Author: Tech Jacks Solutions

50,000 Copilot licences for Indian service companiesAI News Cognizant, Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys, and Wipro have announced plans to deploy more than 200,000 Microsoft Copilot licenses in their enterprises – over 50,000 per company – in what Microsoft is calling a new benchmark for enterprise-scale adoption of generative AI. The companies involved are framing the move as the implementation of a default tool
The post 50,000 Copilot licences for Indian service companies appeared first on AI News.

 Cognizant, Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys, and Wipro have announced plans to deploy more than 200,000 Microsoft Copilot licenses in their enterprises – over 50,000 per company – in what Microsoft is calling a new benchmark for enterprise-scale adoption of generative AI. The companies involved are framing the move as the implementation of a default tool
The post 50,000 Copilot licences for Indian service companies appeared first on AI News. Read More  

Penetration Testing of Agentic AI: A Comparative Security Analysis Across Models and Frameworkscs.AI updates on arXiv.org arXiv:2512.14860v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Agentic AI introduces security vulnerabilities that traditional LLM safeguards fail to address. Although recent work by Unit 42 at Palo Alto Networks demonstrated that ChatGPT-4o successfully executes attacks as an agent that it refuses in chat mode, there is no comparative analysis in multiple models and frameworks. We conducted the first systematic penetration testing and comparative evaluation of agentic AI systems, testing five prominent models (Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-4o, Grok 2, and Nova Pro) across two agentic AI frameworks (AutoGen and CrewAI) using a seven-agent architecture that mimics the functionality of a university information management system and 13 distinct attack scenarios that span prompt injection, Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), SQL injection, and tool misuse. Our 130 total test cases reveal significant security disparities: AutoGen demonstrates a 52.3% refusal rate versus CrewAI’s 30.8%, while model performance ranges from Nova Pro’s 46.2% to Claude and Grok 2’s 38.5%. Most critically, Grok 2 on CrewAI rejected only 2 of 13 attacks (15.4% refusal rate), and the overall refusal rate of 41.5% across all configurations indicates that more than half of malicious prompts succeeded despite enterprise-grade safety mechanisms. We identify six distinct defensive behavior patterns including a novel “hallucinated compliance” strategy where models fabricate outputs rather than executing or refusing attacks, and provide actionable recommendations for secure agent deployment. Complete attack prompts are also included in the Appendix to enable reproducibility.

 arXiv:2512.14860v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Agentic AI introduces security vulnerabilities that traditional LLM safeguards fail to address. Although recent work by Unit 42 at Palo Alto Networks demonstrated that ChatGPT-4o successfully executes attacks as an agent that it refuses in chat mode, there is no comparative analysis in multiple models and frameworks. We conducted the first systematic penetration testing and comparative evaluation of agentic AI systems, testing five prominent models (Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-4o, Grok 2, and Nova Pro) across two agentic AI frameworks (AutoGen and CrewAI) using a seven-agent architecture that mimics the functionality of a university information management system and 13 distinct attack scenarios that span prompt injection, Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), SQL injection, and tool misuse. Our 130 total test cases reveal significant security disparities: AutoGen demonstrates a 52.3% refusal rate versus CrewAI’s 30.8%, while model performance ranges from Nova Pro’s 46.2% to Claude and Grok 2’s 38.5%. Most critically, Grok 2 on CrewAI rejected only 2 of 13 attacks (15.4% refusal rate), and the overall refusal rate of 41.5% across all configurations indicates that more than half of malicious prompts succeeded despite enterprise-grade safety mechanisms. We identify six distinct defensive behavior patterns including a novel “hallucinated compliance” strategy where models fabricate outputs rather than executing or refusing attacks, and provide actionable recommendations for secure agent deployment. Complete attack prompts are also included in the Appendix to enable reproducibility. Read More  

Introducing SOCI indexing for Amazon SageMaker Studio: Faster container startup times for AI/ML workloadsArtificial Intelligence Today, we are excited to introduce a new feature for SageMaker Studio: SOCI (Seekable Open Container Initiative) indexing. SOCI supports lazy loading of container images, where only the necessary parts of an image are downloaded initially rather than the entire container.

 Today, we are excited to introduce a new feature for SageMaker Studio: SOCI (Seekable Open Container Initiative) indexing. SOCI supports lazy loading of container images, where only the necessary parts of an image are downloaded initially rather than the entire container. Read More