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Financial Sector Under Coordinated Siege: eCrime and Nation-State Actors Escalate Across Every Attack Vector

SECURITY ANALYSIS | HIGH | CVSS 7.5

SCC Item ID	SCC-STY-2026-0144
Type	Security Analysis
Severity	HIGH
CVSS Base Score	7.5
Affected Products	Financial institutions, cryptocurrency exchanges, fintech platforms, insurance entities, Microsoft 365 environments (targeted via MURKY PANDA ORB network)
Discovery Source	Rss:T1 Threatintel

Executive Summary

CrowdStrike's 2026 Financial Services Threat Landscape Report documents a 43% rise in hands-on-keyboard intrusions against financial institutions over the past year, alongside $2.02 billion in cryptocurrency theft attributed to DPRK-linked state actors and a 27% increase in Big Game Hunting ransomware victims. Financial services now accounts for 12% of all observed adversary activity globally, ranking fourth among targeted sectors, as eCrime operators, nation-state espionage campaigns, and AI-accelerated social engineering converge simultaneously. This convergence signals that financial institutions face an environment where single-vector defenses are insufficient against simultaneous state-sponsored theft, ransomware extortion, and cloud infrastructure abuse.

Technical Analysis

CrowdStrike's annual financial services threat landscape report, covering April 2025 through March 2026, documents threat activity across three simultaneous pressure vectors: eCrime extortion, nation-state operations, and AI-assisted social engineering.

The 43% rise in hands-on-keyboard intrusions is the most operationally significant figure in the report. Unlike automated malware deployments, hands-on-keyboard activity means human operators are inside the environment, adapting in real time, evading static detection rules, and making decisions based on what they observe. This is consistent with MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1021 (Remote Services), T1078 (Valid Accounts), and T1090 (Proxy), all of which appear in the report's associated technique set and reflect adversaries who have moved past initial access into active post-exploitation.

The DPRK-linked $2.02 billion cryptocurrency theft figure represents state-sponsored financial crime that conflates state-sponsored espionage with financial crime in scale and method. These operations typically combine supply chain compromise (T1195.002), trusted relationship abuse (T1199), and credential theft (T1539) to reach cryptocurrency exchange wallets and DeFi platforms. CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function) is a recurring structural weakness in these environments.

MURKY PANDA is the named actor tied to ORB (Operational Relay Box) network abuse targeting Microsoft 365 environments. ORB networks route attacker traffic through compromised residential or cloud infrastructure to defeat IP-based detection and geographic blocking. MURKY PANDA's approach exploits trusted cloud relationships, meaning the initial access vector is often a legitimately provisioned cloud service or a trusted third-party integration rather than an external intrusion. Techniques T1583.003 (Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server), T1071 (Application Layer Protocol), and T1574.001 (Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking) support this operational pattern.

BGH ransomware operators contributed to a 27% increase in named victims on leak sites. BGH groups increasingly combine data exfiltration (T1560) with encryption (T1486) to apply dual-extortion pressure. CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check) and CWE-426 (Untrusted Search Path) reflect the software integrity weaknesses these operators commonly exploit during payload delivery and execution.

AI-accelerated social engineering, referenced as a cross-cutting threat, most directly amplifies phishing (T1566) and financial fraud (T1657) at scale. The report does not attribute this to a specific actor, treating it instead as a capability now accessible across the eCrime ecosystem.

The defensive implication the report emphasizes is intelligence-led detection: static rules and signature-based controls are insufficient against hands-on operators using legitimate tooling and trusted cloud channels. Detection must shift toward behavioral baselines, identity anomaly detection, and threat-actor-specific TTP mapping against MITRE ATT&CK.

Action Checklist

1. Assess Microsoft 365 exposure: audit third-party OAuth applications, delegated permissions, and trusted cloud integrations that could serve as MURKY PANDA ORB network entry points; revoke any unrecognized or unused application consents.
2. Review authentication controls: verify MFA enforcement across all privileged and external-facing accounts; specifically check for CWE-306 gaps (missing authentication on administrative or API functions) in fintech platforms, exchange integrations, and insurance portals.
3. Hunt for hands-on-keyboard indicators: search SIEM and EDR telemetry for T1078 (Valid Accounts) anomalies, T1021 (Remote Services) lateral movement, and T1090 (Proxy) usage patterns; hands-on intrusions leave behavioral traces that signature detections miss.
4. Audit software integrity controls: assess CWE-494 and CWE-426 exposure in your software supply chain and internal build pipelines; verify that code download and execution paths enforce integrity checks and trusted path controls.
5. Update threat model for DPRK and BGH actors: add DPRK-linked cryptocurrency theft TTPs (T1195.002, T1199, T1539) and BGH dual-extortion patterns (T1486, T1560) to your threat register; map these specifically to your cryptocurrency custody, DeFi exposure, and data exfiltration detection coverage.
6. Brief leadership with financial sector context: present the $2.02 billion DPRK theft figure and 43% intrusion increase as sector-specific risk data, not generic threat trends; quantify your organization's

exposure to cryptocurrency operations, M365 cloud dependencies, and BGH targeting criteria.

7. Review the full CrowdStrike 2026 Financial Services Threat Landscape Report for detailed IOCs, MURKY PANDA infrastructure indicators, and BGH campaign telemetry; integrate these into your threat intelligence platform and SIEM detection rules.

IR / Forensic Enrichment

Triage Priority	URGENT
Escalation Criteria	Escalate immediately to CISO and legal counsel if any MURKY PANDA ORB network IOC matches observed M365 audit log entries, if cryptocurrency custody API keys or wallet signing credentials show unauthorized access events, or if BGH ransomware indicators (T1486 mass encryption, T1560 large archive creation) are detected — these conditions trigger FinCEN SAR filing obligations and potential SEC cyber incident disclosure requirements for public financial institutions within 4 business days.
Recovery Notes	Following containment of any confirmed MURKY PANDA or DPRK-linked intrusion, rotate all M365 service principal secrets, OAuth client credentials, and cryptocurrency custody API keys before restoring normal operations — do not restore access using the same credential material, as DPRK actors are known to maintain persistent access through multiple footholds simultaneously. Monitor Entra ID audit logs and cryptocurrency custody system access logs continuously for 30 days post-recovery, specifically for re-authentication attempts using previously compromised session tokens (T1539) or returning ORB network relay IPs. For BGH recovery, verify that no data exfiltration staging archives remain on internal file servers or cloud storage before confirming eradication, as dual-extortion actors may publish stolen financial data regardless of ransom payment.
Forensic Artifacts	Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log — MailItemsAccessed, FileAccessed, and Consent to application operations tied to unrecognized service principal AppIds: captures MURKY PANDA ORB network OAuth-based mailbox access and data staging consistent with nation-state financial sector espionage | Entra ID Sign-in Logs filtered on Non-Interactive logons and service principal authentications from hosting-block or residential ASNs: identifies ORB network relay nodes used by MURKY PANDA to obscure origin IP attribution during M365 intrusion campaigns | Windows Security Event Log Event IDs 4624/4648/4769 on domain controllers: captures T1078 valid account reuse and T1021 lateral movement telemetry left by hands-on-keyboard operators during the 43% increase in interactive intrusions against financial institutions | Cryptocurrency custody platform API audit logs (Fireblocks audit trail, AWS CloudTrail for custodied wallet Lambda functions, or exchange admin audit logs): captures T1199 trusted relationship abuse and unauthorized wallet access events consistent with DPRK Lazarus Group $2.02B theft methodology | CI/CD pipeline execution logs and build artifact SHA-256 manifests from GitHub Actions, Jenkins, or GitLab CI: captures T1195.002 supply chain compromise indicators including unexpected external package downloads or unsigned artifact substitutions targeting fintech build infrastructure

Per-Action IR Details

Assess Microsoft 365 exposure: audit third-party OAuth applications, delegated permissions, and trusted cloud integrations that could serve as MURKY PANDA ORB network entry points; revoke any unrecognized or unused application consents.

NIST Phase: Detection Analysis

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 — Detection & Analysis: identifying adversary footholds via cloud identity and OAuth abuse consistent with ORB network relay infrastructure

Controls: NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST SI-4 (System Monitoring), NIST AC-2 (Account Management), CIS 5.1 (Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Accounts), CIS 6.2 (Establish an Access Revoking Process)

Compensating: Run Microsoft's free Entra ID (AAD) audit via PowerShell: `Get-MgServicePrincipal -All | Select-Object DisplayName, AppId, PermissionGrantPoliciesAssigned` to enumerate OAuth apps; cross-reference against Microsoft's own 'risky OAuth app' Entra ID audit log category under Sign-ins > Non-interactive. Export unified audit log entries for OfficeActivity with Operation='Add delegated permission grant' using `Search-UnifiedAuditLog -RecordType AzureActiveDirectory -Operations 'Add delegated permission grant'`. A 2-person team can complete this triage in under two hours without a SIEM.

Evidence: Before revoking any consent, export the full Entra ID Audit Log filtered on Category='ApplicationManagement' and Activity='Consent to application' for the prior 90 days — this captures the MURKY PANDA-style OAuth phishing chain. Preserve Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log entries for MailItemsAccessed and FileAccessed operations tied to the suspicious service principal's AppId. Screenshot the Entra ID Enterprise Applications panel showing delegated vs. application-level permissions for each flagged app before removal.

Review authentication controls: verify MFA enforcement across all privileged and external-facing accounts; specifically check for CWE-306 gaps (missing authentication on administrative or API functions) in fintech platforms, exchange integrations, and insurance portals.

NIST Phase: Preparation

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §2 — Preparation: hardening authentication posture against CWE-306 exploitation used by eCrime and nation-state actors targeting financial sector API and admin surfaces

Controls: NIST IA-2 (Identification and Authentication — Organizational Users), NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST AC-2 (Account Management), CIS 6.3 (Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications), CIS 6.4 (Require MFA for Remote Network Access), CIS 6.5 (Require MFA for Administrative Access)

Compensating: Use Microsoft's free Entra ID Conditional Access 'What If' tool to simulate policy gaps for each admin and service account. For non-M365 fintech API surfaces, run `curl -v -X POST https:///admin/endpoint` with no auth header to manually confirm CWE-306 exposure on administrative routes. Document each unauthenticated API endpoint in a spreadsheet as a compensating risk register. For insurance portal external accounts, extract Entra ID Sign-in Logs filtered on MfaDetail.AuthMethod='None' via `Get-MgAuditLogSignIn -Filter "conditionalAccessStatus eq 'notApplied'"`.

Evidence: Before remediating, capture Entra ID Sign-in Logs showing all successful authentications without MFA for privileged roles in the prior 30 days — this establishes a pre-remediation baseline and identifies accounts that may already be compromised via CWE-306 exploitation. For fintech API integrations, retrieve web server access logs (Apache/Nginx) or API gateway logs (AWS API GW, Azure APIM) showing unauthenticated POST/PUT requests to `/admin`, `/api/v*/admin`, or `/management` endpoints in the same window.

Hunt for hands-on-keyboard indicators: search SIEM and EDR telemetry for T1078 (Valid Accounts) anomalies, T1021 (Remote Services) lateral movement, and T1090 (Proxy) usage patterns; hands-on intrusions leave behavioral traces that signature detections miss.

NIST Phase: Detection Analysis

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 — Detection & Analysis: behavioral correlation of hands-on-keyboard intrusion TTPs consistent with the 43% rise in eCrime and nation-state interactive sessions against financial institutions

Controls: NIST SI-4 (System Monitoring), NIST IR-5 (Incident Monitoring), NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs)

Compensating: Deploy Sysmon with SwiftOnSecurity config and hunt using these specific queries: (1) T1078 — Windows Security Event Log Event ID 4624 (Logon Type 3 or 10) for service accounts or admin accounts logging in outside business hours or from new source IPs; (2) T1021 — Event ID 4648 (Explicit Credential Logon) combined with Event ID 7045 (Service Installed) to detect PSExec/WMI lateral movement; (3) T1090 — Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection) for connections to Tor exit node IP ranges or commercial VPN/proxy ASNs (AS9009, AS20473) from workstation processes. Use the free Sigma rule set (github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma) — search for rules tagged

'attack.t1078', 'attack.t1021', 'attack.t1090' and convert to PowerShell with pySigma for no-SIEM environments.

Evidence: Before hunting, preserve a point-in-time snapshot of: Windows Security Event Log (evtx) from all domain controllers covering Event IDs 4624, 4625, 4648, 4768, 4769 (Kerberos TGT/TGS requests) for the prior 14 days — DPRK and BGH actors using valid accounts will show Kerberos anomalies before lateral movement. Capture Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) logs for `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, and `wscript.exe` spawned by unusual parent processes on financial workstations. For T1090, extract NetFlow or Windows Firewall logs showing repeated outbound connections on ports 443/80 to residential or hosting-block IPs from systems that should only communicate with internal banking infrastructure.

Audit software integrity controls: assess CWE-494 and CWE-426 exposure in your software supply chain and internal build pipelines; verify that code download and execution paths enforce integrity checks and trusted path controls.

NIST Phase: Preparation

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §2 — Preparation: establishing software supply chain integrity controls to detect DPRK-linked T1195.002 (Compromise Software Supply Chain) and T1199 (Trusted Relationship) intrusion vectors targeting financial sector build pipelines

Controls: NIST SI-7 (Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity), NIST SI-2 (Flaw Remediation), NIST SA-12 (Supply Chain Protection), CIS 2.1 (Establish and Maintain a Software Inventory), CIS 2.2 (Ensure Authorized Software is Currently Supported), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)

Compensating: For CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check): audit all CI/CD pipeline scripts (Jenkinsfile, .github/workflows/*.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml) for `curl | bash` patterns and unsigned artifact downloads using: `grep -rE '(curl|wget).*\|.*(sh|bash|python)' .github/workflows/`. For CWE-426 (Untrusted Search Path): run `where.exe` or `which` on all binaries called in build scripts without absolute paths. Use free YARA rules from CISA's DPRK supply chain advisories to scan build artifacts and downloaded dependencies. Implement SHA-256 hash pinning in package managers: `npm shrinkwrap`, `pip hash`, `go.sum` verification — these are zero-cost controls a 2-person team can enforce in a day.

Evidence: Before remediating, capture: (1) a full dependency tree export for all production financial applications (`npm list --all`, `pip freeze`, `mvn dependency:tree`) — DPRK actors have injected malicious packages into npm and PyPI ecosystems targeting crypto/fintech; (2) CI/CD pipeline execution logs showing which external URLs are contacted during build steps and whether checksums are verified; (3) Windows AppLocker or WDAC event logs (Event ID 8004 — blocked execution) or, if not enabled, a file system snapshot of `%TEMP%`, `%APPDATA%`, and `C:\ProgramData` on build servers for unexpected executables.

Update threat model for DPRK and BGH actors: add DPRK-linked cryptocurrency theft TTPs (T1195.002, T1199, T1539) and BGH dual-extortion patterns (T1486, T1560) to your threat register; map these specifically to your cryptocurrency custody, DeFi exposure, and data exfiltration detection coverage.

NIST Phase: Preparation

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §2 — Preparation: integrating sector-specific adversary TTPs into the threat model to ensure detection coverage aligns with the $2.02B DPRK cryptocurrency theft campaign and the 27% BGH victim increase in financial services

Controls: NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan), NIST RA-3 (Risk Assessment), NIST SI-5 (Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process), CIS 7.2 (Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process)

Compensating: Map TTPs to existing log sources without a commercial threat intelligence platform: (1) T1539 (Steal Web Session Cookie) — audit browser history and cookie stores on systems with access to crypto custody portals; use free osquery query `SELECT * FROM firefox_addons UNION SELECT * FROM chrome_extensions WHERE identifier LIKE '%cookie%'` to detect unauthorized cookie-harvesting extensions; (2) T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact — BGH ransomware) — deploy free Canary files (honeypot documents named 'FinancialRecords_Q4_2025.xlsx') in high-value directories and alert on any modification via Windows auditing Event ID 4663; (3) T1560 (Archive Collected Data) — Sysmon Event ID 1 for `7z.exe`, `rar.exe`, or `robocopy.exe` invocations with external destination paths on systems holding customer financial data.

Evidence: Before updating the threat model, capture the current state of detection coverage as a gap baseline: export all existing SIEM/EDR detection rules and map them against MITRE ATT&CK Navigator for T1195.002, T1199, T1539, T1486, and T1560 — document which sub-techniques have zero detection coverage. Preserve cryptocurrency custody system audit logs (Fireblocks, Ledger Vault, or equivalent) showing recent API calls and wallet access events as a clean baseline for anomaly comparison after threat model updates are deployed.

Brief leadership with financial sector context: present the $2.02 billion DPRK theft figure and 43% intrusion increase as sector-specific risk data, not generic threat trends; quantify your organization's exposure to cryptocurrency operations, M365 cloud dependencies, and BGH targeting criteria.

NIST Phase: Post Incident

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity: translating threat intelligence into leadership-facing risk quantification to drive resource allocation and board-level accountability for financial sector-specific adversary escalation

Controls: NIST IR-6 (Incident Reporting), NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan), NIST RA-3 (Risk Assessment), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)

Compensating: Build a one-page risk quantification brief using only internal data: (1) count the number of M365 accounts with global admin or privileged roles — each is a potential MURKY PANDA ORB entry point; (2) document total value of cryptocurrency under custody or DeFi protocol exposure — this is your DPRK loss scenario ceiling; (3) run a BGH targeting criteria checklist: revenue >$100M, publicly known financials, observable internet footprint (Shodan search for your ASN). These three data points, paired with the CrowdStrike $2.02B figure, produce a credible board brief with zero budget.

Evidence: Before the leadership brief, pull the following quantitative inputs from existing systems: Entra ID privileged role membership count (Global Admin, Exchange Admin, Security Admin) as of today; Azure Cost Management or M365 Admin Center license count showing cloud dependency scale; any cyber insurance policy limits and exclusions for nation-state attribution and ransomware — BGH dual-extortion and DPRK theft may trigger exclusion clauses that leadership must understand before an incident occurs.

Monitor CrowdStrike's published report and follow-on disclosures for specific IOCs, MURKY PANDA infrastructure indicators, and BGH campaign updates that may not have been included in the initial blog publication.

NIST Phase: Post Incident

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity: establishing an ongoing intelligence consumption process to operationalize MURKY PANDA ORB network indicators and BGH campaign updates as they are released by CrowdStrike and corroborating government sources

Controls: NIST SI-5 (Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives), NIST IR-5 (Incident Monitoring), NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs)

Compensating: Establish a free intelligence feed pipeline: (1) subscribe to CISA's free Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) RSS feed and DPRK-specific advisories at cisa.gov/northkorea — these frequently corroborate CrowdStrike BGH and Lazarus Group disclosures; (2) ingest CrowdStrike's Adversary Universe blog via RSS into a shared team inbox; (3) when MURKY PANDA IOCs are published (IP ranges, domains, certificate hashes), immediately operationalize them using free tools: add IPs to Windows Firewall block rules via PowerShell `New-NetFirewallRule`, create YARA rules from domain patterns for DNS sinkhole detection using Pi-hole or Bind RPZ, and load IOC hashes into VirusTotal for retroactive file scanning at no cost.

Evidence: Maintain a running IOC watchlist log — a simple spreadsheet tracking each CrowdStrike-disclosed MURKY PANDA indicator, the date it was published, whether it was observed in your environment, and which log source confirmed or cleared it. When new BGH campaign infrastructure (C2 domains, ransom negotiation onion addresses, leak site references) is published, immediately query your DNS query logs (Windows DNS Debug Log or BIND query log) and proxy logs for historical hits against those indicators before they age out of retention.

Detection Guidance

Hands-on-keyboard intrusion detection: Establish behavioral baselines for privileged account activity and alert on deviations in remote service usage (T1021), logon patterns from unexpected locations or times (T1078), and proxy or relay traffic patterns inconsistent with normal operations (T1090). EDR telemetry should be reviewed for interactive shell sessions spawned under service accounts or cloud identities.

MURKY PANDA / ORB network detection: In Microsoft 365 environments, audit the Unified Audit Log for OAuth application consent grants, mail forwarding rules, and inbox rule creation by non-standard identities. Monitor for authentication events originating from VPS infrastructure or residential proxy IP ranges. Azure AD / Entra ID sign-in logs should be reviewed for token theft indicators consistent with T1539 (Steal Web Session Cookie) and impossible travel events.

DKPR-linked cryptocurrency operations: Monitor for supply chain anomalies (T1195.002) in vendor software updates, unexpected outbound connections from cryptocurrency custody systems, and authentication events on administrative APIs that lack MFA enforcement (CWE-306). Trusted relationship abuse (T1199) often appears as legitimate third-party access accounts taking actions outside their normal operational pattern.

BGH ransomware precursor activity: Hunt for staging and exfiltration indicators (T1560) in the days before any encryption event. Large archive file creation, unusual data transfers to cloud storage, and DLL search order hijacking artifacts (T1574.001) in endpoint logs are known BGH precursors. Review software execution paths for unsigned binaries loading from user-writable directories (CWE-426) and code fetched without integrity verification (CWE-494).

AI-assisted phishing: Standard phishing indicators (T1566) remain relevant but grammar and formatting quality are no longer reliable signals. Detection should shift to sender authentication (DMARC/DKIM/SPF enforcement), link analysis, and anomalous credential submission patterns. Financial fraud via AI-generated communication (T1657) warrants review of wire transfer authorization workflows for social engineering resistance.

Indicators of Compromise

Type	Value	Context	Confidence
TOOL	`Pending — refer to CrowdStrike 2026 Financial Services Threat Landscape Report for published indicators`	CrowdStrike's report references MURKY PANDA ORB network infrastructure and DPRK-linked campaign indicators; specific IPs, domains, and hashes are expected in the full report but were not included in the blog summary provided as source material	LOW

Framework Mappings

MITRE-ATTACK

- **T1588.001** — Malware
- **T1021** — Remote Services
- **T1583.003** — Virtual Private Server
- **T1486** — Data Encrypted for Impact
- **T1560** — Archive Collected Data

- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1657** — Financial Theft
- **T1566** — Phishing
- **T1090** — Proxy
- **T1588** — Obtain Capabilities
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1199** — Trusted Relationship
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1078** — Valid Accounts
- **T1574.001** — DLL

NIST-800-53R5

- **AC-17** — Remote Access
- **AC-3** — Access Enforcement
- **CM-7** — Least Functionality
- **IA-2** — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)
- **CP-9** — System Backup
- **CP-10** — System Recovery and Reconstitution
- **SA-9** — External System Services
- **SR-3** — Supply Chain Controls and Processes
- **SI-7** — Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity
- **AT-2** — Literacy Training and Awareness
- **CA-7** — Continuous Monitoring
- **SC-7** — Boundary Protection
- **SI-3** — Malicious Code Protection
- **SI-4** — System Monitoring
- **SI-8** — Spam Protection
- **AC-2** — Account Management
- **AC-6** — Least Privilege
- **IA-5** — Authenticator Management
- **CM-3** — Configuration Change Control
- **IR-4** — Incident Handling

OWASP-TOP10-2021

- **A08:2021** — Software and Data Integrity Failures
- **A07:2021** — Identification and Authentication Failures

CIS-V8

- **2.5** — Allowlist Authorized Software
- **2.6** — Allowlist Authorized Libraries

- **6.3** — Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications
- **14.2** — Train Workforce Members to Recognize Social Engineering Attacks
- **8.2** — Collect Audit Logs

NIST-CSF-2

- **RS.MI-01** — Incidents are contained
- **DE.CM-01** — Networks and network services are monitored

HIPAA-SECURITY

- **164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A)** — Data Backup Plan

ISO-27001-2022

- **A.5.29** — Information security during disruption
- **A.5.23** — Information security for use of cloud services

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID	Technique Name	Tactic
T1588.001	Malware	Resource-Development
T1021	Remote Services	Lateral-Movement
T1583.003	Virtual Private Server	Resource-Development
T1486	Data Encrypted for Impact	Impact
T1560	Archive Collected Data	Collection
T1195.002	Compromise Software Supply Chain	Initial-Access
T1657	Financial Theft	Impact
T1566	Phishing	Initial-Access
T1090	Proxy	Command-And-Control
T1588	Obtain Capabilities	Resource-Development
T1539	Steal Web Session Cookie	Credential-Access
T1199	Trusted Relationship	Initial-Access
T1071	Application Layer Protocol	Command-And-Control
T1078	Valid Accounts	Defense-Evasion
T1574.001	DLL	Persistence

Sources

Source	URL	Tier
Blog	https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-2026-financial-s...	T3
	https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-named-leader-gar...	T3
	https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/announcing-threat-ai-industr...	T3
	https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/how-to-mature-your-threat-in...	T3
MURKY PANDA: Trusted-Relationship Cloud Threat | CrowdStrike	https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/murky-panda-trusted-relation...	T3

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