INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
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cPanel Authentication Bypass Under Active Exploitation: Millions of Hosted Sites at Risk

CVE VULNERABILITY | **CRITICAL** | CVSS 9.5

SCC Item ID	SCC-CVE-2026-0123
Type	CVE Vulnerability
Severity	CRITICAL
CVSS Base Score	9.5
Affected Products	cPanel & WHM (specific versions unconfirmed from available data; affects shared/managed hosting deployments broadly)
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Discovery Source	Rss

Executive Summary

A critical authentication-bypass flaw (CVSS 9.5) in cPanel & WHM, the world's most widely deployed web hosting control panel, allows unauthenticated attackers to take full control of hosting accounts without valid credentials. Evidence suggests threat actors exploited this vulnerability for approximately one month before public disclosure, meaning organizations may already be compromised. Any organization or customer hosted on shared or managed hosting infrastructure running cPanel is potentially affected, with exposure ranging from full website defacement to data theft and supply-chain attacks on site visitors.

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability is a critical authentication bypass in cPanel & WHM mapped to CWE-287 (Improper Authentication), CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function), and CWE-288 (Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel). The CVSS base score is 9.5. No official CVE identifier was confirmed in available source data at time of analysis. The attack vector is network-accessible: unauthenticated remote attackers can bypass login controls on cPanel's web-facing management interfaces (typically ports 2082, 2083, 2086, 2087). Multiple proof-of-concept exploit codes are publicly available. At least one researcher has reported zero-day exploitation predating public disclosure by approximately one month, indicating organized threat actor activity prior to patch availability. Until official patch details are published, monitor cPanel's security advisory and assume your installation is affected if running a version released before the patched version specified in the official advisory. Likely post-exploitation techniques based on MITRE mapping include: T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application), T1078 (Valid Accounts, impersonation after bypass), T1133 (External Remote Services), T1505.003 (Web Shell deployment), T1083 (File and Directory Discovery), T1565 (Data

Manipulation), and T1110 (Brute Force, may be used in conjunction). Source quality note: no CVE ID was present in reporting; affected version specifics remain unconfirmed. Monitor the official cPanel security advisory at https://documentation.cpanel.net/display/CL/Security+Advisories for authoritative version and patch details; this URL should be validated by the reader as cPanel's advisory pages are subject to change.

Action Checklist

1. Step 1: Containment. Immediately restrict external access to cPanel and WHM management ports (2082, 2083, 2086, 2087) at the firewall or network perimeter. If your environment permits, restrict access to only known-good management IP ranges. For managed/shared hosting customers, contact your hosting provider immediately to confirm patch status and request written confirmation that no unauthorized access occurred on your account.
2. Step 2: Detection. Review cPanel access logs (/usr/local/cpanel/logs/access_log) and WHM audit logs for authentication events that succeeded without corresponding valid credential entries, unusual access from unfamiliar IPs, or access at unusual times. Look for newly created cPanel accounts, FTP accounts, email forwarders, or cron jobs not initiated by known administrators. Check web server logs for newly deployed files (.php, .asp, .js) in document roots that were not deployed through normal change processes. Search for T1505.003 indicators: web shells commonly named with random strings or mimicking legitimate filenames in public_html directories.
3. Step 3: Eradication. Apply the official cPanel & WHM security patch immediately. Check https://documentation.cpanel.net/display/CL/Security+Advisories for the current advisory and specific patch version. If exploitation is suspected (unauthorized files, new accounts, or suspicious process activity detected), do not proceed with automatic updates until the system is isolated and forensic logs are preserved. If the system is not suspected of compromise, run 'cPanel Update' via WHM (Home > cPanel > Upgrade to Latest Version) or execute '/scripts/upcp' from the command line on the server. If exploitation is confirmed or suspected, treat the server as compromised: audit all hosted accounts for unauthorized files, revoke and rotate all cPanel, WHM, FTP, and database credentials, and review DNS zone files for unauthorized changes.
4. Step 4: Recovery. After patching, verify the installed cPanel version matches or exceeds the version specified in the official advisory. Re-enable management port access only from whitelisted IPs. Conduct a full file integrity check across hosted account document roots. Monitor cPanel access logs for 72 hours post-remediation for recurring unauthorized access attempts. Confirm no malicious cron jobs, SSH keys, or email forwarders remain. Notify hosted customers if unauthorized access to their account data cannot be ruled out.
5. Step 5: Post-Incident. This vulnerability exposes a structural control gap: administrative interfaces for hosting infrastructure should never be directly internet-accessible without IP restriction or VPN enforcement. Implement WHM/cPanel interface access controls as a permanent baseline. Establish a process for monitoring cPanel's official security advisory feed. Evaluate whether shared hosting infrastructure meets your organization's risk tolerance for hosting sensitive applications or customer data, given the multi-tenant exposure model this vulnerability demonstrates.

IR / Forensic Enrichment

Triage Priority	IMMEDIATE

Escalation Criteria	Escalate to senior IR leadership, legal counsel, and executive stakeholders if forensic analysis of cPanel access logs or WHM audit logs reveals successful authentication-bypass events during the ~30-day pre-disclosure exploitation window, any evidence of web shell deployment (T1505.003) in hosted account document roots, unauthorized creation of cPanel or database accounts, or DNS zone tampering — any of these conditions indicate confirmed compromise of multi-tenant hosting infrastructure potentially affecting customer PII/PHI and triggering mandatory breach notification obligations under GDPR (72-hour window), HIPAA, or applicable state breach laws.
Recovery Notes	Recovery is not complete at patch application — because this vulnerability was actively exploited for approximately one month before public disclosure, every hosted account on the affected cPanel server must be treated as potentially compromised until individually verified clean via file integrity check, cron audit, and SSH key review. Post-patch monitoring of `/usr/local/cpanel/logs/access_log` should continue for a minimum of 72 hours watching for resumed access attempts from previously observed attacker IPs, which would indicate either a second exploitation vector or attacker persistence via a mechanism not yet eradicated. Shared hosting customers who cannot obtain confirmation of clean status from their provider should consider migrating sensitive applications to infrastructure under their direct control before resuming normal operations.
Forensic Artifacts	/usr/local/cpanel/logs/access_log and /usr/local/cpanel/logs/login_log — the primary evidence of authentication-bypass exploitation; look for HTTP 200 responses to cPanel/WHM login endpoints (ports 2082–2087) originating from IPs with no corresponding valid credential entry in the login_log, spanning the ~30-day pre-disclosure window | /usr/local/cpanel/logs/audit_log — records all WHM administrative actions including account creation; attacker use of the bypass to create rogue cPanel sub-accounts, FTP users, or reseller accounts will appear here with timestamps correlatable to the suspicious access_log entries | /home/*/public_html/ directory trees with inode creation timestamps — web shells deployed post-exploitation via T1505.003 will appear as PHP files with creation times during the exploitation window; files with randomized names (e.g., 8-16 hex character filenames) or mimicking WordPress/Joomla core filenames in unexpected directories are primary indicators | /var/named/*.db DNS zone files and BIND change logs — attackers with WHM access can trivially add or modify DNS A/MX/TXT records to redirect traffic, enable spam relay, or support phishing infrastructure; compare current zone file state against version-controlled backups or hosting provider change logs | /var/spool/cron/ and per-user crontab entries for all hosted accounts — authentication-bypass exploitation enabling WHM-level access permits installation of persistent cron-based reverse shells or cryptocurrency miners under any hosted account's user context; entries invoking curl/wget to external IPs, base64-encoded commands, or references to /tmp/ executables are high-confidence indicators of post-exploitation persistence

Per-Action IR Details

Step 1: Containment — Immediately restrict external access to cPanel and WHM management ports (2082, 2083, 2086, 2087) at the firewall or network perimeter. If your environment permits, whitelist only known-good management IP ranges. For managed/shared hosting customers, contact your hosting provider immediately to confirm patch status and request confirmation that no unauthorized access occurred on your account.

NIST Phase: Containment

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.3 — Containment Strategy: Stop the bleeding by isolating the attack surface before eradication; for an authentication-bypass, the attack surface is the exposed management interface itself.

Controls: NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST SC-7 (Boundary Protection), CIS 4.4 (Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers), CIS 4.5 (Implement and Manage a Firewall on End-User Devices)

Compensating: On Linux-based cPanel servers, immediately execute: `iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 2082 -j DROP && iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 2083 -j DROP && iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 2086 -j DROP && iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 2087 -j DROP` then re-add rules permitting only your admin IP range: `iptables -I INPUT -s -p tcp --dport 2082:2087 -j ACCEPT`. Persist with `iptables-save > /etc/iptables/rules.v4`. For cPanel's built-in firewall (CSF/LFD if installed), use `csf -d ` to block observed attacker IPs and `csf -a ` to allowlist legitimate management addresses.

Evidence: Before blocking ports, capture a full snapshot of current active sessions on management ports: `ss -tnp | grep -E ':(2082|2083|2086|2087)'` and log all established connections. Also dump current cPanel session tokens from `/var/cpanel/sessions/` — the session files there will reveal any active authenticated sessions that bypassed normal credential checks, which is the direct artifact of this authentication-bypass mechanism. Record the output of `last -F` and `lastb -F` from the cPanel server to document recent successful and failed login history before containment actions overwrite in-memory state.

Step 2: Detection — Review cPanel access logs (/usr/local/cpanel/logs/access_log) and WHM audit logs for authentication events that succeeded without corresponding valid credential entries, unusual access from unfamiliar IPs, or access at unusual times. Look for newly created cPanel accounts, FTP accounts, email forwarders, or cron jobs not initiated by known administrators. Check web server logs for newly deployed files (.php, .asp, .js) in document roots that were not deployed through normal change processes. Search for T1505.003 indicators: web shells commonly named with random strings or mimicking legitimate filenames in public_html directories.

NIST Phase: Detection Analysis

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 — Detection and Analysis: Correlate cPanel authentication success events against credential validation records to identify the bypass pattern; given ~30 days of pre-disclosure exploitation, scope analysis must extend back at least 45 days from the advisory date.

Controls: NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), NIST AU-3 (Content of Audit Records), NIST SI-4 (System Monitoring), NIST IR-5 (Incident Monitoring), CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs)

Compensating: Run the following to extract all cPanel authentication successes from the last 45 days and identify anomalous source IPs: `grep -E '(login|auth)' /usr/local/cpanel/logs/access_log | grep -v '401\|403' | awk '{print $1, $7, $9}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn > /tmp/cpanel_auth_review.txt`. To hunt for post-exploitation web shells matching T1505.003, use: `find /home/*/public_html -name '*.php' -newer /usr/local/cpanel/cpanel -ls 2>/dev/null` (files newer than the cPanel binary are suspicious). Cross-reference with a YARA rule targeting common PHP web shell signatures: `yara /path/to/webshell_rules.yar /home/*/public_html/`. Free YARA web shell rule sets are available from Neo23x0/signature-base on GitHub. For cron backdoors: `for user in $(cut -f1 -d: /etc/passwd); do crontab -u $user -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v '^#' && echo "--- $user ---"; done > /tmp/all_crontabs.txt`.

Evidence: Preserve the following before any log rotation occurs: (1) Full copy of `/usr/local/cpanel/logs/access_log` and `/usr/local/cpanel/logs/login_log` covering at least 45 days pre-advisory; (2) WHM audit log at `/usr/local/cpanel/logs/audit_log` — this records account creation events and administrative actions that would show attacker-created cPanel sub-accounts; (3) Apache/LiteSpeed/Nginx access logs for all virtual hosts under `/usr/local/apache/domlogs/` — POST requests to newly created PHP files indicate web shell interaction; (4) `/var/spool/cron/` for all users to capture backdoor cron jobs; (5) `/home/*/public_html/` directory listing with timestamps (`ls -laR --time-style=full-iso`) to establish a file creation timeline correlated with the exploitation window.

Step 3: Eradication — Apply the official cPanel & WHM security patch immediately. Check https://documentation.cpanel.net/display/CL/Security+Advisories for the current advisory and specific patch version. Run 'cPanel Update' via WHM (Home > cPanel > Upgrade to Latest Version) or execute '/scripts/upcp' from the command line on the server. If exploitation is suspected, treat the server as compromised: audit all hosted accounts for unauthorized files, revoke and rotate all cPanel, WHM, FTP, and database credentials, and review DNS zone files for unauthorized changes.

NIST Phase: Eradication

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.4 — Eradication: For a confirmed authentication-bypass with pre-disclosure exploitation, patching alone is insufficient — all attacker-established persistence mechanisms (web shells, rogue accounts, cron

jobs, SSH keys, DNS changes) must be removed before recovery begins.

Controls: NIST SI-2 (Flaw Remediation), NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST CM-7 (Least Functionality), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process), CIS 7.2 (Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process), CIS 7.3 (Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management)

Compensating: Patch via CLI on the cPanel server: `/scripts/upcp --force` to force update to the latest release tier. Verify patch application: `/usr/local/cpanel/cpanel -V` — confirm output matches or exceeds the version cited in the official advisory. For credential rotation without a PAM/secrets manager: use WHM's built-in bulk password change under `WHM > Account Functions > Change Passwords` for all hosted cPanel accounts. Rotate the WHM root password directly: `passwd root`. For FTP accounts: `pure-pw passwd -f /etc/pure-ftpd/pureftpd.passwd && pure-pw mkdb`. Audit DNS zone files for unauthorized records: `for zone in /var/named/*.db; do echo "=== $zone ==="; grep -v '^;' $zone | grep -E '(A|CNAME|MX|TXT)'; done > /tmp/dns_audit.txt` — look for new A records pointing to attacker-controlled IPs or TXT records used for C2 or spam relay authorization.

Evidence: Before executing `/scripts/upcp`, capture the current installed cPanel version (`/usr/local/cpanel/cpanel -V`) and a full list of currently installed cPanel-managed packages (`/usr/local/cpanel/bin/whmapi1 installed_packages`). Before rotating credentials, dump a list of all existing cPanel accounts, FTP users, and database users so you can identify attacker-created accounts: `whmapi1 listaccts | grep user`, `mysql -e "SELECT user, host, authentication_string FROM mysql.user;"`. Preserve all SSH authorized_keys files before rotation: `find /root /home -name authorized_keys -exec cp --parents {} /tmp/ssh_keys_backup/ \;` — attacker-planted SSH keys are a persistence mechanism independent of the cPanel authentication bypass and must be inventoried before removal.

Step 4: Recovery — After patching, verify the installed cPanel version matches or exceeds the version specified in the official advisory. Re-enable management port access only from whitelisted IPs. Conduct a full file integrity check across hosted account document roots. Monitor cPanel access logs for 72 hours post-remediation for recurring unauthorized access attempts. Confirm no malicious cron jobs, SSH keys, or email forwarders remain. Notify hosted customers if unauthorized access to their account data cannot be ruled out.

NIST Phase: Recovery

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.5 — Recovery: Restoration must be preceded by integrity verification; given the multi-tenant cPanel model, recovery is not complete until all hosted accounts — not just the server itself — are confirmed clean and customers are notified per applicable breach notification obligations.

Controls: NIST SI-7 (Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity), NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST IR-6 (Incident Reporting), NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), CIS 7.4 (Perform Automated Application Patch Management)

Compensating: Perform file integrity verification using cPanel's built-in RPM verification for server binaries: `rpm -Va 2>/dev/null | grep -v '^.....G' > /tmp/rpm_integrity.txt` — deviations from expected checksums on cPanel or Apache binaries indicate tampering. For document root integrity across hosted accounts, generate a new SHA-256 baseline after cleanup: `find /home/*/public_html -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > /tmp/post_recovery_baseline.txt` and compare against any pre-incident baseline if available. To monitor for recurring access attempts during the 72-hour watch window, set up a tail with alerting: `tail -F /usr/local/cpanel/logs/access_log | grep -E '(2082|2083|2086|2087|login|auth)' | tee -a /tmp/recovery_watch.log` running in a persistent tmux session. Email forwarder audit: `whmapi1 list_forwarders | grep -v 'null'` — flag any forwarders pointing to external domains not recognized by the account owner.

Evidence: Before re-enabling external port access, document the final clean state: (1) Confirmed cPanel version output (`/usr/local/cpanel/cpanel -V`); (2) Final crontab audit output from all user accounts (re-run the loop from Step 2); (3) Confirmed clean SSH authorized_keys state across all accounts; (4) DNS zone audit output confirming no residual attacker-added records. These constitute your recovery baseline and will be essential if a repeat incident or regulatory inquiry occurs. Retain all evidence collected during Steps 1–3 in an isolated, write-protected archive for a minimum of 90 days.

Step 5: Post-Incident — This vulnerability exposes a structural control gap: administrative interfaces for hosting infrastructure should never be directly internet-accessible without IP restriction or VPN enforcement. Implement WHM/cPanel interface access controls as a permanent baseline. Establish a process for

monitoring cPanel's official security advisory feed. Evaluate whether shared hosting infrastructure meets your organization's risk tolerance for hosting sensitive applications or customer data, given the multi-tenant exposure model this vulnerability demonstrates.

NIST Phase: Post Incident

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity: Lessons-learned output must result in concrete control changes — specifically, the elimination of unauthenticated internet exposure of cPanel/WHM ports as a permanent architectural baseline, not a temporary compensating control.

Controls: NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan), NIST SI-5 (Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives), NIST RA-3 (Risk Assessment), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process), CIS 4.4 (Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers), CIS 6.3 (Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications)

Compensating: Subscribe to cPanel's official security advisory RSS feed (https://news.cpanel.com/category/security/) and pipe new entries to a Slack webhook or email alias using a free RSS-to-webhook service (e.g., Zapier free tier, or a self-hosted `rss2email` cron job). For permanent WHM/cPanel interface hardening without a VPN appliance, implement cPanel's built-in Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) for all WHM and cPanel logins under `WHM > Security Center > Two-Factor Authentication` — this is free, native, and directly mitigates authentication-bypass risk for future similar vulnerabilities. For multi-tenant shared hosting risk assessment, document each hosted application's data classification and map against the shared hosting provider's incident response SLA; applications handling PII or PCI data should be migrated to dedicated or VPS infrastructure with direct control plane ownership.

Evidence: The primary post-incident evidence artifact is the lessons-learned report documenting: (1) The timeline delta between cPanel's internal patch availability and your organization's applied patch — this gap quantifies your current mean-time-to-remediate (MTTR) for critical hosting infrastructure CVEs; (2) The list of hosted accounts confirmed clean vs. those where unauthorized access could not be ruled out — this directly informs breach notification obligations under GDPR, CCPA, or HIPAA as applicable; (3) The firewall rule change records confirming permanent port restriction, serving as audit evidence for CIS 4.4 compliance. Retain all IR artifacts (logs, forensic outputs, credential rotation records) per your organization's documented retention policy under NIST AU-11 (Audit Record Retention).

Detection Guidance

Primary log sources: /usr/local/cpanel/logs/access_log (cPanel interface access), /usr/local/cpanel/logs/login_log (authentication events), /var/log/WHM (WHM audit trail), and individual account Apache/LiteSpeed access logs under /home/[username]/logs/. Look for: (1) HTTP 200 responses to cPanel login endpoints from IPs with no prior authentication history, particularly against /login/?login_only=1 or /execute/ API endpoints; (2) POST requests to authentication endpoints followed immediately by account modification API calls without intervening session activity; (3) Sudden creation of new cPanel sub-accounts, email accounts, or FTP accounts not matching change records; (4) New .php files appearing in /home/[username]/public_html/ not associated with known deployments, cross-reference file creation timestamps against deployment logs; (5) DNS zone modifications not initiated by known administrators. Behavioral indicator: access from IPs in exploit-active ASNs (hosting and VPS providers commonly used for scanning) making direct API calls rather than browsing the UI. EPSS and KEV data were not available in source data at time of analysis; check CISA KEV (https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog) once a CVE ID is confirmed for authoritative exploitation status.

Indicators of Compromise

Type	Value	Context	Confidence
URL	`No confirmed IOCs available in source data at time of analysis`	No specific IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or URL patterns were confirmed in available reporting. Monitor threat intelligence feeds for indicators once a CVE ID is assigned. Do not treat absence of IOCs as absence of exploitation.	LOW

Framework Mappings

MITRE-ATTACK

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1083** — File and Directory Discovery
- **T1565** — Data Manipulation
- **T1505.003** — Web Shell
- **T1110** — Brute Force
- **T1078** — Valid Accounts
- **T1133** — External Remote Services

NIST-800-53R5

- **CA-8** — Penetration Testing
- **RA-5** — Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning
- **SC-7** — Boundary Protection
- **SI-2** — Flaw Remediation
- **SI-7** — Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity
- **CM-2** — Baseline Configuration
- **CM-7** — Least Functionality
- **SI-3** — Malicious Code Protection
- **SI-4** — System Monitoring
- **AC-7** — Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
- **IA-2** — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)
- **IA-5** — Authenticator Management
- **AC-2** — Account Management
- **AC-6** — Least Privilege
- **AC-17** — Remote Access
- **AC-20** — Use of External Systems
- **IA-8** — Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users)
- **IR-5** — Incident Monitoring

OWASP-TOP10-2021

- **A07:2021** — Identification and Authentication Failures

CIS-V8

- **6.3** — Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications
- **6.4** — Require MFA for Remote Network Access
- **6.5** — Require MFA for Administrative Access
- **7.3** — Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management
- **7.4** — Perform Automated Application Patch Management

SOC2-TSC

- **CC6.1** — The entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures over protected information assets
- **CC6.3** — Authorizes, modifies, or removes access

HIPAA-SECURITY

- **164.312(d)** — Person or Entity Authentication

ISO-27001-2022

- **A.8.8** — Management of technical vulnerabilities

NIST-CSF-2

- **DE.AE-08** — Incidents are declared when adverse events meet the defined incident criteria

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID	Technique Name	Tactic
T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Initial-Access
T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Discovery
T1565	Data Manipulation	Impact
T1505.003	Web Shell	Persistence
T1110	Brute Force	Credential-Access
T1078	Valid Accounts	Defense-Evasion
T1133	External Remote Services	Persistence

Sources

Source	URL	Tier
Security News	https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/exploit-cyber-frenz...	T3

Source	URL	Tier
Critical cPanel Authentication Vulnerability Identified — Update Your ...	https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/critical-cpanel-authentication.html	T3
CRITICAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY WITH CPANEL/WHM ...	https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1sypdwo/critical_se...	T3
Hackers are actively exploiting a bug in cPanel, used by millions of ...	https://techcrunch.com/2026/04/30/hackers-are-actively-exploiting-a...	T2
Critical cPanel & WHM Vulnerability Exploited as Zero-Day for Months	https://www.securityweek.com/critical-cpanel-whm-vulnerability-expl...	T3

DISCLAIMER

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