INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
Security Command Center
TLP:CLEAR
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# FIFA World Cup 2026 Fraud Wave: Lookalike Domains and Banking Malware Targeting Fans

**THREAT CAMPAIGN** | **HIGH** | CVSS 7.4

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| **SCC Item ID** | SCC-CAM-2026-0432 |
| **Type** | Threat Campaign |
| **Severity** | HIGH |
| **CVSS Base Score** | 7.4 |
| **Affected Products** | General consumers, World Cup ticket seekers, streaming viewers; FIFA-themed phishing domains; pirated streaming applications |
| **Published** | 2026-06-07 |
| **Discovery Source** | Gemini |

## Executive Summary

Cybercriminals have registered approximately 19,000 FIFA-themed lookalike domains and embedded banking malware in pirated streaming applications to defraud fans ahead of the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Consumers seeking tickets or free streams are being targeted through credential harvesting pages and malware-laced downloads designed to steal payment card data and banking credentials. The FBI has issued a public advisory on this campaign; organizations with employees or customers engaging in World Cup-related activity face reputational and fraud liability exposure.

## Technical Analysis

This campaign combines two distinct attack chains. First, threat actors registered approximately 19,000 typosquatted and lookalike domains impersonating FIFA and affiliated ticket/streaming services (T1583.001, Acquire Infrastructure: Domains), using these sites to harvest credentials and payment card data via spearphishing links (T1566.002) and web-based credential theft (T1598.003, CWE-1021, UI Redressing). Second, banking malware is delivered inside trojanized streaming applications distributed through unofficial channels, relying on user execution (T1204.002, Malicious File) and masquerading as legitimate software (T1036.005, Match Legitimate Name or Location, CWE-494, Download of Code Without Integrity Check). The malware captures financial credentials via web form injection or overlay techniques (T1056.003, GUI Input Capture). CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) underlies both chains. No CVE is associated. No specific threat actor has been publicly attributed. The FBI advisory and CYFIRMA research represent the primary public intelligence sources.

## Action Checklist

1. Step 1: Containment. Block DNS resolution and web proxy access to known FIFA-themed lookalike domain patterns (e.g., wildcards on fifa2026*, worldcup2026*, fifaticket*) at your DNS filtering and web gateway layers. Alert employees via internal communication to purchase tickets and streaming access exclusively through official FIFA channels (fifa.com and verified broadcaster sites). Implement NIST AC-4 (Information Flow Enforcement) to restrict outbound traffic to uncategorized or newly registered domains via proxy policy.
2. Step 2: Detection. Query DNS and proxy logs for resolution attempts against domains registered within the last 90 days containing strings 'fifa', 'worldcup', 'wc2026', or 'ticket' combined with common lookalike TLDs (.shop, .live, .stream, .club, .online). Review endpoint detection logs for execution of unsigned or unverified applications downloaded from non-enterprise sources, particularly media player or streaming binaries. Apply NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting) cadence to these log sources. Reference CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs) to confirm logging coverage across endpoints and proxies. Behavioral indicators include: unexpected browser credential store access, overlay windows on banking sites, and outbound C2 traffic from non-browser processes. No specific IOC hashes or IPs have been publicly confirmed at sufficient confidence for direct inclusion.
3. Step 3: Eradication. Remove any user-installed streaming applications sourced outside official enterprise software channels. Enforce CIS 2.3 (Address Unauthorized Software) by scanning endpoints for unauthorized media applications and removing them. Rotate credentials for any accounts where users may have entered data on suspicious sites, prioritizing financial and email accounts. Enforce CIS 6.3 (Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications) and CIS 6.5 (Require MFA for Administrative Access) to limit credential reuse impact.
4. Step 4: Recovery. Validate that affected user accounts have completed credential rotation and MFA enrollment. Monitor financial accounts and payment systems for unauthorized transaction attempts for a minimum of 30 days post-incident. Confirm DNS and proxy blocklists are active and updated. Apply NIST AU-6 review cadence to verify no residual C2 beaconing from previously infected endpoints. Confirm CIS 2.1 (Establish and Maintain a Software Inventory) is current so unauthorized applications can be identified promptly.
5. Step 5: Post-Incident. Conduct a user awareness exercise focused on brand impersonation and urgency-based social engineering, specifically using this campaign as a case study. Review and update acceptable use policy to address unofficial software installation. Assess gaps against NIST AC-3 (Access Enforcement) for endpoint application controls and NIST SI-related monitoring coverage. Document lessons learned and update phishing simulation program to include sports/event-themed lures.

## IR / Forensic Enrichment

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|---|---|
| **Triage Priority** | URGENT |
| **Escalation Criteria** | Escalate to legal counsel and executive leadership immediately if DNS/proxy logs confirm any employee entered credentials or payment card data on a FIFA-themed lookalike domain, or if a banking malware binary was executed on any endpoint — either condition may trigger PCI DSS breach notification requirements and/or state consumer protection notification obligations depending on the data types involved. |

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| **Recovery Notes** | After eradication, maintain daily DNS cache and network connection monitoring on all endpoints that appeared in the Step 2 hit list for a minimum of 30 days, as banking trojans from event-themed campaigns (e.g., Grandoreiro, Mekotio) are known to maintain dormant persistence through scheduled tasks that re-establish C2 after initial cleanup. Verify MFA enrollment is confirmed for 100% of affected accounts before closing the incident — partial enrollment leaves credential-harvested accounts exploitable. Coordinate with HR and finance to monitor for fraudulent payment transactions or wire transfer requests originating from affected user accounts, as exfiltrated banking credentials may be monetized days to weeks after the initial compromise. |
| **Forensic Artifacts** | DNS client cache and resolver query logs containing resolution attempts to FIFA-themed lookalike domains with .shop, .live, .stream, .club, or .online TLDs — records which endpoints contacted the ~19,000 registered lookalike domains prior to blocklist deployment \| Downloaded streaming installer binaries in %USERPROFILE%\Downloads matching patterns *stream*.exe, *player*.exe, *fifa*.exe — the delivery vehicle for banking malware embedded in pirated streaming applications; hash and preserve before removal \| Windows Registry Run and RunOnce keys (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and RunOnce) and Scheduled Tasks export — banking trojans from this campaign type use these for post-reboot persistence after masquerading as a streaming application installer \| Browser credential store access artifacts: Windows Security Event Log Event ID 4663 (Object Access) against Chrome Login Data (%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data) or Firefox logins.json (%APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles*.default\logins.json) — indicates credential harvesting overlay activity by banking malware \| Windows Prefetch files (%SystemRoot%\Prefetch\) for any streaming or media player executable names — records first execution timestamp and loaded DLLs, establishing the initial compromise timeline and confirming whether malware executed prior to containment |

### Per-Action IR Details

**Step 1: Containment — Block DNS resolution and web proxy access to known FIFA-themed lookalike domain patterns (e.g., wildcards on fifa2026*, worldcup2026*, fifaticket*) at your DNS filtering and web gateway layers. Alert employees via internal communication to purchase tickets and streaming access exclusively through official FIFA channels (fifa.com and verified broadcaster sites). Implement NIST AC-4 (Information Flow Enforcement) to restrict outbound traffic to uncategorized or newly registered domains via proxy policy.**

**NIST Phase:** Containment

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.3 — Containment Strategy

**Controls:** NIST AC-4 (Information Flow Enforcement)

**Compensating:** For teams without a commercial DNS filtering solution: configure Pi-hole or bind RPZ (Response Policy Zones) with wildcard blocks on fifa2026*, worldcup2026*, fifaticket*, wc2026*, and fifastream* across all TLDs. Use the free Quad9 DNS resolver (9.9.9.9) as upstream — it blocks newly registered and malicious domains by default and covers a large portion of the ~19,000 registered lookalike domains in this campaign. Supplement with a Squid proxy ACL denying domains with a WHOIS registration age under 90 days using the script: `whois | grep 'Creation Date'` piped through a cron-driven blocklist builder. Distribute an internal alert linking exclusively to fifa.com/en/fifaplus and official broadcaster URLs.

**Evidence:** BEFORE implementing blocks, export the full DNS resolver query log (e.g., /var/log/named/queries.log on BIND, or Pi-hole's /etc/pihole/pihole.log) to preserve any pre-containment resolution attempts against FIFA-themed domains. Capture web proxy access logs (Squid: /var/log/squid/access.log; Windows NCSA-format proxy logs) filtered on domains containing 'fifa', 'worldcup', 'wc2026', 'ticket', 'stream' to identify which endpoints already contacted lookalike domains. This pre-block snapshot is your baseline for determining which users require eradication and credential rotation — do not overwrite or rotate logs before extraction.

**Step 2: Detection — Query DNS and proxy logs for resolution attempts against domains registered within the last 90 days containing strings 'fifa', 'worldcup', 'wc2026', or 'ticket' combined with common lookalike TLDs (.shop, .live, .stream, .club, .online). Review endpoint detection logs for execution of unsigned or unverified applications downloaded from non-enterprise sources, particularly media player or streaming binaries. Apply NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting) cadence to these log sources. Reference CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs) to confirm logging coverage across endpoints and proxies. Behavioral indicators include: unexpected browser credential store access, overlay windows on banking sites, and outbound C2 traffic from non-browser processes. No specific IOC hashes or IPs have been publicly confirmed at sufficient confidence for direct inclusion.**

**NIST Phase:** Detection Analysis

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 — Detection and Analysis

**Controls:** NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, And Reporting), NIST AU-2 (Event Logging), CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs)

**Compensating:** Deploy Sysmon with a community config (SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong's modular config) and query for: Event ID 1 (Process Create) where Image matches *vlc*, *kodi*, *stream*, *player* AND the binary's ParentImage is a browser process (chrome.exe, firefox.exe, msedge.exe) — this catches drive-by streaming app installs. Query Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) for unsigned DLLs loaded by browser processes, which is a hallmark of banking overlay malware injecting into the browser session. For DNS, run: `Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object {$_.Entry -match 'fifa|worldcup|wc2026|ticket|stream'} | Export-Csv dns_cache_hits.csv` on each Windows endpoint. Use Wireshark or tcpdump with filter `tcp and not port 443 and not port 80` to surface non-HTTP/S C2 beaconing from non-browser processes, which is typical of banking trojans like Grandoreiro or Mekotio (Latin American banking malware families active in sports-themed campaigns).

**Evidence:** Capture Sysmon Event ID 1 logs filtering on media/streaming binary names spawned from browser parent processes, and Event ID 3 (Network Connection) for outbound connections on non-standard ports from those same binaries. Extract browser credential store access attempts: on Windows, query Security Event Log for Event ID 4663 (Object Access) against the Chrome Login Data path (%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data) or Firefox logins.json (%APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles*.default\logins.json). Collect DNS client cache snapshots from all endpoints (`ipconfig /displaydns` or `Get-DnsClientCache`) before any remediation flushes the cache. Preserve any downloaded streaming installer binaries in quarantine (do not execute) — file path typically %USERPROFILE%\Downloads*stream*.exe or *player*.exe — for subsequent hash comparison against VirusTotal.

**Step 3: Eradication — Remove any user-installed streaming applications sourced outside official enterprise software channels. Enforce CIS 2.3 (Address Unauthorized Software) by scanning endpoints for unauthorized media applications and removing them. Rotate credentials for any accounts where users may have entered data on suspicious sites, prioritizing financial and email accounts. Apply D3-CRO (Credential Rotation) for affected user accounts. Enforce CIS 6.3 (Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications) and CIS 6.5 (Require MFA for Administrative Access) to limit credential reuse impact.**

**NIST Phase:** Eradication

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.4 — Eradication

**Controls:** CIS 2.3 (Address Unauthorized Software), CIS 6.3 (Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications), CIS 6.5 (Require MFA for Administrative Access), NIST AC-2 (Account Management)

**Compensating:** Run a PowerShell inventory of user-installed applications outside Program Files (enterprise-managed path) using: `Get-ItemProperty HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Select DisplayName, InstallDate, InstallLocation | Where-Object {$_.InstallLocation -notlike 'C:\Program Files*'} | Export-Csv unauthorized_apps.csv`. Cross-reference results against CIS 2.1 software inventory baseline. For confirmed malware-laced streaming apps, use ClamAV with the latest daily.cvd signature database to scan %USERPROFILE%\Downloads, %TEMP%, and %APPDATA% for known banking trojan signatures before removal. Write a YARA rule targeting the campaign's delivery mechanism: strings containing 'fifastream', 'wc2026', or 'worldcuptv' in PE header metadata, combined with an embedded AutoIt or NSIS installer stub (common delivery method for banking malware in event-themed campaigns). Force credential rotation via Active Directory: `Set-ADUser

-Identity -ChangePasswordAtLogon $true` for all users who accessed identified lookalike domains per Step 2 DNS evidence.

**Evidence:** Before removing unauthorized streaming applications, collect the full installer binary (hash with `Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256`), capture the Windows Prefetch file for the executable (%SystemRoot%\Prefetch\-*.pf — records first and last eight run timestamps), and extract the registry Run key persistence entries (`HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` and `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`) that banking malware commonly uses for persistence. Also export the Windows Scheduled Tasks list (`schtasks /query /fo LIST /v > scheduled_tasks_before_eradication.txt`) — banking trojans from this campaign type frequently establish scheduled task persistence. Document all of this before removal; it is your evidence of compromise.

**Step 4: Recovery — Validate that affected user accounts have completed credential rotation and MFA enrollment. Monitor financial accounts and payment systems for unauthorized transaction attempts for a minimum of 30 days post-incident. Confirm DNS and proxy blocklists are active and updated. Apply NIST AU-6 review cadence to verify no residual C2 beaconing from previously infected endpoints. Confirm CIS 2.1 (Establish and Maintain a Software Inventory) is current so unauthorized applications can be identified promptly.**

**NIST Phase:** Recovery

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.5 — Recovery

**Controls:** NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, And Reporting), CIS 2.1 (Establish and Maintain a Software Inventory), NIST AC-2 (Account Management)

**Compensating:** Establish a 30-day post-eradication monitoring cadence using a daily cron job or scheduled task that runs: `Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object {$_.Entry -match 'fifa|worldcup|wc2026|ticket|stream'}` on each endpoint and exports results — any hit after eradication indicates reinfection or a missed malware instance. Use osquery with the query `SELECT * FROM process_open_sockets WHERE remote_port NOT IN (80, 443) AND name NOT IN ('chrome.exe','firefox.exe','msedge.exe','svchost.exe')` to surface residual non-browser C2 beaconing characteristic of banking trojans maintaining post-eradication persistence. Alert HR and finance teams to flag any anomalous payment card transactions or ACH transfers originating from accounts belonging to users who appeared in the Step 2 DNS hit list, as banking malware from this campaign type may have already exfiltrated stored payment credentials prior to containment.

**Evidence:** During recovery validation, pull Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection) logs for the 30-day window from previously infected endpoints, filtering for outbound connections to IP ranges or domains not in your known-good allowlist — residual banking trojan C2 often beacons on port 8080, 4443, or randomized high ports. Preserve payment system and VPN authentication logs showing account activity for all users identified in Step 2 for the full 30-day monitoring window — these are your evidence of scope if a delayed breach notification obligation is triggered. Document MFA enrollment completion timestamps from your identity provider for all affected accounts as proof of remediation.

**Step 5: Post-Incident — Conduct a user awareness exercise focused on brand impersonation and urgency-based social engineering, specifically using this campaign as a case study. Review and update acceptable use policy to address unofficial software installation. Assess gaps against NIST AC-3 (Access Enforcement) for endpoint application controls and NIST SI-related monitoring coverage. Document lessons learned and update phishing simulation program to include sports/event-themed lures.**

**NIST Phase:** Post Incident

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity

**Controls:** NIST AC-3 (Access Enforcement), NIST AU-2 (Event Logging), CIS 4.6 (Securely Manage Enterprise Assets and Software)

**Compensating:** Build the phishing simulation exercise using the actual lookalike domain naming patterns from this campaign (fifa2026[random].shop, worldcuptv[random].live) as lure URLs — free platforms like GoPhish support custom template creation at no cost. For the acceptable use policy gap on unauthorized software, implement AppLocker (built into Windows, no additional cost) with a default-deny policy permitting only publisher-signed

applications from %ProgramFiles% and %ProgramFiles(x86)%, which would have blocked the unsigned streaming malware delivery mechanism in this campaign. Document the detection gap identified in Step 2 (no SIEM correlation on newly-registered domain age) as a formal finding, and write a Sigma rule targeting browser-spawned unsigned executable downloads: condition on Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Created) where TargetFilename matches *Downloads*stream*.exe and the file's Imphash or signing status is absent. Publish the Sigma rule to your internal detection library.

**Evidence:** Compile the full incident timeline from DNS query logs (first resolution attempt against a lookalike domain) through eradication completion, documenting dwell time — this is a required element of the lessons learned report per NIST 800-61r3 §4 and is necessary if any regulatory breach notification assessment is needed. Preserve all forensic artifacts collected in Steps 1–4 (installer binaries, registry exports, prefetch files, DNS cache snapshots, network connection logs) in a write-protected evidence archive with SHA-256 hashes for chain-of-custody integrity. The dwell time and scope data directly inform whether payment card breach notification obligations apply under PCI DSS or state-level consumer protection statutes.

## Detection Guidance

Primary detection surfaces are DNS logs, web proxy logs, and endpoint execution logs. Query DNS/proxy for outbound requests to domains: (1) containing 'fifa', 'worldcup', 'wc2026', 'ticket', or 'stream' registered within the last 90 days; (2) using uncommon or newly observed TLDs (.shop, .live, .stream, .club, .online, .vip). Flag any domain with low Alexa/Cisco Umbrella rank combined with FIFA-related keywords. On endpoints, detect: execution of unsigned binaries with names resembling media players or streaming clients sourced from user download directories; browser process spawning unexpected child processes; overlay or accessibility service abuse on mobile devices. Behavioral indicators for banking malware include: non-browser processes initiating connections to financial institution domains; credential store access by newly installed applications; unexpected scheduled tasks or persistence mechanisms created post-application install. No confirmed public IOC hashes or C2 IPs are available at high confidence from the cited sources. Apply NIST SI (System and Information Integrity) monitoring for endpoint-level detection and credential compromise indicators.

## Indicators of Compromise

| Type | Value | Context | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | `fifa2026*` | Wildcard pattern — approximately 19,000 FIFA-themed lookalike domains registered ahead of World Cup 2026; specific domains not publicly enumerated in cited sources | LOW |
| DOMAIN | `worldcup2026*` | Wildcard pattern — typosquatted domains impersonating FIFA ticket and streaming services; specific domains not confirmed in cited sources | LOW |

## Framework Mappings

### MITRE-ATTACK

- **T1583.001** — Domains

- **T1204.002** — Malicious File
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1598.003** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1036.005** — Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- **T1056.003** — Web Portal Capture

**NIST-800-53R5**

- **AT-2** — Literacy Training and Awareness
- **SC-7** — Boundary Protection
- **SI-3** — Malicious Code Protection
- **SI-4** — System Monitoring
- **SI-8** — Spam Protection
- **SI-7** — Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity
- **CM-3** — Configuration Change Control

**OWASP-TOP10-2021**

- **A08:2021** — Software and Data Integrity Failures

**CIS-V8**

- **2.5** — Allowlist Authorized Software
- **2.6** — Allowlist Authorized Libraries
- **6.3** — Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications
- **14.2** — Train Workforce Members to Recognize Social Engineering Attacks

**HIPAA-SECURITY**

- **164.312(d)** — Person or Entity Authentication

**SOC2-TSC**

- **CC6.1** — Logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures

## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

| Technique ID | Technique Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1583.001 | Domains | Resource-Development |
| T1204.002 | Malicious File | Execution |
| T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link | Initial-Access |
| T1598.003 | Spearphishing Link | Reconnaissance |
| T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | Defense-Evasion |
| T1056.003 | Web Portal Capture | Collection |

## Sources

| Source | URL | Tier |
|---|---|---|
| **FIFA World Cup 2026 Scams Are Already Live: Fake Sites, ...** | https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/fifa-world-cup-2026-scams-are-alr... | T3 |
| **The FBI is warning soccer fans to watch out for fake** | https://www.facebook.com/UpNorthLive/posts/the-fbi-is-warning-socce... | T3 |
| **Cybercriminals create 19000 FIFA-themed domains ahead ...** | https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/08/fifa-world-cup-cyber-thr... | T3 |
| **Cyber Threats Surrounding the FIFA World Cup 2026** | https://www.cyfirma.com/research/cyber-threats-surrounding-the-fifa... | T3 |
| **FIFA World Cup 2026 Scams Are Already Live: Fake Sites…** | https://www.develeap.com/news/fifa-world-cup-2026-scams-are-already... | T3 |



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