INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
Security Command Center
TLP:CLEAR
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CVE-2026-23870: Imperva Customers Protected Against Critical React Server Components DoS Vulnerability

CVE VULNERABILITY | CRITICAL

SCC Item ID	SCC-CVE-2026-0151
Type	CVE Vulnerability
CVE ID	CVE-2026-23870
Severity	CRITICAL
EPSS Score	0.0032 (55th percentile)
Affected Products	React Server Components (RSC) and dependent frameworks (specific versions unconfirmed from available data)
Published	7 hours ago
Discovery Source	Serper

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-23870 is a critical-severity denial-of-service vulnerability affecting React Server Components (RSC), a widely used web framework component. Organizations running RSC-dependent applications face potential service outages if exploitation succeeds. Immediate patching and WAF deployment with resource exhaustion detection rules are required mitigation measures.

Technical Analysis

CVE-2026-23870 is a denial-of-service vulnerability rooted in CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) within React Server Components and frameworks that depend on RSC functionality. The vulnerability is disclosed via GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh from the facebook/react repository. MITRE ATT&CK mapping: T1499 (Endpoint Denial of Service) and T1499.003 (Application Exhaustion Flood), indicating the attack vector likely involves crafted requests designed to exhaust server-side resources. EPSS score: 0.322% (55th percentile), suggesting moderate but not yet widespread exploitation probability. NVD CVSS score is not yet available; qualitative rating of critical reflects vendor advisory assessment pending CVSS publication. Consult the NVD entry (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23870) and the GitHub advisory (https://github.com/facebook/react/security/advisories/GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh) directly for authoritative CVSS scoring, affected version ranges, and root cause specifics. CISA KEV: not listed. Patch status: unconfirmed from available data, check the facebook/react repository for updated releases.

Action Checklist

1. Step 1: Containment, Identify all internal applications and services built on React Server Components (RSC) or RSC-dependent frameworks (Next.js App Router, for example). If internet-facing and unpatched, place behind a WAF with rules targeting application exhaustion patterns and request rate limiting.
2. Step 2: Detection, Query application logs and web server logs for abnormal request volume patterns targeting RSC-served routes (high request rates, repeated payloads, connection exhaustion events). Review server CPU and memory utilization for unexplained spikes correlating with inbound request bursts. No specific IOC patterns are confirmed from available data; monitor GitHub advisory GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh for published indicators.
3. Step 3: Eradication, Apply the patched version of React once the facebook/react repository publishes a fix addressing GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh. Specific patch version ranges are unconfirmed from this pipeline run; verify directly at https://github.com/facebook/react/security/advisories/GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh and the NVD entry before applying updates in production.
4. Step 4: Recovery, After patching, validate RSC-dependent services return to normal performance baselines. Monitor application response times and error rates for 24-48 hours post-remediation. Confirm WAF or rate-limiting rules remain in place as a secondary control layer.
5. Step 5: Post-Incident, Review whether RSC-dependent services were scoped correctly in your asset inventory. Assess whether application-layer DoS scenarios are covered in your incident response playbooks. Evaluate rate-limiting and resource exhaustion controls across other framework-dependent services.

IR / Forensic Enrichment

Triage Priority	URGENT
Escalation Criteria	Escalate to senior IR leadership and engage legal/compliance if web server access logs show sustained high-volume request bursts against RSC routes coinciding with service degradation or outage affecting customer-facing applications, particularly if PII or PHI is processed by the affected RSC-dependent service, which may trigger breach notification obligations under HIPAA, GDPR, or applicable state law.
Recovery Notes	Post-patch recovery validation must specifically confirm that Node.js process memory no longer exhibits unbounded growth under sustained RSC route load — this is the functional test that the CVE-2026-23870 DoS vector is closed, not merely that the service is online. Maintain WAF rate-limiting rules on RSC routes as a permanent secondary control layer even after patching, as the specific payload pattern for this vulnerability class may be reused in future variants. Continue monitoring NGINX/Apache 5xx error rates and Node.js RSS memory on a 30-minute polling interval for a minimum of 48 hours post-patch before declaring recovery complete.

Forensic Artifacts	Web server access logs (NGINX /var/log/nginx/access.log or Apache /var/log/apache2/access.log): high-frequency request bursts to RSC-served routes (/_next/server/, /api/ prefixes in Next.js App Router) from single or distributed source IPs — the primary indicator of DoS exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-23870 | Node.js process memory snapshots (/tmp/node_mem_monitor.log from cron collection, or PM2 logs at ~/.pm2/logs/): unbounded RSS memory growth correlated with inbound request bursts is the runtime signature of resource exhaustion exploitation specific to the RSC DoS mechanism | TCP connection state tables (output of 'ss -s' and 'netstat -an'): CLOSE_WAIT or TIME_WAIT accumulation on the Node.js serving port indicates connection exhaustion consistent with application-layer DoS against RSC endpoints | package-lock.json and npm audit output: establishes the exact vulnerable React version present on affected systems at time of incident, required for determining exposure window and satisfying NIST SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) documentation requirements | Node.js heap dumps (gcore output from the serving process if exploitation was active): captures in-memory state during or after exploitation, enabling analysis of whether the resource exhaustion mechanism produced exploitable memory artifacts beyond the DoS impact — relevant if GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh advisory is later updated to reflect additional impact beyond DoS

Per-Action IR Details

Step 1: Containment — Identify all internal applications and services built on React Server Components (RSC) or RSC-dependent frameworks (Next.js App Router, for example). If internet-facing and unpatched, place behind a WAF with rules targeting application exhaustion patterns. Imperva has confirmed deployed protections; other WAF vendors should be queried for equivalent rule coverage.

NIST Phase: Containment

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.3 — Containment Strategy

Controls: NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST SC-5 (Denial-of-Service Protection), NIST CM-8 (System Component Inventory), CIS 1.1 (Establish and Maintain Detailed Enterprise Asset Inventory), CIS 4.4 (Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers)

Compensating: For teams without a commercial WAF, deploy NGINX with a rate-limiting configuration targeting RSC routes: use 'limit_req_zone' and 'limit_req' directives to cap requests per IP on paths served by RSC (e.g., /api/ or /_next/ route prefixes in Next.js App Router). Example: 'limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=rsc_limit:10m rate=30r/s;' applied to RSC-served location blocks. Alternatively, use Cloudflare's free tier with a custom rate-limiting rule targeting the same URI patterns. Document all identified RSC-dependent services in a temporary asset register (spreadsheet acceptable) cross-referenced against internet exposure status.

Evidence: Before implementing WAF rules, snapshot current web server access logs (NGINX: /var/log/nginx/access.log; Apache: /var/log/apache2/access.log) and capture a baseline of active network connections to RSC-serving ports using 'ss -tnp' or 'netstat -antp'. Record current process memory and CPU utilization for the Node.js process serving RSC via 'ps aux | grep node' and 'top -b -n1'. This baseline is required to distinguish pre-containment exploitation evidence from post-containment noise.

Step 2: Detection — Query application logs and web server logs for abnormal request volume patterns targeting RSC-served routes (high request rates, repeated payloads, connection exhaustion events). Review server CPU and memory utilization for unexplained spikes correlating with inbound request bursts. No specific IOC patterns are confirmed from available data — monitor GitHub advisory GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh for published indicators.

NIST Phase: Detection Analysis

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 — Detection and Analysis

Controls: NIST SI-4 (System Monitoring), NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), NIST AU-2 (Event Logging), NIST IR-5 (Incident Monitoring), CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a

Vulnerability Management Process)

Compensating: Without a SIEM, run this bash one-liner against NGINX access logs to surface high-frequency source IPs hitting RSC routes: 'awk \'$7 ~ /^\/_next\/|^\/api\//{print $1, $7}\' /var/log/nginx/access.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -50'. For Next.js App Router specifically, filter on requests to '/_next/server/' and '/api/' path prefixes. Monitor Node.js process memory growth using a cron job: 'while true; do ps -o pid,rss,cmd -p $(pgrep node) >> /tmp/node_mem_monitor.log; sleep 30; done'. Alert threshold: RSS growth exceeding 20% over a 5-minute window without corresponding legitimate traffic increase warrants investigation. Watch GitHub advisory GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh for confirmed payload signatures to convert into YARA or Sigma rules once published.

Evidence: Collect web server access logs covering the 72 hours preceding detection, preserving original timestamps (do not copy without 'cp --preserve=timestamps'). Capture Node.js application-level logs if configured (default path varies; check PM2 logs at '~/.pm2/logs/' or systemd journal via 'journalctl -u your-nextjs-service --since "72 hours ago"'). Export current active TCP connection counts by state: 'ss -s' output and 'netstat -an | awk \'/^tcp/{print $6}\' | sort | uniq -c'. Preserve a memory dump of the Node.js process if exploitation is suspected: 'gcore $(pgrep node)' requires gdb installed. These artifacts capture the RSC-specific resource exhaustion pattern that DoS exploitation of this vulnerability would produce.

Step 3: Eradication — Apply the patched version of React once the facebook/react repository publishes a fix addressing GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh. Specific patch version ranges are unconfirmed from this pipeline run; verify directly at https://github.com/facebook/react/security/advisories/GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh and the NVD entry before applying updates in production.

NIST Phase: Eradication

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.4 — Eradication

Controls: NIST SI-2 (Flaw Remediation), NIST SI-7 (Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity), NIST CM-8 (System Component Inventory), CIS 7.3 (Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management), CIS 7.4 (Perform Automated Application Patch Management), CIS 2.2 (Ensure Authorized Software is Currently Supported)

Compensating: Before patching, record the current React and Next.js versions across all affected services: 'find /var/www -name package.json -not -path \'*/node_modules/*\' | xargs grep -l react' to enumerate deployments, then 'cat package-lock.json | grep -A2 \'"react"\'' for pinned versions. Verify patch integrity post-update by comparing the published SHA-256 checksum of the React npm package from the GitHub advisory against your installed package: 'shasum -a 256 node_modules/react/index.js'. For teams using npm, run 'npm audit' post-patch to confirm GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh no longer appears in the audit output. Stage the patch in a non-production RSC environment and conduct a synthetic load test (use 'ab' or 'wrk') to confirm the resource exhaustion behavior is resolved before production rollout.

Evidence: Before applying the patch, preserve the vulnerable package state: archive the full 'node_modules/react/' and 'node_modules/react-dom/' directories with 'tar -czf react_prepatched_$(date +%Y%m%d).tar.gz node_modules/react node_modules/react-dom'. Record package-lock.json or yarn.lock as a point-in-time dependency snapshot. If active exploitation occurred prior to eradication, preserve web server access logs and any Node.js heap dumps before proceeding — these constitute forensic evidence of exploitation attempts specific to the RSC DoS mechanism and must not be overwritten by log rotation.

Step 4: Recovery — After patching, validate RSC-dependent services return to normal performance baselines. Monitor application response times and error rates for 24-48 hours post-remediation. Confirm WAF or rate-limiting rules remain in place as a secondary control layer.

NIST Phase: Recovery

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.5 — Recovery

Controls: NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST SI-6 (Security and Privacy Function Verification), NIST SC-5 (Denial-of-Service Protection), NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), CIS 7.2 (Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process)

Compensating: Establish a recovery validation baseline by running synthetic HTTP load tests against RSC-served routes post-patch using 'wrk -t4 -c100 -d60s https://your-app/rsc-route' and confirming Node.js process memory stabilizes (does not grow unbounded) under sustained load — this directly validates the DoS vector is closed. Monitor

NGINX or Apache error logs for HTTP 503/504 responses (indicating continued exhaustion) using: 'tail -f /var/log/nginx/error.log | grep -E \'(503|504|upstream timed out)\'' for the 48-hour watch period. Verify WAF rate-limiting rules are still active and have not been silently disabled by comparing current NGINX config against the version saved during containment.

Evidence: Capture post-patch performance baselines: Node.js RSS memory under normal load ('ps -o rss -p $(pgrep node)'), average response time from synthetic tests, and HTTP 5xx error rate from access logs. Document the exact React version deployed to production post-patch (output of 'npm list react' in the application directory). These serve as the verified clean-state baseline for future incident comparison and satisfy NIST AU-3 (Content of Audit Records) requirements for documenting the recovery event.

Step 5: Post-Incident — Review whether RSC-dependent services were scoped correctly in your asset inventory. Assess whether application-layer DoS scenarios are covered in your incident response playbooks. Evaluate rate-limiting and resource exhaustion controls across other framework-dependent services.

NIST Phase: Post Incident

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity

Controls: NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan), NIST CM-8 (System Component Inventory), NIST RA-3 (Risk Assessment), NIST SI-5 (Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives), CIS 1.1 (Establish and Maintain Detailed Enterprise Asset Inventory), CIS 2.1 (Establish and Maintain a Software Inventory), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)

Compensating: Conduct a dependency audit across all web-facing services to identify other framework-level DoS exposure: run 'find /var/www -name package.json -not -path \'*/node_modules/*\' | xargs grep -l "next\|react\|remix\|astro"' to enumerate RSC-adjacent framework deployments that may share the same vulnerability class. Subscribe to GitHub Security Advisories for the facebook/react repository directly (no tooling required) to receive future GHSA notifications. Document the gap between CVE publication and internal detection in a lessons-learned entry — for this CVE the detection dependency on Imperva advisory publication (rather than internal telemetry) should be captured as a detection coverage gap in the IR playbook.

Evidence: Preserve the complete incident timeline document: first log evidence of anomalous RSC-route traffic, time WAF rule was deployed, time patch was applied, and time normal baselines were confirmed. Archive the pre-patch and post-patch 'npm audit' outputs as evidence of flaw remediation per NIST SI-2 (Flaw Remediation). Retain all collected access logs, Node.js process snapshots, and network connection exports per your organization's audit record retention policy per NIST AU-11 (Audit Record Retention).

Detection Guidance

No confirmed IOC signatures are available from the ingested data. Detection should focus on behavioral indicators consistent with CWE-400/T1499.003: abnormally high request rates to RSC-served endpoints, server resource exhaustion (CPU, memory, connection pool saturation) without corresponding legitimate traffic spikes, and elevated 503/504 error rates on RSC routes. Web application firewall logs, application performance monitoring (APM) tools, and server-side metrics are the primary detection surfaces. Once the GitHub advisory (GHSA-rv78-f8rc-xrxh) publishes full technical details, refine detection rules against the confirmed attack vector and payload patterns.

Framework Mappings

MITRE-ATTACK

- **T1499** — Endpoint Denial of Service
- **T1499.003** — Application Exhaustion Flood

NIST-800-53R5

- **SC-5** — Denial-of-Service Protection

CIS-V8

- **13.8** — Deploy a Network Intrusion Prevention Solution

ISO-27001-2022

- **A.8.8** — Management of technical vulnerabilities

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID	Technique Name	Tactic
T1499	Endpoint Denial of Service	Impact
T1499.003	Application Exhaustion Flood	Impact

Sources

Source	URL	Tier
	https://securityboulevard.com/2026/05/cve-2026-23870-imperva-custom...	T3
CVE-2026-23870 Detail - NVD	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23870	T1
Denial of Service Vulnerability in React Server Components - GitHub	https://github.com/facebook/react/security/advisories/GHSA-rv78-f8r...	T3
Imperva Customers Protected Against React Server Components ...	https://www.imperva.com/blog/imperva-customers-protected-against-re...	T3
CVE-2026-23870: Customers Protected Against Critical React ...	https://x.com/omvapt/status/2053303511979274386	T3

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