

MongoDB MongoBleed (CVE-2025-14847) – Critical database vulnerability under active exploitation with verified detection tools available. CISA deadline January 19, 2026.
Google Cloud Phishing Campaign – Sophisticated credential harvesting bypassing email security by abusing legitimate Google infrastructure. 9,400 emails targeting 3,200+ organizations.
Ransomware Operations – Qilin and TridentLocker posted new victims including federal contractor Sedgwick. Two BlackCat operators pleaded guilty January 2.

Bottom Line: MongoDB patching is the highest-priority technical action. Phishing awareness requires immediate user communication. Ransomware defense remains ongoing priority.

A.2 Intelligence Confidence Summary

Threat	Confidence	Detection Available	IOCs Available	Action Type
MongoBleed (CVE-2025-14847)	HIGH	✅ Yes – Tools Included	⚠️ Partial	IMMEDIATE PATCH + HUNT
Google Cloud Phishing	MEDIUM	⚠️ Indicators Only	⚠️ Partial	USER AWARENESS
Qilin Ransomware	MEDIUM	⚠️ Generic Rules	❌ Vendor-Gated	DEFENSE HARDENING
TridentLocker	LOW	❌ Not Available	❌ Not Available	MONITOR ONLY
Fortinet CVE-2020-12812	HIGH	✅ Config Check	N/A	CONFIGURATION REVIEW

Legend:

HIGH: Multiple authoritative sources, verified detection content
MEDIUM: Confirmed threat, limited operational intelligence
LOW: Emerging threat, insufficient data for action

A.3 Critical Actions by Priority

Priority	Action	Owner	Deadline	Confidence
1	Patch MongoDB to fixed versions	Infrastructure	Jan 19, 2026 (CISA)	HIGH
2	Run MongoBleed detection scan	Security Ops	Immediate	HIGH
3	User phishing awareness (Google-origin emails)	Security Awareness	This week	MEDIUM
4	Fortinet SSL VPN 2FA configuration audit	Network Security	This week	HIGH
5	Backup restoration test	IT Operations	This week	HIGH
6	January Patch Tuesday preparation	IT Operations	Jan 14, 2026	HIGH

A.4 Framework Compliance Summary

This week’s recommended actions address the following control frameworks:

Framework	Controls Addressed	Primary Categories
CIS Controls v8	28 controls	Vulnerability Management, Access Control, Data Recovery
NIST CSF 2.0	22 functions	Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover
ISO 27001:2022	24 controls	A.5 (Organizational), A.6 (People), A.8 (Technical)

Detailed mappings in Section D.

SECTION B: THREAT INTELLIGENCE DETAILS

For Security Analysts and Incident Responders

B.1 MongoDB MongoBleed (CVE-2025-14847)

Intelligence Summary

Attribute	Value
CVE	CVE-2025-14847
CVSS	8.7 (High)
Nickname	MongoBleed
Added to CISA KEV	December 29, 2025
CISA Deadline	January 19, 2026
Exploitation Status	ACTIVE – Confirmed in wild
Detection Confidence	HIGH

Vulnerability Description

MongoBleed is a heap-memory disclosure vulnerability in MongoDB Server’s zlib compression handling. Unauthenticated attackers can send malformed compressed network packets to leak sensitive data from server memory, including credentials, API keys, and session tokens.

Root Cause: MongoDB returned allocated buffer size instead of actual decompressed data length, exposing adjacent heap memory.

Affected Versions

Branch	Vulnerable	Fixed
8.2.x	8.2.0 – 8.2.2	8.2.3
8.0.x	8.0.0 – 8.0.16	8.0.17
7.0.x	7.0.0 – 7.0.27	7.0.28
6.0.x	6.0.0 – 6.0.26	6.0.27
5.0.x	5.0.0 – 5.0.31	5.0.32
4.4.x	4.4.0 – 4.4.29	4.4.30
4.2, 4.0, 3.6	All versions	NO PATCH – EOL

MongoDB Atlas: Automatically patched. No customer action required.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID	Name	Usage
T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Initial exploitation of exposed MongoDB

Exposure Data

Metric	Value	Source
Global vulnerable instances	87,000+	Censys
Cloud environments affected	42%	Wiz Research
US instances	~20,000	Censys
China instances	~17,000	Censys
Germany instances	~8,000	Censys

Detection Tools (VERIFIED – READY TO DEPLOY)

Tool 1: MongoBleed Detector (Florian Roth)

Repository: https://github.com/Neo23x0/mongobleed-detector
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Status: Verified, actively maintained, includes real attack test data

# Clone the detector
git clone https://github.com/Neo23x0/mongobleed-detector.git
cd mongobleed-detector
chmod +x mongobleed-detector.sh

# Basic scan of default MongoDB log paths (/var/log/mongodb/*.log*)
./mongobleed-detector.sh

# Scan specific log files
./mongobleed-detector.sh -p /var/log/mongodb/*.log*

# With custom thresholds (adjust for your environment)
# Check ./mongobleed-detector.sh --help for current options
./mongobleed-detector.sh -p /var/log/mongodb/*.log* \
    -t 1440 \
    -c 50 \
    -b 300

Command-Line Options (verify with --help):

Option	Description
`-p, --path <glob>`	Log path/glob pattern
`-t, --time <minutes>`	Lookback window (default: 4320 = 3 days)
`-c, --conn-threshold`	Connection count threshold (default: 100)
`-b, --burst-threshold`	Burst rate per minute (default: 400)
`--forensic-dir <path>`	Analyze multiple hosts from subdirectories

What It Detects:

Source IPs with high connection counts but zero metadata events
Connection velocity anomalies (legitimate: ~1-10/min, attack: 50,000-100,000/min)
Metadata rate analysis (legitimate: ~100%, attack: 0%)

Tool 2: Velociraptor Artifact (Eric Capuano)

Artifact Name: Linux.Detection.CVE202514847.MongoBleed
Author: Eric Capuano (Recon InfoSec)
Documentation: https://blog.ecapuano.com/p/hunting-mongobleed-cve-2025-14847

Detection Logic:

1. Parse MongoDB JSON logs for:
   - Event ID 22943: Client connection
   - Event ID 51800: Client metadata
   - Event ID 22944: Client disconnection

2. Aggregate by source IP within time window

3. Calculate:
   - Metadata rate = metadata_events / connection_events
   - Connection velocity = connections / time_window

4. Alert criteria:
   - Metadata rate < 10% AND connection count > threshold
   - Connection velocity > 1000/minute

Tool 3: Nuclei Template (Wiz Research)

Source: https://www.wiz.io/blog/mongobleed-cve-2025-14847-exploited-in-the-wild-mongodb
Purpose: Validate if MongoDB instance is exploitable (safe, non-exfiltrating check)

id: CVE-2025-14847
info:
  name: CVE-2025-14847 - MongoDB Information Disclosure
  author: Wiz Research
  severity: High
  description: |
    Mismatched length fields in Zlib compressed protocol headers 
    may allow read of uninitialized heap memory by unauthenticated client.
  metadata:
    max-request: 1
  tags: mongodb,memory-leak,network
tcp:
  - host:
    - "{{Hostname}}"
    inputs:
      - data: "2a0000000100000000000000dc070000dd0700003200000002789c636080028144064620050002ca0073"
        type: hex

Log Indicators to Monitor

Log Pattern	Event ID	Meaning
Burst of connections (>1000/min)	22943	Potential exploitation
Missing metadata after connection	51800 absent	Attack signature
Spike in “Slow query” messages	N/A	Exploitation artifact
“InvalidBSON: incorrect BSON length”	N/A	BSON parsing errors from attack

Enable Enhanced Logging

mongod --setParameter "logComponentVerbosity={network: 0, command: 1, accessControl: 0, query: 0}" --quiet

Remediation Steps

Immediate: Patch to fixed versions listed above
If patching delayed: Disable zlib compression: # In mongod.confnet: compression: compressors: snappy,zstd # Omit zlib# Or via command linemongod --networkMessageCompressors snappy,zstd
Network controls: Restrict MongoDB port (27017) to trusted IPs only
Post-incident: If previously exposed, rotate all credentials that may have been in memory

Sources

Source	URL
CISA KEV	https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
Wiz Research	https://www.wiz.io/blog/mongobleed-cve-2025-14847-exploited-in-the-wild-mongodb
Eric Capuano Detection	https://blog.ecapuano.com/p/hunting-mongobleed-cve-2025-14847
Neo23x0 Detector	https://github.com/Neo23x0/mongobleed-detector
Bleeping Computer	https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/exploited-mongobleed-flaw-leaks-mongodb-secrets-87k-servers-exposed/
The Hacker News	https://thehackernews.com/2025/12/mongodb-vulnerability-cve-2025-14847.html

B.2 Google Cloud Application Integration Phishing Campaign

Intelligence Summary

Attribute	Value
Disclosed	January 2-3, 2026
Researcher	Check Point Harmony Email Security
Campaign Duration	14 days (December 2025)
Emails Sent	9,394
Organizations Targeted	~3,200
Detection Confidence	MEDIUM

Attack Methodology

Abuse Vector: Google Cloud Application Integration “Send Email” task – a legitimate workflow automation feature misused to send phishing from Google-owned infrastructure.

Why It Works: Emails originate from noreply-application-integration@google.com, passing SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks. Traditional email security relies on sender reputation, which Google domains inherently possess.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID	Name	Usage
T1566.002	Phishing: Spearphishing Link	Malicious links in emails
T1598.003	Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link	Credential harvesting objective
T1078.004	Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts	OAuth consent abuse variant reported

Attack Chain

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Stage 1: Email Delivery                                         │
│ From: noreply-application-integration@google.com                │
│ Content: Voicemail alert / File access request / Q4 document    │
│ Link: storage.cloud.google.com/...                              │
└─────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
                          ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Stage 2: First Redirect                                         │
│ URL: googleusercontent.com                                      │
│ Content: Fake CAPTCHA (blocks automated scanners)               │
└─────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
                          ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Stage 3: Credential Harvesting                                  │
│ URL: [Non-Microsoft domain]                                     │
│ Content: Fake Microsoft 365 login page                          │
│ Objective: Harvest M365 credentials                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Verified Indicators

Indicator Type	Value	Status
Sender Address	`noreply-application-integration@google.com`	✅ Verified
Initial Link Domain	`storage.cloud.google.com`	✅ Verified
Redirect Domain	`googleusercontent.com`	✅ Verified
Final Destination	Non-Microsoft domain (specific URLs not released)	⚠️ Not disclosed

Industry Targeting

Industry	Percentage
Manufacturing/Industrial	19.6%
Technology/SaaS	18.9%
Finance/Banking/Insurance	14.8%
Professional Services	10.7%
Retail/Consumer	9.1%
Other (Media, Education, Healthcare, Energy, Government)	23.9%

Detection Recommendations

Email Security:

# Monitor for Application Integration emails with suspicious characteristics
From: *application-integration*@google.com
Contains: Links to storage.cloud.google.com
Content themes: voicemail, file access, permission request, "Q4"

User Awareness Indicators (share with end users):

Unexpected voicemail notifications from Google
File sharing requests you didn’t initiate
Google emails asking you to sign into Microsoft
CAPTCHA pages before accessing shared files
Any email asking for M365 credentials via Google infrastructure

Post-Click Detection:

# Identity/SIEM alerts to configure
- OAuth consent grants to unfamiliar applications
- Sign-ins from new locations within hours of email delivery
- New Azure AD app permissions
- Impossible travel after credential entry

Limitations

What We Have	What We Don’t Have
Sender address pattern	Specific phishing URLs
Redirect chain structure	Final harvesting domain names
Industry targeting data	Attacker attribution
Attack flow description	Detection signatures

Sources

Source	URL
Check Point Research	https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/phishing-campaign-leverages-trusted-google-cloud-automation-capabilities-to-evade-detection
The Hacker News	https://thehackernews.com/2026/01/cybercriminals-abuse-google-cloud-email.html
RavenMail Analysis	https://ravenmail.io/blog/phishing-using-google-infra

B.3 Qilin (Agenda) Ransomware

Intelligence Summary

Attribute	Value
Also Known As	Agenda
Type	Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)
Active Since	2022
2025 Victims	1,000+ claimed
Detection Confidence	MEDIUM
IOC Availability	Vendor-gated (subscription required)

Recent Activity (Week of January 6, 2026)

Date	Victim	Source
Jan 2, 2026	Ellison Educational Equipment	Ransomware.live
Jan 2, 2026	Farmacia San Pablo	Ransomware.live
Jan 2, 2026	Multiple others	Ransomware.live

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping (VERIFIED)

Source: MITRE ATT&CK S1242, Rescana, KELA, Qualys

Tactic	Technique ID	Technique Name
Initial Access	T1566.001	Spearphishing Attachment
	T1566.002	Spearphishing Link
	T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution	T1059.001	PowerShell
	T1204.002	User Execution: Malicious File
Persistence	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys
	T1547.004	Winlogon Helper DLL
Privilege Escalation	T1548.002	Bypass User Account Control
	T1134	Access Token Manipulation
Defense Evasion	T1562.001	Disable or Modify Tools
	T1070.001	Clear Windows Event Logs
	T1070.004	File Deletion
	T1027.013	File Obfuscation
Credential Access	T1003.001	LSASS Memory
Discovery	T1087.001	Local Account Discovery
	T1083	File and Directory Discovery
	T1018	Remote System Discovery
	T1135	Network Share Discovery
Lateral Movement	T1021.002	SMB/Windows Admin Shares
	T1053.005	Scheduled Task
Impact	T1486	Data Encrypted for Impact
	T1490	Inhibit System Recovery

Known Tooling

Tool	Purpose
Cobalt Strike	C2, lateral movement
SystemBC RAT	Proxy, persistence
SliverC2	Alternative C2 framework
Mimikatz (Themida-packed)	Credential dumping
NetExec	Network enumeration
MeshCentral	Remote management
Kickidler	Legitimate monitoring tool (abused)

Publicly Available IOCs (Partial)

Source: Compiled from SentinelOne, HHS, Sophos, Blackpoint Cyber, Cyble

# IP Addresses (verify currency before blocking)
194.165.16[.]13
93.115.25[.]139

# Domain (trojanized installer)
rv-tool[.]net

Note: Complete IOC lists require subscription to:

KELA Cyber
SOCRadar
HHS HC3 (healthcare sector)

Generic Detection (SigmaHQ)

These are generic ransomware behaviors, not Qilin-specific:

# PowerShell Download Cradle Detection
title: Suspicious PowerShell Download
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '.downloadstring('
      - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
      - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
  condition: selection

# Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
title: VSS Deletion Attempt
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'vssadmin'
      - 'delete'
      - 'shadows'
  condition: selection

# Windows Event Log Clearing
title: Security Log Cleared
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 1102
  condition: selection

Defense Priorities

MFA everywhere – Especially RDP, VPN, email
Backup integrity – Test restoration weekly
Network segmentation – Limit lateral movement
Endpoint detection – Monitor for credential dumping, VSS deletion
User training – Phishing remains primary initial access

Sources

Source	URL
MITRE ATT&CK	https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1242/
Qualys Analysis	https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2025/06/18/qilin-ransomware-explained-threats-risks-defenses
KELA Profile	https://www.kelacyber.com/blog/ransomware-threat-actor-profile-qilin/
Darktrace	https://www.darktrace.com/blog/a-busy-agenda-darktraces-detection-of-qilin-ransomware-as-a-service-operator
Ransomware.live	https://www.ransomware.live/

B.4 TridentLocker Ransomware (Sedgwick Incident)

Intelligence Summary

Attribute	Value
Incident Date	December 31, 2025
Victim	Sedgwick Government Solutions
Data Claimed	3.4 GB
Detection Confidence	LOW
IOC Availability	NOT AVAILABLE

Incident Details

On December 31, 2025, the TridentLocker ransomware group claimed to have attacked Sedgwick Government Solutions, a company providing claims and risk management services to federal agencies including DHS, ICE, CBP, USCIS, Department of Labor, and CISA.

Sedgwick confirmed it is addressing a security incident. The subsidiary is segmented from broader Sedgwick corporate systems.

What We DON’T Have

Missing Intel	Status
IOCs	Not publicly available
MITRE ATT&CK mapping	No technical analysis published
Detection rules	Not available
Attack methodology	Not disclosed
File hashes	Not available

Recommended Action

Monitor for emerging intelligence:

Ransomware.live
ID Ransomware
Bleeping Computer forums
Vendor threat intelligence portals

Apply generic ransomware defenses as documented in Qilin section.

Source

Source	URL
The Record	https://therecord.media/sedgwick-cyber-incident-ransomware

B.5 Fortinet SSL VPN (CVE-2020-12812)

Intelligence Summary

Attribute	Value
CVE	CVE-2020-12812
Renewed Warning	December 24, 2025
Exposed Instances	9,700+ (January 2, 2026)
Detection Confidence	HIGH
Issue Type	Configuration vulnerability (2FA bypass)

Vulnerability Description

CVE-2020-12812 allows attackers to bypass two-factor authentication on FortiOS SSL VPN when LDAP authentication is used with specific configurations. This is a 2020 vulnerability with renewed exploitation activity.

Detection

Configuration Audit – Check FortiOS for vulnerable settings:

LDAP authentication enabled
2FA configured but bypassable
Review authentication policies

Remediation

Apply current FortiOS patches
Review LDAP authentication configuration
Verify 2FA is correctly enforced
Consider additional authentication controls

Source

Source	URL
The Hacker News	https://thehackernews.com/2025/12/fortinet-warns-of-active-exploitation.html

SECTION C: CISA KEV & VULNERABILITY TABLE

Current CISA KEV Items Affecting Stack

CVE	Product	CVSS	Exploitation	CISA Deadline	Action
CVE-2025-14847	MongoDB Server	8.7	Active	Jan 19, 2026	Patch immediately
CVE-2020-12812	Fortinet FortiOS	9.8	Active	Ongoing	Config review

SECTION D: CONTROL FRAMEWORK MAPPING

For GRC, Compliance, and Audit Teams

D.1 This Week’s Activities → Control Alignment

MongoDB Patching (CVE-2025-14847)

Framework	Control ID	Control Name
CIS 18	7.1	Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process
CIS 18	7.2	Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process
CIS 18	7.4	Perform Automated Application Patch Management
NIST CSF	ID.RA-01	Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented
NIST CSF	PR.PS-02	Software is maintained, replaced, and removed
NIST CSF	RS.MI-02	Incidents are mitigated
ISO 27001	A.8.8	Management of technical vulnerabilities
ISO 27001	A.8.9	Configuration management

Phishing Awareness Training

Framework	Control ID	Control Name
CIS 18	14.1	Establish and Maintain a Security Awareness Program
CIS 18	14.2	Train Workforce Members to Recognize Social Engineering
CIS 18	14.3	Train Workforce on Authentication Best Practices
NIST CSF	PR.AT-01	All users are informed and trained
NIST CSF	PR.AT-02	Privileged users understand roles
ISO 27001	A.6.3	Information security awareness, education and training

Backup Testing (Ransomware Preparedness)

Framework	Control ID	Control Name
CIS 18	11.1	Establish and Maintain a Data Recovery Process
CIS 18	11.2	Perform Automated Backups
CIS 18	11.3	Protect Recovery Data
CIS 18	11.4	Establish and Maintain an Isolated Instance of Recovery Data
CIS 18	11.5	Test Data Recovery
NIST CSF	PR.DS-11	Backups of data are created, protected, maintained, and tested
NIST CSF	RC.RP-01	Recovery plan is executed during or after a cybersecurity incident
ISO 27001	A.8.13	Information backup
ISO 27001	A.5.29	Information security during disruption

Fortinet Configuration Review

Framework	Control ID	Control Name
CIS 18	4.1	Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process
CIS 18	6.3	Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications
CIS 18	6.4	Require MFA for Remote Network Access
NIST CSF	PR.AA-01	Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked
NIST CSF	PR.AA-03	Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated
ISO 27001	A.8.5	Secure authentication
ISO 27001	A.8.20	Networks security

D.2 Control Coverage Summary

Mitigation	CIS Controls	NIST CSF	ISO 27001
MongoDB Patching	7.1, 7.2, 7.4	ID.RA, PR.PS, RS.MI	A.8.8, A.8.9
Phishing Awareness	14.1, 14.2, 14.3	PR.AT	A.6.3
Backup Testing	11.1-11.5	PR.DS, RC.RP	A.8.13, A.5.29
Fortinet Review	4.1, 6.3, 6.4	PR.AA	A.8.5, A.8.20

SECTION E: DETECTION TOOLKIT SUMMARY

Quick Reference for Security Operations

E.1 Ready-to-Deploy Tools

Threat	Tool	Source	Command
MongoBleed	mongobleed-detector	Neo23x0	`./mongobleed-detector.sh` or `-p /var/log/mongodb/.log`
MongoBleed	Velociraptor Artifact	Eric Capuano	`Linux.Detection.CVE202514847.MongoBleed`
MongoBleed	Nuclei Template	Wiz Research	`nuclei -t cve-2025-14847.yaml -u mongodb://target:27017`

E.2 Log Queries

MongoDB Exploitation Indicators

# NOTE: For reliable detection, use the verified Neo23x0 tool:
# ./mongobleed-detector.sh --data-dir /var/log/mongodb/
#
# For manual log review, search for Event ID patterns:

# Find connection events (Event ID 22943)
grep '"id":22943' /var/log/mongodb/mongod.log | tail -50

# Find metadata events (Event ID 51800) - should match connections
grep '"id":51800' /var/log/mongodb/mongod.log | tail -50

# Search for BSON parsing errors (exploitation artifact)
grep "InvalidBSON" /var/log/mongodb/mongod.log

# Search for slow query spikes
grep "Slow query" /var/log/mongodb/mongod.log | wc -l

Generic Ransomware Indicators (Windows)

# NOTE: Event ID 4688 requires "Audit Process Creation" with command-line logging enabled
# Check policy: auditpol /get /subcategory:"Process Creation"
# Enable: Group Policy > Audit Policy > Detailed Tracking > Audit Process Creation

# Check for VSS deletion attempts (requires command-line auditing)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security';ID=4688} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
  Where-Object {$_.Message -like "*vssadmin*delete*shadows*"}

# Check for security log clearing (Event ID 1102)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security';ID=1102} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

# Check for suspicious PowerShell (requires PowerShell Script Block Logging)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational';ID=4104} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object {$_.Message -like "*downloadstring*" -or $_.Message -like "*Invoke-WebRequest*"}

SECTION F: INTELLIGENCE GAPS & RECOMMENDATIONS

F.1 What This Briefing Provides

Verified detection tools with working code
MITRE ATT&CK mappings confirmed by multiple sources
Honest confidence assessments
Source URLs for all claims
Framework compliance mappings

F.2 What This Briefing Does NOT Provide

Complete IOC lists for Qilin (requires vendor subscription)
TridentLocker technical analysis (not yet available)
Specific phishing URLs (not released by Check Point)
Sigma rules specific to Qilin (generic rules only)
YARA rules (not applicable or not publicly available)

F.3 Recommended Intelligence Subscriptions

To fill gaps, consider:

Vendor	Coverage	URL
KELA Cyber	Ransomware IOCs, dark web monitoring	https://www.kelacyber.com
SOCRadar	Threat intelligence, IOC feeds	https://socradar.io
VirusTotal Enterprise	IOC enrichment, hunting	https://www.virustotal.com
HHS HC3	Healthcare-specific ransomware intel	https://www.hhs.gov/hc3

SECTION G: UPCOMING EVENTS

Date	Event	Action Required
Jan 14, 2026	Microsoft Patch Tuesday	Prepare test environments
Jan 19, 2026	CISA KEV deadline (MongoDB)	Complete patching
Ongoing	Ransomware monitoring	Daily victim tracking

SECTION H: SOURCES

Primary Sources

Category	Source	URL
Vulnerability	CISA KEV	https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
Detection	Neo23x0 MongoBleed Detector	https://github.com/Neo23x0/mongobleed-detector
Detection	Eric Capuano Blog	https://blog.ecapuano.com/p/hunting-mongobleed-cve-2025-14847
Detection	Wiz Research	https://www.wiz.io/blog/mongobleed-cve-2025-14847-exploited-in-the-wild-mongodb
Phishing	Check Point Research	https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/phishing-campaign-leverages-trusted-google-cloud-automation-capabilities-to-evade-detection
Ransomware	Ransomware.live	https://www.ransomware.live
Ransomware	The Record	https://therecord.media
Ransomware	MITRE ATT&CK	https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1242/
Analysis	The Hacker News	https://thehackernews.com
Analysis	Bleeping Computer	https://www.bleepingcomputer.com
Analysis	SecurityWeek	https://www.securityweek.com
Frameworks	CIS Controls	https://www.cisecurity.org/controls
Frameworks	NIST CSF	https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
Frameworks	ISO 27001	https://www.iso.org/standard/27001

Document Version: 1.0
Prepared: January 5, 2026
Classification: Public
Next Update: January 13, 2026

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TJS Weekly Security Intelligence Briefing – Week of Jan 5th 2026

January 5th TJS Weekly Security Intelligence Briefing

Table of Contents

SECTION A: EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

A.1 Executive Summary

A.2 Intelligence Confidence Summary

A.3 Critical Actions by Priority

A.4 Framework Compliance Summary

SECTION B: THREAT INTELLIGENCE DETAILS

B.1 MongoDB MongoBleed (CVE-2025-14847)

Intelligence Summary

Vulnerability Description

Affected Versions

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Exposure Data

Detection Tools (VERIFIED – READY TO DEPLOY)

Tool 1: MongoBleed Detector (Florian Roth)

Tool 2: Velociraptor Artifact (Eric Capuano)

Tool 3: Nuclei Template (Wiz Research)

Log Indicators to Monitor

Enable Enhanced Logging

Remediation Steps

Sources

B.2 Google Cloud Application Integration Phishing Campaign

Intelligence Summary

Attack Methodology

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Attack Chain

Verified Indicators

Industry Targeting

Detection Recommendations

Limitations

Sources

B.3 Qilin (Agenda) Ransomware

Intelligence Summary

Recent Activity (Week of January 6, 2026)

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping (VERIFIED)

Known Tooling

Publicly Available IOCs (Partial)

Generic Detection (SigmaHQ)

Defense Priorities

Sources

B.4 TridentLocker Ransomware (Sedgwick Incident)

Intelligence Summary

Incident Details

What We DON’T Have

Recommended Action

Source

B.5 Fortinet SSL VPN (CVE-2020-12812)

Intelligence Summary

Vulnerability Description

Detection

Remediation

Source

SECTION C: CISA KEV & VULNERABILITY TABLE

Current CISA KEV Items Affecting Stack

SECTION D: CONTROL FRAMEWORK MAPPING

D.1 This Week’s Activities → Control Alignment

MongoDB Patching (CVE-2025-14847)

Phishing Awareness Training

Backup Testing (Ransomware Preparedness)

Fortinet Configuration Review

D.2 Control Coverage Summary

SECTION E: DETECTION TOOLKIT SUMMARY

E.1 Ready-to-Deploy Tools

E.2 Log Queries

MongoDB Exploitation Indicators

Generic Ransomware Indicators (Windows)

SECTION F: INTELLIGENCE GAPS & RECOMMENDATIONS

F.1 What This Briefing Provides

F.2 What This Briefing Does NOT Provide

F.3 Recommended Intelligence Subscriptions

SECTION G: UPCOMING EVENTS

SECTION H: SOURCES

Primary Sources

Tech Jacks Solutions

University of Hawaii Cancer Center hit by ransomware attack BleepingComputerSergiu Gatlan

New Malware Campaign Delivers Remcos RAT Through Multi-Stage Windows Attack The Hacker Newsinfo@thehackernews.com (The Hacker News)