INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
Security Command Center

TLP:CLEAR
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iRhythm Healthcare Data Breach Exposes Protected Health Information via Third-Party Applications

DATA BREACH | HIGH

SCC Item ID	SCC-DBR-2026-0176
Type	Data Breach
Severity	HIGH
Affected Products	iRhythm Technologies, third-party-hosted business applications (specific vendors and versions not publicly disclosed)
Published	6 hours ago
Discovery Source	Serper

Executive Summary

iRhythm Technologies disclosed unauthorized access to protected health information (PHI) stored on third-party-hosted business applications, triggering HIPAA breach notification obligations. The breach affects patient data managed through external vendor platforms; the full scope of records exposed, the attack vector, and responsible threat actor have not been publicly confirmed. Organizations with similar third-party PHI hosting arrangements face heightened regulatory scrutiny and patient notification liability.

Technical Analysis

iRhythm Technologies reported unauthorized access to PHI held by third-party business application providers. No CVE identifier is associated with this incident. The breach maps to CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) and MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) and T1078 (Valid Accounts), indicating the vector likely involved either exploitation of an externally exposed application or abuse of legitimate credentials at the third-party host. Specific vendor names, application versions, and affected record counts have not been publicly disclosed as of the configuration date. No patch identifier, vendor advisory, or confirmed IOCs are available in current sources. HHS OCR breach reporting portal (ocrportal.hhs.gov) is the authoritative tracking source for formal scope disclosure.

Action Checklist

1. Step 1: Containment. If your organization uses iRhythm-connected third-party business applications that handle PHI, immediately audit active sessions and access tokens for those platforms. Suspend any integrations with unconfirmed vendor security posture pending official iRhythm disclosure. Reference NIST AC-17 (Remote Access) to verify connection controls on all external application integrations.
2. Step 2: Detection. Review access logs for third-party-hosted applications that store or transmit PHI, focusing on anomalous authentication events, off-hours access, and bulk data exports. Apply NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting) cadence. Query for T1078 indicators: logins from unexpected geolocations, service account access outside normal patterns, and token reuse across sessions. No confirmed IOCs are available; behavioral baselines are the primary detection mechanism at this stage.
3. Step 3: Eradication. No specific patch or vendor advisory is publicly available. Rotate credentials and API keys for any third-party business applications that interface with PHI repositories (NIST AC-2, Account Management; D3-CRO, Credential Rotation). Enforce re-authentication for all privileged accounts on affected external platforms. Apply D3-UAP (User Account Permissions) review to confirm least-privilege access across third-party integrations.
4. Step 4: Recovery. Validate that PHI data flows to and from third-party applications are operating under verified, updated credentials. Confirm audit logging is active and centrally collected per NIST AU-12 (Audit Record Generation) and CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs). Monitor for resumed unauthorized access attempts for a minimum of 30 days post-remediation.
5. Step 5: Post-Incident. Conduct a third-party risk review against all vendors with PHI access. Formalize vendor security assessment requirements aligned with NIST AC-20 (Use of External Systems). Document control gaps identified in this incident and update the organization's HIPAA Business Associate Agreement (BAA) review cycle. Apply CIS 1.1 (Enterprise Asset Inventory) and CIS 5.1 (Inventory of Accounts) to ensure all third-party PHI access points are catalogued.

IR / Forensic Enrichment

Triage Priority	URGENT
Escalation Criteria	Escalate immediately to HIPAA Privacy Officer, Legal, and executive leadership if log analysis confirms unauthorized access to PHI records affecting 500 or more individuals (triggering HHS Office for Civil Rights notification within 60 days), if any evidence of bulk data exfiltration is identified, or if the organization lacks visibility into the specific third-party platforms implicated by iRhythm's disclosure.
Recovery Notes	Post-containment, validate that all PHI data flows to iRhythm-connected third-party applications are operating exclusively under newly rotated credentials and that legacy API keys generate no further traffic — any activity from deprecated key IDs constitutes a re-compromise indicator requiring immediate escalation. Maintain enhanced logging and manual review of authentication and data-export events across all affected vendor platforms for a minimum of 30 days, given the absence of confirmed IOCs and the behavioral-baseline-only detection posture. Document the scope of PHI potentially exposed for HIPAA breach notification assessment, as the 60-day notification clock runs from the date the breach was discovered, not from iRhythm's public disclosure.

Forensic Artifacts	Third-party vendor platform authentication audit logs: specifically events showing source IP geolocation anomalies, user-agent strings inconsistent with known internal tooling, MFA bypass events, and service account logins outside established operational hours — the primary behavioral indicators in the absence of confirmed IOCs for this breach. | OAuth 2.0 and API key usage records from the IdP (Azure AD, Okta, or equivalent): access token issuance timestamps, scopes granted, refresh token usage patterns, and any token reuse across geographically disparate sessions, which would indicate credential theft or session hijacking against the third-party application integrations. | Data-export and bulk-query event logs from each third-party hosted application: API pagination sequences returning large PHI datasets, scheduled report downloads, or record-export events executed by service accounts — the artifact class most directly evidencing PHI exfiltration from externally hosted business applications. | PHI data flow network logs (firewall, proxy, or API gateway): outbound connections from third-party application infrastructure to unexpected external IP ranges or domains, particularly large-payload HTTPS POST or GET responses that could represent bulk PHI extraction, captured during the suspected compromise window. | BAA and vendor security attestation records (SOC 2 Type II reports, penetration test summaries, security questionnaire responses): documentation of the vendor's security posture at the time of the breach, which establishes the due-diligence baseline for regulatory and legal purposes under HIPAA's third-party risk management obligations.

Per-Action IR Details

Step 1: Containment — If your organization uses iRhythm-connected third-party business applications that handle PHI, immediately audit active sessions and access tokens for those platforms. Suspend any integrations with unconfirmed vendor security posture pending official iRhythm disclosure. Reference NIST AC-17 (Remote Access) to verify connection controls on all external application integrations.

NIST Phase: Containment

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.3 — Containment Strategy

Controls: NIST AC-17 (Remote Access), NIST AC-12 (Session Termination), CIS 6.2 (Establish an Access Revoking Process)

Compensating: For teams without a PAM or SSO console: enumerate active OAuth tokens and API keys for iRhythm-connected vendor platforms by pulling application-level session logs or admin dashboards manually. Run 'Get-AzureADUserSignInActivity' (Azure) or equivalent IdP audit export to list active sessions against third-party app registrations. Revoke suspicious tokens directly via vendor admin portal. Document each integration endpoint in a spreadsheet before suspension so you can validate completeness.

Evidence: Before suspending any integration or revoking tokens, capture: (1) a full export of active OAuth 2.0 access and refresh tokens from the IdP (Azure AD, Okta, or equivalent) for all third-party app registrations that have PHI scope; (2) current session state from the third-party vendor admin consoles (session IDs, source IPs, timestamps, user agents); (3) API gateway or reverse proxy access logs showing inbound/outbound calls to iRhythm-connected application endpoints in the 30 days preceding disclosure. These are volatile — token revocation destroys the active session record that could identify the adversary's access window.

Step 2: Detection — Review access logs for third-party-hosted applications that store or transmit PHI, focusing on anomalous authentication events, off-hours access, and bulk data exports. Apply NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting) cadence. Query for T1078 indicators: logins from unexpected geolocations, service account access outside normal patterns, and token reuse across sessions. No confirmed IOCs are available; behavioral baselines are the primary detection mechanism at this stage.

NIST Phase: Detection Analysis

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 — Detection and Analysis

Controls: NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), NIST AU-3 (Content Of Audit Records), CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs)

Compensating: Without a SIEM: export authentication logs from each third-party vendor portal (most SaaS platforms provide a downloadable audit log in CSV/JSON) and parse with PowerShell or Python. Use this PowerShell one-liner to flag off-hours logins: 'Import-Csv auth_log.csv | Where-Object { [int]($_.timestamp | Get-Date).Hour -notin 7..18 } | Export-Csv suspicious_logins.csv'. For bulk-export detection, filter for API calls with response payload sizes significantly exceeding the 95th-percentile baseline for that service account. Use Sigma rule 'win_susp_oauth_token_reuse.yml' if logs can be ingested into a local Elasticsearch instance.

Evidence: Capture before any remediation action: (1) raw authentication logs from each third-party application's audit trail covering at least 90 days — specifically fields for user agent, source IP, authentication method (password, token, MFA bypass), and session duration; (2) data-export or download event logs from the vendor platform (look for bulk record retrieval events, API pagination calls returning large PHI datasets, or report-generation events tied to service accounts); (3) IdP sign-in logs for all accounts granted access to iRhythm-connected apps, preserving the original geolocation and device fingerprint fields that may be overwritten on log rotation. Given no confirmed IOCs, behavioral deviation from 30-day baselines is the primary artifact class.

Step 3: Eradication — No specific patch or vendor advisory is publicly available. Rotate credentials and API keys for any third-party business applications that interface with PHI repositories (NIST AC-2, Account Management; D3-CRO, Credential Rotation). Enforce re-authentication for all privileged accounts on affected external platforms. Apply D3-UAP (User Account Permissions) review to confirm least-privilege access across third-party integrations.

NIST Phase: Eradication

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.4 — Eradication and Recovery

Controls: NIST AC-2 (Account Management), NIST AC-6 (Least Privilege), CIS 5.1 (Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Accounts), CIS 6.2 (Establish an Access Revoking Process)

Compensating: Without enterprise PAM: build a manual API key and service account inventory using the vendor admin console exports gathered in Step 1. Rotate each credential individually via the vendor portal, recording the old key hash (if available), rotation timestamp, and authorizing analyst. For platforms exposing a management API, automate rotation with a short Python script using the vendor SDK (e.g., for AWS-hosted integrations: 'aws iam create-access-key' followed by 'aws iam delete-access-key'). Verify re-authentication enforcement by attempting a login with a revoked token and confirming rejection in the audit log.

Evidence: Before rotating any credential or API key: (1) capture the full list of existing API key IDs, their creation dates, last-used timestamps, and associated IAM roles or scopes from the vendor admin console — this establishes which keys may have been active during the breach window; (2) export current permission assignments for all accounts on affected third-party platforms, preserving the exact permission sets prior to least-privilege enforcement so you can document scope of potential unauthorized access; (3) if the vendor platform supports it, pull the API call history for each service account to identify which PHI endpoints were queried and what data volumes were returned during the suspected compromise period. These records are volatile in the sense that vendor log retention windows (often 30-90 days) may purge them if not exported promptly.

Step 4: Recovery — Validate that PHI data flows to and from third-party applications are operating under verified, updated credentials. Confirm audit logging is active and centrally collected per NIST AU-12 (Audit Record Generation) and CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs). Monitor for resumed unauthorized access attempts for a minimum of 30 days post-remediation.

NIST Phase: Recovery

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.5 — Recovery

Controls: NIST AU-12 (Audit Record Generation), NIST AU-9 (Protection Of Audit Information), CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs), CIS 4.4 (Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers)

Compensating: Without a centralized SIEM: configure each third-party vendor platform to forward audit logs via webhook or scheduled export to a hardened internal log repository (e.g., a self-hosted Graylog or Elasticsearch instance). Implement a daily cron job to pull and hash-verify log exports so tampering is detectable. Set up email or

SMS alerting on vendor platforms for any authentication event originating from a new IP or device — most SaaS platforms offer this natively at no cost. Run weekly manual reviews of authentication and data-export logs for the 30-day monitoring window using the same PowerShell/Python parsing approach from Step 2.

Evidence: At recovery validation, confirm the following are generating and forwarding correctly: (1) authentication success/failure events for all accounts on iRhythm-connected platforms, with MFA status and source IP recorded per event; (2) data-access events for PHI record queries, including record counts returned, to establish a new clean baseline; (3) API key usage logs confirming only newly rotated keys are generating traffic — any activity from a deprecated key ID is an immediate re-compromise indicator. Preserve log integrity by storing exports in write-once or append-only storage with hash verification.

Step 5: Post-Incident — Conduct a third-party risk review against all vendors with PHI access. Formalize vendor security assessment requirements aligned with NIST AC-20 (Use of External Systems). Document control gaps identified in this incident and update the organization's HIPAA Business Associate Agreement (BAA) review cycle. Apply CIS 1.1 (Enterprise Asset Inventory) and CIS 5.1 (Inventory of Accounts) to ensure all third-party PHI access points are catalogued.

NIST Phase: Post Incident

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity

Controls: NIST AC-20 (Use Of External Systems), NIST AU-11 (Audit Record Retention), CIS 1.1 (Establish and Maintain Detailed Enterprise Asset Inventory), CIS 5.1 (Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Accounts), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)

Compensating: Without a GRC platform: create a vendor PHI risk register in a spreadsheet tracking each third-party application name, PHI data types hosted, BAA status, last security assessment date, and incident history. Use CISA's free Third-Party Relationship Security guidance and the NIST SP 800-161 supply chain risk checklist as assessment templates. Assign each vendor a quarterly review cadence, prioritizing those with direct PHI repository access. Store the register in a version-controlled repository (Git) so changes are auditable.

Evidence: For the post-incident record: (1) the complete pre- and post-incident vendor access inventory, documenting which third-party applications held PHI access, what data categories were in scope, and the credential/permission state at time of discovery versus after eradication; (2) all log exports collected during Steps 1-4, retained for a minimum of six years per HIPAA audit retention requirements — document hash values to establish chain of custody; (3) the BAA review records for vendors implicated in or connected to the iRhythm disclosure, including any vendor-provided security attestations or SOC 2 reports obtained during the post-incident review; (4) the lessons-learned document capturing detection timeline, dwell time estimate, and control gaps for regulatory and internal audit purposes.

Detection Guidance

No confirmed IOCs are available from public sources as of the configuration date. Detection should focus on behavioral indicators aligned with T1190 and T1078. Query authentication logs for third-party-hosted business applications for: (1) logins from IP ranges inconsistent with normal vendor or employee geography; (2) service account or API key authentication outside established time windows; (3) bulk record access or export events on PHI-containing data stores; (4) failed authentication spikes preceding successful logins, consistent with credential stuffing. Apply NIST AU-6 review procedures to external application audit logs. Confirm that third-party vendors are forwarding logs to your SIEM per CIS 8.2. Use D3-LAM (Local Account Monitoring) principles extended to federated and third-party accounts. Monitor HHS OCR breach portal for formal scope disclosure that may yield additional indicators.

Framework Mappings

MITRE-ATTACK

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1078** — Valid Accounts

NIST-800-53R5

- **CA-8** — Penetration Testing
- **RA-5** — Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning
- **SC-7** — Boundary Protection
- **SI-2** — Flaw Remediation
- **SI-7** — Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity
- **AC-2** — Account Management
- **AC-6** — Least Privilege
- **IA-2** — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)
- **IA-5** — Authenticator Management
- **AC-3** — Access Enforcement
- **SR-2** — Supply Chain Risk Management Plan

OWASP-TOP10-2021

- **A01:2021** — Broken Access Control

CIS-V8

- **6.1** — Establish an Access Granting Process
- **6.2** — Establish an Access Revoking Process
- **15.1** — Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Service Providers

SOC2-TSC

- **CC6.1** — The entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures over protected information assets
- **CC7.4** — Responds to identified security incidents
- **CC9.2** — Manages risks associated with vendors and business partners
- **CC6.3** — Authorizes, modifies, or removes access

HIPAA-SECURITY

- **164.312(a)(1)** — Access Control
- **164.308(a)(6)(ii)** — Response and Reporting

ISO-27001-2022

- **A.5.34** — Privacy and protection of personal information
- **A.5.21** — Managing information security in the ICT supply chain

NIST-CSF-2

- **RS.CO-03** — Recovery activities and progress communicated
- **GV.SC-01** — Cybersecurity supply chain risk management program

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID	Technique Name	Tactic
T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Initial-Access
T1078	Valid Accounts	Defense-Evasion

Sources

Source	URL	Tier
	https://www.massdevice.com/irhythm-reports-cybersecurity-breach-hea...	T3
iRhythm reports cybersecurity breach with protected health data ...	https://x.com/EpicPlain/status/2066647876806017453	T3
HIPAA Notice of Privacy Practices - iRhythm Technologies	https://www.irhythmtech.com/us/en/who-we-are/trust-center/privacy/h...	T3
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services - Office for Civil Rights	https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf	T1
iRhythm Data Breach Exposes PHI in Cybersecurity Incident	https://thecyberexpress.com/irhythm-data-breach/	T3

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