INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
Security Command Center
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# Scattered Spider Member Arrested in Finland; U.S. Federal Charges Detail Persistent Social Engineering Playbook

THREAT ACTOR | HIGH | CVSS 7.5

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|---|---|
| SCC Item ID | SCC-TAC-2026-0011 |
| Type | Threat Actor |
| Severity | HIGH |
| CVSS Base Score | 7.5 |
| Affected Products | Large enterprises across hospitality, gaming, retail, financial services, logistics, and technology sectors; named historical victims include MGM Resorts, Caesars Entertainment, Riot Games, MailChimp, Twilio, DoorDash, Reddit, Allianz Life, Co-op, Marks & Spencer, Harrods, WestJet, Jaguar Land Rover |
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## Executive Summary

A 19-year-old member of the Scattered Spider threat collective was arrested in Finland on April 10, 2026, and faces U.S. federal charges tied to at least four enterprise intrusions. The group's playbook, impersonating employees to manipulate IT helpdesks into bypassing authentication controls, has proven effective against large, security-mature organizations in hospitality, gaming, retail, financial services, and logistics, resulting in ransomware deployment and data extortion. Organizations in these sectors face elevated risk of operational disruption, significant data loss, and double-extortion ransomware demands, regardless of the strength of their technical perimeter controls.

## Technical Analysis

Scattered Spider (also tracked as UNC3944 and Octo Tempest) conducts intrusions by exploiting the human and procedural layer rather than unpatched software. No CVE applies. The attack chain maps to CWE-287 (Improper Authentication), CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function), and CWE-522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials). Initial access is achieved through two primary vectors: (1) voice and SMS-based social engineering of IT helpdesk staff to trigger MFA resets or SIM swaps for target accounts (T1566, T1566.004, T1078), and (2) MFA fatigue attacks that flood enrolled users with authentication prompts until approval is granted (T1621). Post-access activity includes internal phishing to expand access (T1534), session cookie theft

(T1539), credential stuffing (T1110.004), trusted relationship abuse (T1199), ransomware deployment historically using ALPHV/BlackCat (T1486), and data extortion (T1657). Infrastructure acquisition (T1583.008) and exploitation of public-facing applications (T1190) have also been observed in select intrusions. Named historical victims include MGM Resorts, Caesars Entertainment, Riot Games, MailChimp, Twilio, DoorDash, Reddit, Allianz Life, Co-op, Marks & Spencer, Harrods, WestJet, and Jaguar Land Rover. Ransomware deployment and double-extortion are consistent post-access outcomes. The April 2026 arrest and the prior guilty plea of alleged leader Tyler Buchanan reflect escalating law enforcement action but do not indicate the collective has ceased operations.

## Action Checklist

1. Containment: Immediately audit IT helpdesk procedures for authentication reset workflows. Require out-of-band identity verification (manager callback, in-person confirmation, or HR-verified identity ticket) before any MFA reset, SIM swap, or account recovery action is executed. Suspend self-service MFA reset portals for privileged and administrative accounts pending procedure review.
2. Detection: Review authentication and helpdesk logs for anomalies - after-hours MFA reset requests, resets initiated via phone or chat without a corresponding ticket, accounts with MFA disabled and immediate login from new devices or geolocations, and high-volume MFA push notifications to a single user in a short window. Query SIEM for T1621 (MFA fatigue) patterns: >3 push denials followed by approval within a single session. Cross-reference VPN and Okta/Azure AD logs for impossible travel or new device enrollment immediately following a helpdesk interaction.
3. Eradication: Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/WebAuthn hardware tokens or passkeys) for all privileged accounts, remote access, and identity provider authentication. Remove SMS and voice-call MFA as options for high-value accounts. Implement number matching and additional context in push-based MFA to defeat prompt bombing. Revoke and reissue sessions for any accounts that underwent recent unverified resets.
4. Recovery: After procedure changes are in place, audit all MFA resets and account recovery actions executed in the prior 90 days. Validate that no unauthorized persistence mechanisms (new MFA devices, federated identity providers, OAuth app grants, or VPN certificates) were added to privileged accounts. Monitor affected accounts for lateral movement indicators for a minimum of 30 days post-remediation.
5. Post-Incident: Conduct tabletop exercises simulating a helpdesk social engineering call with a trained red team voice actor. Establish a dedicated verification callback number for helpdesk staff to initiate; never accept inbound caller ID as identity proof. Formalize a tiered identity verification policy aligned to NIST SP 800-63B assurance levels, requiring higher assurance for privileged account recovery. Brief helpdesk and identity management staff on Scattered Spider TTPs using MITRE ATT&CK entries T1566.004 and T1621 as reference.

## IR / Forensic Enrichment

| | |
|---|---|
| **Triage Priority** | IMMEDIATE |

| | |
|---|---|
| **Escalation Criteria** | Escalate immediately to CISO, legal counsel, and law enforcement liaison if any privileged account reset in the prior 90 days cannot be verified as legitimate, if evidence of ransomware staging tools (ALPHV/BlackCat or RansomHub TTPs associated with Scattered Spider) is found in any post-reset session, or if PII/payment card data accessible to compromised accounts triggers breach notification obligations under GDPR Article 33 (72-hour window), CCPA, PCI DSS Requirement 12.10, or SEC Rule 13a-15 disclosure requirements applicable to publicly traded named victims. |
| **Recovery Notes** | After enforcing phishing-resistant MFA and revoking compromised sessions, validate that no rogue federated identity providers, unauthorized OAuth application grants, or new Conditional Access trusted location entries were added to the identity provider during the incident window — these are documented Scattered Spider persistence mechanisms that survive credential rotation. Monitor all formerly compromised privileged accounts for lateral movement indicators including first-time access to file shares, mass download events from SharePoint or OneDrive, and new VPN split-tunnel or direct-access connections for a minimum of 30 days, given the group's documented dwell times prior to ransomware deployment. Retain all identity provider and helpdesk audit logs for a minimum of 12 months to support any parallel FBI/DOJ investigation given the active federal prosecution of Scattered Spider members. |
| **Forensic Artifacts** | Okta System Log entries for `user.mfa.factor.deactivate` and `user.mfa.factor.activate` events within the same session or within a 15-minute window — the atomic forensic signature of a Scattered Spider helpdesk-bypassed MFA reset, distinguishable from legitimate resets by the absence of a corresponding employee-initiated ticket and the presence of a new device fingerprint on the activation event \| Azure AD Audit Log records for `Add registered owner to service principal` and `Add app role assignment to service principal` actions performed by newly recovered accounts — forensic indicator of Scattered Spider's documented OAuth persistence technique used to maintain access after initial compromise at MGM and similar targets \| VPN gateway authentication logs (Palo Alto GlobalProtect or Cisco AnyConnect) showing first-time certificate-based or SAML-based authentication from residential ISP IP ranges (cross-reference against ARIN ASN lookups for known hosting/proxy providers) in the hours immediately following a helpdesk interaction — Scattered Spider consistently accesses enterprise VPNs from residential proxy infrastructure to avoid geographic anomaly detection \| Helpdesk platform records (ServiceNow, Zendesk, or Jira Service Management) filtered for phone- or chat-channel interactions requesting MFA reset or account recovery where the submitting actor is `agent` rather than `end-user` — the absence of an employee-originated ticket is the primary process artifact distinguishing Scattered Spider's vishing workflow from legitimate requests \| Azure AD Identity Protection risk detection logs for `unfamiliarFeatures` and `anonymizedIPAddress` risk event types correlated against accounts that underwent recent helpdesk-initiated resets — these events capture Scattered Spider's use of anonymizing infrastructure post-access and are retained in Azure AD P2 logs or exportable via Microsoft Sentinel free tier ingestion for Azure AD identity logs |

### Per-Action IR Details

**Containment — Immediately audit IT helpdesk procedures for authentication reset workflows. Require out-of-band identity verification (manager callback, in-person confirmation, or HR-verified identity ticket) before any MFA reset, SIM swap, or account recovery action is executed. Suspend self-service MFA reset portals for privileged and administrative accounts pending procedure review.**

**NIST Phase:** Containment

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.3 — Containment Strategy

**Controls:** NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST IA-1 (Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures), CIS 6.5 (Require MFA for Administrative Access), CIS 5.4 (Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator

Accounts)

**Compensating:** Export your identity provider's (Okta, Azure AD, or Duo) admin console MFA reset audit log to CSV immediately. Use PowerShell against Azure AD: `Get-AzureADAuditSignInLogs -Filter "category eq 'Authentication'"` filtered on 'Reset MFA' activity type. For Okta, query the System Log API endpoint `/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType+eq+"user.mfa.factor.deactivate"`. Freeze helpdesk-initiated resets in the IAM admin console — a single checkbox in Okta Admin > Settings > Account > End-User Account Management — requiring a second admin to approve. Document this freeze with a timestamp for the incident record.

**Evidence:** Before locking down reset workflows, capture: (1) Okta System Log or Azure AD Audit Log exports covering the prior 30 days filtered on MFA factor enrollment, deactivation, and account recovery events — these will show Scattered Spider's initial helpdesk-leveraged MFA bypass as a `user.mfa.factor.deactivate` followed immediately by `user.mfa.factor.activate` for a new device from an unfamiliar IP. (2) Helpdesk ticketing system (ServiceNow, Zendesk, Jira Service Management) records of phone- or chat-initiated reset requests that lack a corresponding employee-submitted ticket — a hallmark of Scattered Spider's vishing workflow. (3) Telecom carrier records or MDM logs for SIM swap events against corporate-liable mobile numbers for any accounts that recently underwent a voice-initiated reset.

**Detection — Review authentication and helpdesk logs for anomalies: after-hours MFA reset requests, resets initiated via phone or chat without a corresponding ticket, accounts with MFA disabled and immediate login from new devices or geolocations, and high-volume MFA push notifications to a single user in a short window. Query SIEM for T1621 (MFA fatigue) patterns: >3 push denials followed by approval within a single session. Cross-reference VPN and Okta/Azure AD logs for impossible travel or new device enrollment immediately following a helpdesk interaction.**

**NIST Phase:** Detection Analysis

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 — Detection and Analysis

**Controls:** NIST SI-4 (System Monitoring), NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting), NIST AU-3 (Content of Audit Records), CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs)

**Compensating:** Without a SIEM, use the following targeted queries: (1) Azure AD: `Get-AzureADAuditSignInLogs` filtering on `conditionalAccessStatus eq 'failure'` and `authenticationDetails/authenticationStepResultDetail eq 'MFA denied'` — export to CSV and apply a PowerShell `Group-Object UserPrincipalName` to surface accounts with >3 MFA denials in a rolling 60-minute window. (2) Okta: Query `/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType+eq+"user.authentication.auth_via_mfa"` and `outcome.result eq "FAILURE"` then correlate against `user.authentication.auth_via_mfa` SUCCESS for the same user. (3) For impossible travel detection without a SIEM, use the Azure AD Identity Protection 'Unfamiliar sign-in properties' risk event report (free tier available) or Okta ThreatInsight. (4) Apply the public Sigma rule `sigma/rules/cloud/okta/okta_user_mfa_factor_deactivated.yml` against exported Okta logs using `sigma-cli` with a `grep`-based backend — no SIEM license required.

**Evidence:** Forensic evidence to collect prior to this step: (1) Okta System Log entries for `user.session.start` events with `device.os` or `client.ipAddress` values that differ from the user's last 10 sessions — Scattered Spider enrolls attacker-controlled devices immediately after a successful helpdesk reset. (2) Azure AD Sign-in logs showing `deviceDetail.isCompliant: false` or `deviceDetail.isManaged: false` for newly registered devices on targeted accounts. (3) VPN gateway authentication logs (Cisco AnyConnect, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, or Zscaler) for new certificate enrollments or first-time connections from residential ISP IP ranges in the hours following a helpdesk interaction — cross-reference against ARIN/RDAP lookups to identify Scattered Spider's known use of residential proxy infrastructure. (4) MFA provider logs (Duo, Okta Verify, Microsoft Authenticator) for `push sent` events in bursts of 10+ within a 10-minute window targeting a single user — the MFA fatigue (T1621) signature used against MGM and Caesars.

**Eradication — Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/WebAuthn hardware tokens or passkeys) for all privileged accounts, remote access, and identity provider authentication. Remove SMS and voice-call MFA as options for high-value accounts. Implement number matching and additional context in push-based MFA to defeat prompt bombing. Revoke and reissue sessions for any accounts that underwent recent unverified resets.**

**NIST Phase:** Eradication

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.4 — Eradication

**Controls:** NIST IA-5 (Authenticator Management), NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST SI-2 (Flaw Remediation), CIS 6.3 (Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications), CIS 6.5 (Require MFA for Administrative Access)

**Compensating:** For teams without budget for hardware tokens: (1) Enable passkey/FIDO2 support in Azure AD (Entra ID) at no additional cost under the free tier — navigate to Azure AD > Security > Authentication Methods > Passkey (FIDO2) and scope to privileged role groups. (2) In Okta, disable `Phone` and `SMS` factor types under Security > Authenticators for the `Privileged Users` group policy — this is a configuration change, not a licensed feature. (3) Enable Okta number matching under Security > Authenticators > Okta Verify > Settings (no additional license required as of Okta's 2023 mandate). (4) Force session revocation for all impacted accounts using Azure AD PowerShell: `Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken -ObjectId ` or Okta API: `POST /api/v1/users/{userId}/sessions/clear`. Run these commands for every account identified in the detection step as having undergone a helpdesk-initiated reset in the prior 90 days.

**Evidence:** Before executing eradication actions, preserve: (1) A full export of current MFA factor enrollments for all privileged accounts from Okta (`GET /api/v1/users/{userId}/factors`) or Azure AD (`GET /users/{id}/authentication/methods`) — this establishes a pre-remediation baseline and may reveal attacker-enrolled authenticator apps or phone numbers added post-compromise. (2) Active session tokens and refresh token metadata for accounts with recent resets — in Azure AD, use `Get-AzureADUserRegisteredDevice` and `Get-MsolUserByStrongAuthentication` to enumerate attacker-registered devices before revoking sessions. (3) Any OAuth application grants or service principal credentials added to compromised accounts — Scattered Spider is documented using OAuth persistence (T1550.001) after initial access; query Azure AD App Registrations and Enterprise Applications for new grants in the incident window.

**Recovery — After procedure changes are in place, audit all MFA resets and account recovery actions executed in the prior 90 days. Validate that no unauthorized persistence mechanisms (new MFA devices, federated identity providers, OAuth app grants, or VPN certificates) were added to privileged accounts. Monitor affected accounts for lateral movement indicators for a minimum of 30 days post-remediation.**

**NIST Phase:** Recovery

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §3.5 — Recovery

**Controls:** NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling), NIST IR-5 (Incident Monitoring), NIST AU-11 (Audit Record Retention), NIST SI-7 (Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity), CIS 5.1 (Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Accounts)

**Compensating:** For a 2-person team executing this without enterprise tooling: (1) Run a 90-day Okta System Log export for `user.mfa.factor.activate`, `user.account.update_password`, and `user.session.impersonation.grant` events — pipe through `jq` to extract actor IP, user, and timestamp for manual triage. (2) Audit Azure AD Conditional Access Named Locations and Trusted IP ranges for any additions made during the incident window — Scattered Spider has added trusted locations to suppress MFA prompts for attacker-controlled IPs. (3) Enumerate all federated identity providers configured in your Azure AD tenant using `Get-AzureADDomain` and `Get-AzureADDomainFederationSettings` — an attacker with Global Admin can add a rogue federated IdP as a persistence mechanism (documented in Scattered Spider's post-access playbook). (4) Use osquery's `certificates` table and `SELECT * FROM certificates WHERE self_signed=1` to audit VPN client certificate stores on privileged workstations for unauthorized self-signed certs added during the incident window.

**Evidence:** Prior to recovery validation, collect: (1) Azure AD Audit Logs filtered on `category eq 'ApplicationManagement'` for the 90-day window — look for new service principal credential additions, OAuth2PermissionGrants, and AppRoleAssignments on privileged accounts, which represent Scattered Spider's documented post-access persistence via OAuth app abuse. (2) VPN gateway logs (GlobalProtect, AnyConnect) showing certificate-based authentication events for new certificate CNs that don't correspond to known IT-issued certificates — cross-reference against your PKI's issued certificate list. (3) Identity provider audit logs for any new external identity federation configurations or trust relationships added — a forensic indicator of Scattered Spider attempting to maintain access after credential rotation by adding a rogue SAML IdP.

**Post-Incident — Conduct tabletop exercises simulating a helpdesk social engineering call with a trained red team voice actor. Establish a dedicated verification callback number for helpdesk staff to initiate — never**

**accept inbound caller ID as identity proof. Formalize a tiered identity verification policy aligned to NIST SP 800-63B assurance levels, requiring higher assurance for privileged account recovery. Brief helpdesk and identity management staff on Scattered Spider TTPs using MITRE ATT&CK entries T1566.004 and T1621 as reference.**

**NIST Phase:** Post Incident

**Reference:** NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity

**Controls:** NIST IR-2 (Incident Response Training), NIST IR-3 (Incident Response Testing), NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan), NIST IR-6 (Incident Reporting), CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process)

**Compensating:** For a small team without a red team budget: (1) Use publicly available Scattered Spider social engineering call scripts documented in the FBI/CISA joint advisory (August 2023) as tabletop scenario injects — these include verbatim pretexting language the group uses to impersonate new employees or IT contractors. (2) Record a sample vishing call using a free tool like Audacity and play it during helpdesk staff training to build pattern recognition. (3) Implement a free call-back verification workflow: create a dedicated internal extension or Google Voice number visible only to helpdesk staff on a printed reference card (not in the directory accessible to callers) — staff call the requesting employee's known HR-on-file number, never the number provided by the caller. (4) Publish the MITRE ATT&CK Navigator layer for Scattered Spider (group G1015) as a one-page PDF for helpdesk awareness — the Navigator is freely accessible and pre-maps the group's documented TTP set including T1566.004 (Spearphishing Voice) and T1621 (MFA Request Generation).

**Evidence:** Post-incident documentation to preserve for lessons learned and regulatory reporting: (1) A complete timeline correlating helpdesk ticketing system records, IAM audit logs, and VPN/SSO authentication logs showing the full Scattered Spider kill chain from initial vishing contact through MFA reset to first authenticated session — this timeline is required for any breach notification obligations under GDPR, CCPA, or SEC incident disclosure rules depending on affected sector. (2) All helpdesk call recordings or chat transcripts from the incident window that may capture the social engineering interaction itself — preserve under legal hold if litigation or law enforcement referral is anticipated given active FBI/DOJ prosecution of Scattered Spider members. (3) The pre-remediation MFA enrollment baseline captured during eradication, retained for a minimum of 3 years per NIST AU-11 (Audit Record Retention) guidance, to support any future forensic or legal proceedings.

## Detection Guidance

Focus detection on the authentication and identity management stack, not the perimeter. Key signals: (1) MFA reset or account recovery requests originating from voice/chat channels without a linked self-service ticket - query helpdesk ticketing systems for resets lacking user-initiated portal events. (2) MFA push flood pattern - alert on >3 consecutive push denials to a single account within 10 minutes, particularly if followed by an approval. (3) New device or authenticator enrollment immediately after a helpdesk interaction - correlate Okta System Log event 'user.mfa.factor.update' or Azure AD 'Update user' with 'Add authentication method' within the same session window. (4) Impossible travel or new ASN/geolocation login following MFA reset - join authentication logs with GeoIP data and flag logins from new countries or hosting ASNs within 2 hours of a reset event. (5) Session cookie reuse - detect authentication tokens used from two geographically distinct IPs in an implausibly short window (T1539). (6) Internal phishing activity - monitor for mass internal email sends from recently reset accounts and for OAuth app consent grants to unfamiliar applications (T1534). MITRE ATT&CK techniques to map detection rules against: T1621, T1078, T1566.004, T1534, T1539, T1110.004.

## Indicators of Compromise

| Type | Value | Context | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | `No confirmed IOCs available in cited sources` | Scattered Spider frequently uses legitimately registered domains and commercially available remote access tools; specific IOC lists should be sourced from CISA advisories or your threat intelligence provider. CISA published a joint advisory on Scattered Spider TTPs (AA23-320A) that includes relevant indicators. | LOW |

## Framework Mappings

### MITRE-ATTACK

- **T1583.008** — Malvertising
- **T1110.004** — Credential Stuffing
- **T1566.004** — Spearphishing Voice
- **T1078** — Valid Accounts
- **T1621** — Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- **T1657** — Financial Theft
- **T1486** — Data Encrypted for Impact
- **T1199** — Trusted Relationship
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1534** — Internal Spearphishing
- **T1566** — Phishing
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application

### NIST-800-53R5

- **AC-2** — Account Management
- **AC-6** — Least Privilege
- **IA-2** — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)
- **IA-5** — Authenticator Management
- **CP-9** — System Backup
- **CP-10** — System Recovery and Reconstitution
- **AT-2** — Literacy Training and Awareness
- **CA-7** — Continuous Monitoring
- **SC-7** — Boundary Protection
- **SI-3** — Malicious Code Protection
- **SI-4** — System Monitoring
- **SI-8** — Spam Protection
- **CA-8** — Penetration Testing

- **RA-5** — Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning
- **SI-2** — Flaw Remediation
- **SI-7** — Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity
- **IA-8** — Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users)
- **IR-4** — Incident Handling

### OWASP-TOP10-2021

- **A04:2021** — Insecure Design
- **A07:2021** — Identification and Authentication Failures

### CIS-V8

- **5.2** — Use Unique Passwords
- **6.3** — Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications
- **6.4** — Require MFA for Remote Network Access
- **6.5** — Require MFA for Administrative Access
- **7.3** — Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management
- **7.4** — Perform Automated Application Patch Management
- **14.2** — Train Workforce Members to Recognize Social Engineering Attacks

### HIPAA-SECURITY

- **164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D)** — Password Management
- **164.312(d)** — Person or Entity Authentication
- **164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A)** — Data Backup Plan

### SOC2-TSC

- **CC6.1** — The entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures over protected information assets

### NIST-CSF-2

- **RS.MI-01** — Incidents are contained

### ISO-27001-2022

- **A.5.29** — Information security during disruption
- **A.8.8** — Management of technical vulnerabilities

## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

| Technique ID | Technique Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1583.008 | Malvertising | Resource-Development |
| T1110.004 | Credential Stuffing | Credential-Access |
| T1566.004 | Spearphishing Voice | Initial-Access |

| Technique ID | Technique Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Defense-Evasion |
| T1621 | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | Credential-Access |
| T1657 | Financial Theft | Impact |
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Impact |
| T1199 | Trusted Relationship | Initial-Access |
| T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie | Credential-Access |
| T1534 | Internal Spearphishing | Lateral-Movement |
| T1566 | Phishing | Initial-Access |
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial-Access |

## Sources

| Source | URL | Tier |
|---|---|---|
| **Security News** | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/us-reportedly-charge... | T3 |
| **Cyberattacks Upset British Life, Disrupting Car Factories and ...** | https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/06/business/jaguar-range-rover-cybe... | T2 |
| **Understanding the MGM and Caesars Cyberattacks: Lessons Learned** | https://www.risk-strategies.com/blog/understanding-mgm-and-caesars-... | T3 |
| **MGM, Caesars attacks raise new concerns about social engineering ...** | https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/mgm-caesars-attacks-social-e... | T3 |
| **Client Advisory: A Tale of Two Cyberattacks: MGM and Caesars** | https://mcgriff.com/resources/articles/client-advisory-a-tale-of-tw... | T3 |



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