INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
Security Command Center
TLP:CLEAR
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# Carnival Corporation Data Breach Exposes Personal Data of Nearly 6 Million Individuals

DATA BREACH | HIGH

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|---|---|
| SCC Item ID | SCC-DBR-2026-0143 |
| Type | Data Breach |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected Products | Carnival Corporation customer and employee records (scope: ~6 million individuals) |
| Published | 1 day ago |
| Discovery Source | Serper |

## Executive Summary

Carnival Corporation has confirmed a data breach affecting approximately 6 million customers and employees, with ShinyHunters claiming responsibility for the theft. Exposed data includes names, addresses, and other personal information. This is Carnival's fourth publicly known breach since 2019, heightening regulatory exposure and reputational risk across its cruise brands.

## Technical Analysis

ShinyHunters, a financially motivated threat actor group with a documented history of large-scale data theft and extortion, claimed responsibility for unauthorized access to Carnival Corporation systems resulting in exfiltration of records for approximately 6 million individuals. The initial access vector has not been publicly confirmed. No CVE has been assigned; this is an unauthorized access and data exfiltration incident. Relevant CWEs: CWE-359 (Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor) and CWE-284 (Improper Access Control). MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed or attributed: T1078 (Valid Accounts, likely initial access), T1530 (Data from Cloud Storage), T1537 (Transfer Data to Cloud Account), T1567 (Exfiltration Over Web Service), and T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact, noted in ShinyHunters' known TTPs, though ransomware deployment is not confirmed in this incident). No patch is applicable; remediation is access control and monitoring-focused. ShinyHunters has previously been linked to breaches at AT&T, Ticketmaster, and other high-volume consumer data holders.

## Action Checklist

1. Step 1: Containment. Audit all externally accessible data stores, including cloud storage buckets and APIs, for unauthorized access or anomalous egress. Rotate credentials for any service accounts or

administrative accounts with access to customer and employee PII repositories. Reference NIST AC-2 (Account Management) and AC-17 (Remote Access) to scope the review. Apply CIS 6.2 (Access Revoking Process) to disable any accounts not actively required.

2. Step 2: Detection. Review SIEM and DLP logs for bulk data access or exfiltration events consistent with T1530 and T1537. Query for anomalous access to cloud storage objects (S3, Azure Blob, GCS) in the 90 days prior to disclosure. Look for large outbound data transfers to non-corporate destinations, OAuth token reuse from unfamiliar IPs, and API calls with atypical user agents. Reference AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting) for log review cadence and AU-12 (Audit Record Generation) for log completeness. Apply D3-LAM (Local Account Monitoring) and D3-SFA (System File Analysis) for host-level indicators.

3. Step 3: Eradication. There is no software patch to apply. Eradication focuses on access control hardening. Enforce MFA on all administrative and externally exposed interfaces per CIS 6.3, CIS 6.5, and NIST AC-7. Remove or rotate any compromised credentials. Enforce least privilege across all data access roles per NIST AC-6 and CIS 5.4. Apply D3-CRO (Credential Rotation) and D3-CH (Credential Hardening) across affected systems.

4. Step 4: Recovery. Validate that all access to PII repositories is logged and alerts are active per NIST AU-2 (Event Logging) and AU-9 (Protection of Audit Information). Confirm cloud storage bucket permissions have been reviewed and tightened per CIS 3.3 (Configure Data Access Control Lists). Monitor for re-access attempts using ShinyHunters-associated infrastructure. Retain logs per NIST AU-11 for forensic support.

5. Step 5: Post-Incident. Conduct a gap assessment against NIST AC-4 (Information Flow Enforcement) and CIS 3.2 (Establish and Maintain a Data Inventory) to determine whether sensitive PII was appropriately segmented and inventoried before the incident. Evaluate whether AU-13 (Monitoring for Information Disclosure) controls were active for open-source indicators of ShinyHunters activity. Document lessons learned and update the incident response playbook to include cloud data exfiltration scenarios. This is Carnival's fourth breach in seven years; a pattern of repeated compromise warrants a formal third-party security program assessment.

## IR / Forensic Enrichment

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|---|---|
| **Triage Priority** | URGENT |
| **Escalation Criteria** | Escalate immediately to legal counsel, DPO, and executive leadership if forensic analysis confirms PII exfiltration volume exceeds 500 individuals in any EU/UK jurisdiction (triggering GDPR/UK GDPR 72-hour supervisory authority notification), any US state with breach notification thresholds (California, New York, Texas), or if ShinyHunters publishes or offers the dataset for sale on criminal forums, confirming active data monetization and accelerating regulatory clock. |

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| **Recovery Notes** | Following containment and credential rotation, maintain elevated monitoring on all cloud storage APIs for a minimum of 90 days, specifically watching for access patterns consistent with ShinyHunters re-exploitation or sale of stolen credentials to secondary actors — ShinyHunters has a documented history of selling datasets to other threat actors after initial monetization. Verify that no shadow copies of the PII dataset exist in unmanaged cloud storage, developer sandboxes, or data pipeline staging buckets that were not in scope for the initial access review. Given Carnival's pattern of four breaches since 2019, a formal Purple Team exercise targeting cloud storage misconfigurations and credential theft scenarios should be scheduled within 90 days of recovery to validate that newly implemented controls are effective against the TTPs used in this campaign. |
| **Forensic Artifacts** | AWS CloudTrail data event logs (s3:GetObject, s3:ListBucket, s3:GetBucketAcl) for all S3 buckets tagged or named with PII-relevant identifiers — these are the primary forensic record of what data was accessed, by which identity, from which IP, and at what volume during the exfiltration window \| S3 Server Access Logs for PII-containing buckets showing HTTP response codes, BytesSent per request, and Requester field — cross-reference with CloudTrail to identify any access that bypassed IAM logging (e.g., pre-signed URL abuse or bucket policy misconfigurations allowing unauthenticated access) \| Identity provider authentication logs (Okta System Log, Azure AD Sign-In logs, AWS IAM last-used data) filtered for service accounts and admin accounts with s3:GetObject permissions, specifically looking for logins from IPs not associated with Carnival's known corporate egress ranges or CI/CD infrastructure, consistent with ShinyHunters use of residential proxies or VPS infrastructure \| VPC Flow Logs or Azure NSG Flow Logs showing high-volume outbound TCP flows (destination port 443 or 80) from subnets hosting data pipeline or ETL workloads to non-corporate external IPs — ShinyHunters exfiltration typically manifests as sustained high-throughput HTTPS transfers rather than brief bursts, making flow duration and bytes-transferred the key discriminators \| Any breach notification or data sale posts on criminal forums (BreachForums, Telegram channels) by ShinyHunters attributing data to Carnival Corporation, archived with timestamp, URL, and hash of the page content — these serve as external corroboration of scope and timing and are admissible evidence for regulatory submissions and potential civil litigation |

### Per-Action IR Details

**Step 1: Containment — Audit all externally accessible data stores, including cloud storage buckets and APIs, for unauthorized access or anomalous egress. Rotate credentials for any service accounts or administrative accounts with access to customer and employee PII repositories. Reference NIST AC-2 (Account Management) and AC-17 (Remote Access) to scope the review. Apply CIS 6.2 (Access Revoking Process) to disable any accounts that are not actively required.**

**NIST Phase:** Containment

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.3 — Containment Strategy

**Controls:** NIST AC-2 (Account Management), NIST AC-17 (Remote Access), NIST AC-6 (Least Privilege), CIS 6.2 (Establish an Access Revoking Process), CIS 5.1 (Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Accounts)

**Compensating:** Without enterprise IAM tooling, export all service account and admin account listings from AWS IAM (aws iam list-users && aws iam list-access-keys --user-name ), Azure AD (az ad user list --query), or GCP (gcloud iam service-accounts list). Immediately disable keys inactive for 30+ days using aws iam update-access-key --status Inactive. For on-prem, run Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties LastLogonDate | Where-Object {$_.LastLogonDate -lt (Get-Date).AddDays(-30)} in PowerShell. Enumerate and revoke OAuth app grants using the Google Workspace Admin SDK or Azure AD app registrations panel — ShinyHunters operations frequently leverage stolen OAuth tokens or API keys exfiltrated from code repositories or misconfigured CI/CD pipelines.

**Evidence:** Before rotating credentials, snapshot and preserve: AWS CloudTrail logs (s3:GetObject, s3:ListBucket, GetBucketAcl events) for the 90 days prior to disclosure; Azure Storage diagnostic logs for blob access events; GCP Cloud Audit Logs (DATA_READ, DATA_WRITE) from Cloud Storage; IAM Access Advisor reports showing last-accessed timestamps for all roles with s3:GetObject or equivalent permissions; any CI/CD pipeline configuration files (GitHub Actions .yml, .env files, Jenkinsfiles) that may have exposed credentials to the threat actor; and network flow logs (VPC Flow Logs, NSG Flow Logs) showing high-volume outbound transfers from storage VPCs to external IPs.

**Step 2: Detection — Review SIEM and DLP logs for bulk data access or exfiltration events consistent with T1530 and T1537. Query for anomalous access to cloud storage objects (S3, Azure Blob, GCS) in the 90 days prior to disclosure. Look for large outbound data transfers to non-corporate destinations, OAuth token reuse from unfamiliar IPs, and API calls with atypical user agents. Reference AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting) for log review cadence and AU-12 (Audit Record Generation) for log completeness. Apply D3-LAM (Local Account Monitoring) and D3-SFA (System File Analysis) for host-level indicators.**

**NIST Phase:** Detection Analysis

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 — Detection and Analysis

**Controls:** NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), NIST AU-12 (Audit Record Generation), NIST AU-3 (Content of Audit Records), CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)

**Compensating:** Without a SIEM, use AWS CLI to query CloudTrail directly: aws cloudtrail lookup-events --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=GetObject --start-time | jq '.Events[] | select(.Username != "expected-service-account")'. For Azure, use KQL in Log Analytics: StorageBlobLogs | where OperationName == 'GetBlob' | where CallerIpAddress !in (known_corp_ranges) | summarize TotalBytes=sum(ResponseBodySize) by CallerIpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | where TotalBytes > 100000000. For ShinyHunters-specific IOC hunting, query threat intelligence feeds (OTX AlienVault, abuse.ch) for IPs associated with ShinyHunters campaigns and cross-reference against VPC Flow Logs or Azure NSG logs using grep or awk on exported CSV. Use Sigma rule detection.emerging_threats.cloud_exfiltration as a starting template for manual log analysis.

**Evidence:** Preserve before analysis: raw CloudTrail JSON logs showing s3:GetObject events with RequestParameters.bucketName matching PII storage buckets, grouped by sourceIPAddress; AWS S3 Server Access Logs showing HTTP 200 responses with large response sizes (BytesSent > 10MB per request) to non-corporate IPs; user-agent strings from API calls — ShinyHunters tooling frequently uses scripted clients (Python boto3, curl, custom scrapers) with non-standard user-agent strings; OAuth token issuance and usage logs from the identity provider (Okta system logs, Azure AD Sign-In logs filtered by application ID) showing token reuse across geographically dispersed IPs in short time windows; and DLP alert exports from the 90-day window if a DLP solution was in place, even if alerts were not actioned at the time.

**Step 3: Eradication — There is no software patch to apply. Eradication focuses on access control hardening. Enforce MFA on all administrative and externally exposed interfaces per CIS 6.3 and CIS 6.5 and NIST AC-7. Remove or rotate any compromised credentials. Enforce least privilege across all data access roles per NIST AC-6 and CIS 5.4. Apply D3-CRO (Credential Rotation) and D3-CH (Credential Hardening) across affected systems.**

**NIST Phase:** Eradication

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.4 — Eradication

**Controls:** NIST AC-6 (Least Privilege), NIST AC-7 (Unsuccessful Logon Attempts), NIST AC-2 (Account Management), CIS 6.3 (Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications), CIS 6.5 (Require MFA for Administrative Access), CIS 5.4 (Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts)

**Compensating:** Enforce MFA without enterprise SSO using AWS IAM policy condition keys: add a condition block requiring aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent: true on all IAM policies granting s3:GetObject or s3:ListBucket. For Azure, enable Conditional Access policy requiring MFA for all users with Storage Blob Data Reader or higher roles — this is available in the free Azure AD tier. For credential rotation without a secrets manager, use the AWS CLI rotation sequence: aws iam create-access-key, update application configs, then aws iam delete-access-key on the old key ID.

Document each rotation in a change log. Apply AWS IAM Access Analyzer (free service) to identify overly permissive bucket policies and cross-account access: aws accessanalyzer list-findings --analyzer-name .

**Evidence:** Before removing any access or rotating credentials, preserve: a complete export of all IAM policies and inline policies attached to roles with access to Carnival's PII repositories (aws iam get-role-policy, aws iam list-attached-role-policies); a snapshot of S3 bucket ACLs and bucket policies (aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket && aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket ) showing the permission state at time of breach; any exposed credentials found in public or internal code repositories (check GitHub secret scanning alerts, GitLab SAST findings, or manually search git log history for AWS_ACCESS_KEY patterns using truffleHog or git-secrets); and identity provider logs showing the full authentication history for any service account whose credentials are being rotated, to establish the attacker's access timeline.

**Step 4: Recovery — Validate that all access to PII repositories is logged and alerts are active per NIST AU-2 (Event Logging) and AU-9 (Protection of Audit Information). Confirm cloud storage bucket permissions have been reviewed and tightened per CIS 3.3 (Configure Data Access Control Lists). Monitor for re-access attempts using ShinyHunters-associated infrastructure. Retain logs per NIST AU-11 for forensic support.**

**NIST Phase:** Recovery

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.5 — Recovery

**Controls:** NIST AU-2 (Event Logging), NIST AU-9 (Protection of Audit Information), NIST AU-11 (Audit Record Retention), NIST AC-4 (Information Flow Enforcement), CIS 3.3 (Configure Data Access Control Lists)

**Compensating:** Enable S3 Object-Level logging via CloudTrail if not already active — this is the critical gap that allows bulk GetObject to go undetected (aws cloudtrail put-event-selectors --trail-name --event-selectors '[{"ReadWriteType":"All","IncludeManagementEvents":true,"DataResources":[{"Type":"AWS::S3::Object","Values":["arn:aws:s3:::*"]}]}]'). Set up a free CloudWatch alarm on the metric filter for s3:GetObject with BytesSent sum > 500MB per 5-minute window. For ShinyHunters re-access monitoring, export current ShinyHunters-attributed IPs from OTX AlienVault or Feodo Tracker and add them to an AWS WAF IP set blocking rule or Azure Firewall deny list. Retain all CloudTrail logs, VPC Flow Logs, and S3 access logs to an immutable S3 bucket with Object Lock (Compliance mode) for the retention period required by applicable breach notification regulations (minimum 3 years for GDPR, varies by US state law).

**Evidence:** Verify the following before declaring recovery complete: CloudTrail is confirmed active and logging data events (not just management events) for all S3 buckets containing PII — validate with aws cloudtrail get-event-selectors; S3 Block Public Access is enabled at the account level and confirmed for each PII bucket (aws s3api get-public-access-block --bucket ); all bucket policies have been re-evaluated and no wildcard principal ('*') grants exist; and a baseline of expected API call volume and source IPs has been established in CloudWatch so that future anomalies representing re-access by ShinyHunters or a copycat actor can be detected against a known-good baseline.

**Step 5: Post-Incident — Conduct a gap assessment against NIST AC-4 (Information Flow Enforcement) and CIS 3.2 (Establish and Maintain a Data Inventory) to determine whether sensitive PII was appropriately segmented and inventoried before the incident. Evaluate whether AU-13 (Monitoring for Information Disclosure) controls were active for open-source indicators of ShinyHunters activity. Document lessons learned and update the incident response playbook to include cloud data exfiltration scenarios. This is Carnival's fourth breach in seven years; a pattern of repeated compromise warrants a formal third-party security program assessment.**

**NIST Phase:** Post Incident

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity

**Controls:** NIST AC-4 (Information Flow Enforcement), NIST AU-13 (Monitoring for Information Disclosure), NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), CIS 3.2 (Establish and Maintain a Data Inventory), CIS 7.2 (Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process)

**Compensating:** For the data inventory gap assessment without enterprise DLP, use AWS Macie (has a free 30-day trial and ongoing free tier for S3 bucket evaluation) to classify PII-containing objects across all S3 buckets — aws macie2 create-classification-job --job-type ONE_TIME --s3-job-definition . For AU-13 (open-source monitoring for ShinyHunters activity), subscribe to free threat intel sources that track ShinyHunters: Hudson Rock's Cavalier feed,

threat actor profiles on Flashpoint Community (free tier), and RaidForums/BreachForums monitoring via Have I Been Pwned's organizational notification service. Add ShinyHunters as a tracked threat actor in OpenCTI (free, self-hosted) and configure automated ingestion of MISP feeds tagged with this actor. Document lessons learned using the NIST 800-61r3 §4 template, specifically addressing why four breaches over seven years did not produce durable control improvements — this pattern indicates systemic process failure, not isolated technical gaps.

**Evidence:** Artifacts to compile for the lessons-learned session and potential regulatory submission: a complete timeline of access events from the 90-day pre-disclosure window, sourced from CloudTrail and S3 access logs, showing first observed unauthorized access date versus breach disclosure date (this gap is critical for GDPR 72-hour notification compliance assessment); any dark web or paste site posts by ShinyHunters advertising Carnival data (archive using HTTrack or SingleFile before they are taken down — these establish scope and timing); prior incident reports from Carnival's three previous breaches (2019 ransomware, 2020 ransomware, 2021 unauthorized access) to identify which controls were recommended but not implemented; and an exported list of all data subjects potentially affected, segmented by jurisdiction, to support breach notification obligation scoping under GDPR, CCPA, and applicable US state laws.

## Detection Guidance

Query cloud access logs (AWS CloudTrail, Azure Monitor, GCP Audit Logs) for bulk GetObject, ListBucket, or equivalent read operations against PII-containing storage over the past 90 days. Flag any API calls originating from IP ranges not associated with corporate egress or known vendor ranges. Review identity logs for Valid Account usage (T1078), look for accounts authenticating from new geolocations, outside business hours, or via credential stuffing patterns. Check for large outbound data transfers to file-sharing or cloud sync services consistent with T1567 (Exfiltration Over Web Service). Apply D3-LAM for monitoring service account and administrative account activity. Behavioral indicators include: sudden spikes in read volume against customer or employee databases, access by accounts with recently changed passwords, and enumeration activity against data APIs. ShinyHunters has historically used compromised credentials and cloud misconfigurations as initial footholds; review bucket ACLs and public-access settings immediately.

## Indicators of Compromise

| Type | Value | Context | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | `ShinyHunters-associated infrastructure not publicly confirmed at time of analysis` | ShinyHunters has historically used leak forums and Telegram channels to publish stolen data; monitor BreachForums and similar platforms for Carnival data listings | LOW |

## Framework Mappings

### MITRE-ATTACK

- **T1486** — Data Encrypted for Impact
- **T1530** — Data from Cloud Storage
- **T1537** — Transfer Data to Cloud Account
- **T1078** — Valid Accounts
- **T1567** — Exfiltration Over Web Service

### NIST-800-53R5

- **CP-9** — System Backup
- **CP-10** — System Recovery and Reconstitution
- **AC-2** — Account Management
- **AC-6** — Least Privilege
- **IA-2** — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)
- **IA-5** — Authenticator Management
- **AC-3** — Access Enforcement

### OWASP-TOP10-2021

- **A01:2021** — Broken Access Control

### CIS-V8

- **6.1** — Establish an Access Granting Process
- **6.2** — Establish an Access Revoking Process

### SOC2-TSC

- **CC6.1** — The entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures over protected information assets
- **CC7.4** — Responds to identified security incidents
- **CC6.3** — Authorizes, modifies, or removes access

### HIPAA-SECURITY

- **164.312(a)(1)** — Access Control
- **164.308(a)(6)(ii)** — Response and Reporting

### ISO-27001-2022

- **A.8.8** — Management of technical vulnerabilities
- **A.5.34** — Privacy and protection of personal information

### NIST-CSF-2

- **RS.CO-03** — Recovery activities and progress communicated

## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

| Technique ID | Technique Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Impact |
| T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | Collection |
| T1537 | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | Exfiltration |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Defense-Evasion |

| Technique ID | Technique Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service | Exfiltration |

## Sources

| Source | URL | Tier |
|---|---|---|
| | https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/data-breaches/2026/05/carnival-co... | T3 |
| **Cruise giant Carnival confirms data breach affecting nearly 6 million ...** | https://therecord.media/cruise-giant-carnival-confirms-data-breach-... | T3 |
| **Carnival Data Breach Exposed 6 Million People - SecurityWeek** | https://www.securityweek.com/carnival-data-breach-exposed-6-million... | T3 |
| **Carnival Data Breach Exposes Personal Information of 6 Million ...** | https://www.reddit.com/r/pwnhub/comments/1tq7o07/carnival_data_brea... | T3 |
| **Carnival Data Breach Exposes Data of Nearly 6 Million Customers** | https://www.techrepublic.com/article/news-carnival-data-breach-6-mi... | T3 |



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