INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
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Apple Issues Rare Backport Patch for iOS 18 Against DarkSword Mobile Exploitation Tool

SECURITY ANALYSIS | HIGH | CVSS 7.5

SCC Item ID	SCC-STY-2026-0045
Type	Security Analysis
Severity	HIGH
CVSS Base Score	7.5
Affected Products	Apple iOS 18 / iPadOS 18
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Discovery Source	Rss

Executive Summary

Apple issued a rare backport security patch for iOS 18 and iPadOS 18 to address an exploitation framework tracked as 'DarkSword,' extending remediation beyond the standard iOS release cycle, a signal that Apple assessed active or credible risk to users who cannot or have not upgraded. The decision creates direct implications for enterprises managing mixed iOS fleets, where policy-locked or hardware-constrained devices running iOS 18 represent a meaningful and potentially unpatched attack surface. The move reflects a broader pattern of sophisticated mobile exploitation tooling targeting mainstream consumer platforms, reinforcing that mobile device management and patch cadence governance are active risk factors, not administrative afterthoughts.

Technical Analysis

DarkSword is characterized as a mobile OS exploitation framework, not a single vulnerability, but a tooled capability for attacking Apple devices. The CWE profile (CWE-119: buffer overflow/memory safety, CWE-269: improper privilege management, CWE-284: improper access control) suggests a chained attack pattern: memory corruption to gain an initial foothold, followed by privilege escalation to achieve elevated code execution or persistent access. This pattern is consistent with established iOS exploitation tradecraft, where sandbox escape and kernel privilege escalation are typically required to reach high-value device functions.

The MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile technique mapping confirms this attack pattern. T1404 (Exploit OS Vulnerability) and T1422 (System Network Configuration Discovery) suggest post-compromise reconnaissance capability. T1417 (Input Capture) and T1437 (Application Layer Protocol) point toward data exfiltration or credential harvesting as likely objectives. T1458 (Repackaged Application) and T1629 (Impair Defenses)

suggest DarkSword may include delivery mechanisms, such as trojanized apps, and active defense evasion components, not merely an exploit chain.

The backport decision is operationally significant. Apple typically drives remediation through current-version upgrades; extending a fix to iOS 18 indicates that the affected user population is large enough, or the threat credible enough, to justify the engineering and support overhead. Enterprise environments are disproportionately exposed: MDM policy locks, hardware lifecycle constraints, and application compatibility requirements routinely hold devices on prior major releases. Those environments should treat this as a priority deployment event, not a standard patch cycle item.

Confidence on technical specifics remains medium. Source attribution includes secondary press and tier-3 reporting, supplemented by Apple's official support advisory. Security teams should monitor the Apple Support advisory directly for updated technical detail as Apple typically releases sparse initial advisories and supplements them post-patch.

Action Checklist

1. Step 1: Assess exposure, inventory all iOS and iPadOS 18 devices under management via MDM console; identify devices policy-locked to iOS 18 due to hardware constraints, app compatibility holds, or explicit MDM profiles blocking major version upgrades
2. Step 2: Deploy the backport patch, push the Apple-issued iOS 18 / iPadOS 18 security update as a priority deployment; do not defer to standard patch window cadence given Apple's rare decision to backport
3. Step 3: Audit MDM controls, review which devices are blocked from upgrading to the current iOS version and re-evaluate the justification for each hold; prioritize removal of holds based on application compatibility testing and hardware support status. For devices where compatibility cannot be confirmed, escalate to the application owner for testing timeline
4. Step 4: Review mobile threat detection, verify that mobile threat defense (MTD) solutions in your environment are updated and monitoring for behavioral patterns consistent with DarkSword TTPs: privilege escalation attempts, anomalous inter-process communication, and unexpected network connections from device-resident apps
5. Step 5: Update threat model, log DarkSword as an active mobile exploitation framework in your threat register; map against T1404, T1417, T1629, and T1458 in your MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile coverage assessment
6. Step 6: Communicate to leadership, brief on organizational iOS fleet exposure with specific device counts and patch status; frame as a mobile endpoint governance risk, not a generic software vulnerability
7. Step 7: Monitor Apple Support advisory, track the iOS 18 / iPadOS 18 security content page for CVE assignments, expanded technical disclosure, and any follow-on patches as Apple supplements initial advisories

IR / Forensic Enrichment

Triage Priority	IMMEDIATE

Escalation Criteria	Escalate to CISO and legal counsel immediately if MDM telemetry or MTD alerts indicate any iOS 18 device accessed, transmitted, or stored PII, PHI, or PCI-scoped data during the exposure window between Apple's backport advisory date and confirmed patch deployment, as this may trigger breach notification obligations under HIPAA, GDPR, or applicable state privacy law.
Recovery Notes	After patch deployment is confirmed across all iOS 18 devices, verify recovery by pulling a fresh MDM compliance report showing 100% of managed iOS 18 devices on the patched build version — treat any device still on a pre-patch build as an unresolved exposure requiring escalation or isolation from corporate resources via MDM conditional access policy. Monitor MTD alert volume on the patched fleet for 30 days post-remediation for any DarkSword-consistent behavioral anomalies (IPC abuse, privilege escalation attempts) that could indicate pre-patch compromise persisting after the update. For devices where pre-patch compromise cannot be ruled out (e.g., high-value targets, executives, privileged-access users), consider a full MDM unenroll-and-re-enroll cycle to establish a clean enrollment baseline rather than relying solely on the patch to close residual risk.
Forensic Artifacts	iOS Unified Log captures (via `idevicesyslog` or Xcode Devices window) from the exposure window — specifically subsystem entries under `com.apple.springboard`, `launchd`, `com.apple.networkextension`, and `com.apple.security`, which are the runtime components most likely to reflect DarkSword's documented IPC abuse (T1417) and privilege escalation (T1404) behaviors | MDM device compliance timeline export — timestamped records of each device's OS build version over time, establishing the precise exposure window per device between the backport advisory date and confirmed patch deployment; this is the primary evidence artifact for any breach notification analysis | MTD behavioral alert history (30-day lookback from patch date) — filter on alert categories matching privilege escalation, inter-process communication anomalies, and unexpected outbound network connections from sandboxed apps, which align with DarkSword TTPs T1404, T1417, T1629, and T1458 | Network perimeter DNS and TLS SNI logs from the exposure window — capture outbound DNS queries and TLS handshake SNI fields from iOS device IP ranges; DarkSword as an exploitation framework would likely establish C2 communication from compromised devices, and SNI fields in TLS records may reveal non-Apple, non-standard destination domains inconsistent with legitimate app traffic | Apple crash reporter logs pulled via `idevicecrashreport` (libimobiledevice) from high-value devices in the exposure window — DarkSword privilege escalation attempts may produce system daemon crashes (particularly in `SpringBoard`, `mediaserverd`, or `locationd`) that are preserved in the device's crash log directory at `/var/mobile/Library/Logs/CrashReporter/` and accessible via MDM or Apple Configurator 2

Per-Action IR Details

Step 1: Assess exposure — inventory all iOS and iPadOS 18 devices under management via MDM console; identify devices policy-locked to iOS 18 due to hardware constraints, app compatibility holds, or explicit MDM profiles blocking major version upgrades

NIST Phase: Preparation

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §2 — Preparation: establishing asset visibility and exposure baseline before incident response actions begin

Controls: NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling) — preparation sub-phase requires knowing which assets are exposed before containment decisions can be made, NIST SI-5 (Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives) — Apple's rare backport decision constitutes a high-signal advisory requiring immediate asset scoping, CIS 1.1 (Establish and Maintain Detailed Enterprise Asset Inventory) — MDM-sourced device inventory must capture OS version, hardware model, and upgrade-block status for all managed iOS/iPadOS endpoints, CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability

Management Process) — exposure scoping against a specific advisory is the first gate of vulnerability management

Compensating: For teams without full MDM visibility: run `profiles status -type enrollment` via Apple Configurator 2 on sampled devices to confirm MDM enrollment and OS version. Export device list from Apple Business Manager (ABM) > Devices > filter OS version contains '18.' Cross-reference against Apple's hardware compatibility list for iOS 26 to flag hardware-constrained devices (iPhone XR and earlier cannot run iOS 26). Document results in a shared spreadsheet with columns: Device Serial, Model, OS Version, Upgrade Block Reason, Patch Status.

Evidence: Before scoping, pull the MDM device compliance report filtered to OS version 18.x — capture this as a timestamped baseline artifact. Note any devices showing OS version unchanged after the backport patch release date (the patch release date is the forensic anchor; any device still on a pre-patch iOS 18 build after that date is a confirmed exposure window). Preserve MDM enrollment profile XMLs for policy-locked devices to document the justification chain for audit purposes.

Step 2: Deploy the backport patch — push the Apple-issued iOS 18 / iPadOS 18 security update as a priority deployment; do not defer to standard patch window cadence given Apple's rare decision to backport

NIST Phase: Containment

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.3 — Containment Strategy: applying vendor-issued patches out-of-cycle when active or credible exploitation risk is assessed by the vendor

Controls: NIST SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) — vendor-confirmed active risk overrides standard patch cadence; immediate remediation is required, NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling) — containment actions must be executed consistently with the IR plan, including emergency change procedures, CIS 7.3 (Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management) — mobile OS patches must be pushed via MDM without waiting for the standard monthly window given Apple's explicit backport signal, CIS 7.4 (Perform Automated Application Patch Management) — verify that any iOS system apps updated alongside the backport (e.g., Safari WebKit components targeted by DarkSword IPC abuse) are also current

Compensating: In Jamf Pro: navigate to Devices > Mobile Device Management Commands > Schedule OS Update, select iOS 18 target group, set install action to 'Download and Install' with force restart after defined deferral window (recommend 24 hours max given severity). In Apple Business Essentials or MDM-lite environments: use Apple Configurator 2 to push the update via USB to high-priority devices (executive fleet, privileged-access users) immediately while MDM push propagates. Monitor push receipt using MDM device check-in logs — devices not checking in within 48 hours should be flagged for manual follow-up.

Evidence: Before pushing the patch, capture device syslog snapshots via `idevicesyslog` (from libimobiledevice, free/open source) on any device suspected of prior compromise — DarkSword's privilege escalation and IPC abuse patterns may leave entries in the iOS unified log under subsystems related to SpringBoard, launchd, or network extension processes. Preserve the pre-patch OS build number (Settings > General > About > Software Version) as a forensic baseline. After patching, log the patch deployment timestamp per device for compliance evidence under NIST AU-12 (Audit Record Generation).

Step 3: Audit MDM controls — review which devices are blocked from upgrading to iOS 26 and whether those holds remain justified; remove upgrade blocks where hardware and application compatibility permit

NIST Phase: Eradication

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.4 — Eradication: removing conditions that allowed the threat to persist, including policy configurations that prevent full remediation

Controls: NIST CM-6 (Configuration Settings) — MDM upgrade-block profiles are configuration settings that must be reviewed and justified; unjustified blocks that leave devices on iOS 18 indefinitely are a configuration risk, NIST SI-2 (Flaw Remediation) — devices capable of running iOS 26 but blocked by policy represent an unmitigated flaw remediation gap, NIST IR-4 (Incident Handling) — eradication requires addressing not just the immediate patch but the systemic policy conditions that created the exposure surface, CIS 4.6 (Securely Manage Enterprise Assets and Software) — MDM configuration profiles must be version-controlled and reviewed; upgrade blocks should have documented expiration or re-evaluation triggers

Compensating: Export MDM restriction profiles as XML (in Jamf: Settings > Configuration Profiles > export; in Mosyle: Profiles > export JSON). Parse for the `forceDelayedMajorSoftwareUpdates` and `enforcedSoftwareUpdateMaximumOSDeferral` keys — these are the MDM payload keys Apple uses to block major

version upgrades. For each device group with these keys active, document the business justification. Cross-reference app compatibility holds against the app vendor's current iOS 26 support statement. Remove blocks where no valid justification exists using a documented change record.

Evidence: Capture the full MDM configuration profile inventory before making changes — this is your pre-remediation baseline and audit trail. Document which devices had `forceDelayedMajorSoftwareUpdates` set to true and for how long, as this directly quantifies the DarkSword exposure window for each device. If any iOS 26-capable device was blocked from upgrading without documented justification, treat the gap as a control failure requiring root cause analysis per NIST IR-5 (Incident Monitoring).

Step 4: Review mobile threat detection — verify that mobile threat defense (MTD) solutions in your environment are updated and monitoring for behavioral patterns consistent with DarkSword TTPs: privilege escalation attempts, anomalous inter-process communication, and unexpected network connections from device-resident apps

NIST Phase: Detection Analysis

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §3.2 — Detection and Analysis: verifying that detection tooling covers the specific behavioral indicators of the active threat before declaring containment complete

Controls: NIST SI-4 (System Monitoring) — MTD must be actively monitoring for DarkSword-specific behaviors: IPC anomalies, privilege escalation attempts, and unexpected outbound connections from sandboxed apps, NIST IR-5 (Incident Monitoring) — track and document any MTD alerts triggered on iOS 18 devices during and after the patch deployment window, CIS 8.2 (Collect Audit Logs) — MTD behavioral logs must be collected and retained; ensure MTD agent logs are forwarded to your central log repository, NIST DE.CM-09 (Computing hardware and software, runtime environments, and their data are monitored) — mobile endpoints are in scope for runtime monitoring; MTD is the primary control for iOS behavioral detection

Compensating: Without enterprise MTD (e.g., Lookout, Zimperium, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on iOS): enable Apple's built-in diagnostic logging by navigating to Settings > Privacy & Security > Analytics & Improvements > Share iPhone Analytics — this enables on-device crash and anomaly reporting. Use `idevicecrashreport` (libimobiledevice) to pull crash logs from managed devices; DarkSword privilege escalation attempts may produce crashes in system daemons. Review Apple's on-device network activity using iOS Screen Time API logs (if configured in MDM) for unexpected app network usage patterns. For network-layer detection: capture traffic from iOS devices at the network perimeter using Wireshark or Zeek, filtering on DNS queries and TLS SNI fields for domains not associated with legitimate app activity.

Evidence: Pull MTD alert history filtered to the 30 days preceding the backport patch announcement — DarkSword-related activity (IPC abuse consistent with T1417, privilege escalation consistent with T1404) may have generated alerts that were not triaged as related. Collect iOS unified log captures (`idevicesyslog` or via Xcode Devices window) focusing on subsystems: `com.apple.springboard`, `com.apple.networkextension`, `com.apple.security`, and `launchd` — these are the subsystems most likely to reflect DarkSword's inter-process communication abuse and privilege escalation paths. Preserve MTD agent version numbers as evidence that detection coverage was current at time of incident.

Step 5: Update threat model — log DarkSword as an active mobile exploitation framework in your threat register; map against T1404, T1417, T1629, and T1458 in your MITRE ATT&CK for Mobile coverage assessment

NIST Phase: Post Incident

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity: using threat intelligence from the incident to update detection coverage, threat models, and organizational risk posture

Controls: NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan) — threat register updates and ATT&CK coverage mapping are components of maintaining a current IR plan, NIST RA-3 (Risk Assessment) — DarkSword's active exploitation framework status and Apple's backport decision are inputs to organizational mobile risk assessment, NIST SI-5 (Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives) — Apple's advisory and any supplemental threat intelligence on DarkSword must be formally ingested into the threat register, CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process) — threat register entries for active exploitation frameworks feed the vulnerability management

prioritization process

Compensating: Without a commercial threat intelligence platform: create a structured threat register entry in a shared document or ticketing system with fields: Threat Name (DarkSword), Type (Mobile Exploitation Framework), Affected Platform (iOS/iPadOS 18), ATT&CK Techniques (T1404 — Device Administrator Permissions, T1417 — Input Capture, T1629 — Impair Defenses, T1458 — Repackaged Application), Detection Coverage (MTD Yes/No, Network Yes/No, MDM Yes/No), Last Updated. Use MITRE ATT&CK Navigator (free, browser-based at attack.mitre.org/versions/mobile) to create a coverage layer for Mobile ATT&CK, highlighting T1404, T1417, T1629, and T1458 in red if no detection exists, yellow if MTD-only, green if corroborated by network or MDM telemetry.

Evidence: Document the detection gap analysis as a formal artifact: for each of T1404, T1417, T1629, and T1458, record whether your current tooling (MTD, MDM, network monitoring) would have generated an alert if DarkSword had executed those techniques against your fleet during the exposure window. This gap analysis is both a forensic record of your pre-patch detection posture and an input to leadership risk reporting. Preserve the ATT&CK Navigator layer file as a versioned artifact for post-incident review.

Step 6: Communicate to leadership — brief on organizational iOS fleet exposure with specific device counts and patch status; frame as a mobile endpoint governance risk, not a generic software vulnerability

NIST Phase: Post Incident

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity: communicating lessons learned and residual risk to organizational leadership to inform governance decisions

Controls: NIST IR-6 (Incident Reporting) — report incident status, exposure scope, and remediation progress to designated organizational roles within defined timeframes, NIST IR-8 (Incident Response Plan) — the IR plan must define escalation and communication paths to leadership for high-severity mobile threats, NIST CA-7 (Continuous Monitoring) — leadership briefing should reference ongoing monitoring posture and what visibility gaps exist for iOS endpoints, CIS 7.2 (Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process) — patch status metrics (devices patched, devices pending, devices unremediable due to hardware) are the core content of the leadership brief

Compensating: Structure the leadership brief around three numbers from your MDM inventory report: (1) total iOS/iPadOS 18 devices under management, (2) devices patched with the backport update (with timestamp), (3) devices remaining on pre-patch iOS 18 builds and the reason (hardware incompatible with iOS 26, app hold, user-deferred). Frame DarkSword as a mobile exploitation framework — analogous to a commercial offensive tool like Pegasus in category, not a one-off app vulnerability — to convey the severity of Apple's rare backport decision. No SIEM required; the MDM compliance report and a one-page risk summary are sufficient for this briefing.

Evidence: Attach the timestamped MDM compliance export (from Step 1) to the leadership briefing as supporting evidence — this documents the exposure window (devices on unpatched iOS 18 between DarkSword's known activity period and patch deployment). If any devices are in regulated data environments (handling PII, PHI, or PCI-scoped data), flag them explicitly as potential breach notification triggers requiring legal review, per escalation protocol. Document the briefing date and attendees as an IR record under NIST IR-5 (Incident Monitoring).

Step 7: Monitor Apple Support advisory — track the iOS 18 / iPadOS 18 security content page for CVE assignments, expanded technical disclosure, and any follow-on patches as Apple supplements initial advisories

NIST Phase: Post Incident

Reference: NIST 800-61r3 §4 — Post-Incident Activity: maintaining situational awareness after initial remediation as vendor disclosure evolves and new indicators emerge

Controls: NIST SI-5 (Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives) — Apple's security content pages are a primary advisory source; monitoring for CVE assignment and technical expansion is a required SI-5 activity, NIST IR-5 (Incident Monitoring) — post-patch monitoring must include tracking vendor advisory updates for DarkSword, as initial advisories are frequently supplemented with additional CVEs and affected component details, NIST AU-6 (Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting) — when Apple assigns CVEs and discloses technical details, re-analyze MTD and MDM logs from the exposure window against the newly disclosed indicators, CIS 7.1 (Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process) — advisory monitoring is a documented component of the vulnerability management process; assign a named owner to track the Apple security content page for this advisory

Compensating: Set a browser-based alert or RSS feed on Apple's security releases page (support.apple.com/en-us/100100) — Apple publishes RSS for security updates and this requires no tooling budget. Supplement with a free CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog check (cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog) — if DarkSword's associated CVEs are added to KEV, federal-adjacent organizations have a 14-day binding remediation deadline regardless of patch window policy. Assign one team member to check both sources weekly and log updates to the DarkSword threat register entry created in Step 5.

Evidence: When Apple releases CVE IDs for DarkSword-related vulnerabilities, immediately re-run log queries against the exposure window (from first Apple advisory date to patch deployment completion date) using the newly disclosed component names as search terms in MDM logs, MTD alert history, and any iOS unified log captures preserved in Step 4. Document each advisory update with its date, newly disclosed CVEs, and whether the disclosure changes the forensic artifact set or detection signatures — this retrospective analysis is the primary post-incident forensic value of advisory monitoring.

Detection Guidance

Given the technique mapping and CWE profile, security teams should focus detection efforts on the following:

Device-side behavioral signals: Anomalous privilege escalation events on iOS devices; unexpected kernel extensions or process injection patterns if MDM telemetry exposes them; apps requesting permissions inconsistent with their declared function (T1417 input capture overlap).

Network-layer signals: Unusual outbound connections from managed iOS devices to unfamiliar infrastructure, particularly over non-standard application layer protocols (T1437); DNS queries to newly registered or low-reputation domains from mobile device traffic.

MDM and UEM telemetry: Devices that have not accepted the patch within your defined SLA window; devices where MDM enrollment has been disrupted or compliance status has changed unexpectedly (potential T1629 defense impairment).

App integrity: Review any recently sideloaded or enterprise-distributed applications for repackaging indicators (T1458); validate code signing and provisioning profile legitimacy for all non-App Store apps in your fleet.

Log sources to prioritize: MDM compliance and patch status logs, mobile threat defense (MTD) event logs, network proxy or DNS logs segmented by device type, and any unified endpoint management (UEM) enrollment anomaly alerts.

Note: No confirmed IOC values (hashes, IPs, domains) were available from verified primary sources at analysis time. Behavioral hunting is the appropriate posture until Apple releases confirmed indicators. Monitor the Apple Support advisory (support.apple.com/en-us/121250) for any updates with confirmed indicators of compromise as Apple releases supplemental technical disclosure.

Framework Mappings

MITRE-ATTACK

- **T1422** — System Network Configuration Discovery
- **T1404** — Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- **T1417** — Input Capture
- **T1458** — Replication Through Removable Media

- **T1629** — Impair Defenses
- **T1437** — Application Layer Protocol

OWASP-TOP10-2021

- **A01:2021** — Broken Access Control
- **A03:2021** — Injection

NIST-800-53R5

- **AC-6** — Least Privilege
- **SI-16** — Memory Protection
- **SI-10** — Information Input Validation
- **AC-3** — Access Enforcement

CIS-V8

- **5.4** — Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts
- **6.8** — Define and Maintain Role-Based Access Control
- **16.10** — Apply Secure Design Principles in Application Architectures
- **6.1** — Establish an Access Granting Process
- **6.2** — Establish an Access Revoking Process
- **7.3** — Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management
- **7.4** — Perform Automated Application Patch Management

SOC2-TSC

- **CC6.1** — The entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures over protected information assets
- **CC6.3** — Authorizes, modifies, or removes access

HIPAA-SECURITY

- **164.312(a)(1)** — Access Control

ISO-27001-2022

- **A.8.8** — Management of technical vulnerabilities

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID	Technique Name	Tactic
T1422	System Network Configuration Discovery	Discovery
T1404	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Privilege-Escalation
T1417	Input Capture	Collection
T1458	Replication Through Removable Media	Initial-Access

Technique ID	Technique Name	Tactic
T1629	Impair Defenses	Defense-Evasion
T1437	Application Layer Protocol	Command-And-Control

Sources

Source	URL	Tier
Security News	https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint-security/apple-patches-darkswo...	T3
About the security content of iOS 18 and iPadOS 18 - Apple Support	https://support.apple.com/en-us/121250	T3
A new iPhone hacking tool puts some iOS 18 users at risk - Engadget	https://www.engadget.com/cybersecurity/a-new-iphone-hacking-tool-pu...	T3
Apple Updates iOS 18 and iPadOS 18 to Address 'DarkSword ...	https://www.thurrott.com/apple/334445/apple-updates-ios-18-and-ipad...	T3
Security Vulnerabilities : r/ios - Reddit	https://www.reddit.com/r/ios/comments/1q9ugxx/security_vulnerabilit...	T3

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